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TAXING CITIZENS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY
MICHAEL S. KIRSCH*
This Article addresses a fundamental issue underlying the U.S. tax system in the
international context: the use of citizenship as a jurisdictional basis for imposing
income tax. As a general matter, the United States is the only economically devel-
oped country that taxes its citizens abroad on their foreign income.
Despite this broad assertion of taxing jurisdiction, Congress allows citizens abroad
to exclude from taxation a limited amount of income earned from working outside
the United States. Influential lobbying groups, including businesses that employ
significant numbers of U.S. citizens abroad, argue that this exclusion is necessary in
order to keep American business competitive overseas. Recently, these groups have
argued that modern developments, including lowered barriers to trade and the
increased mobility of workers, strengthen this argument, and that the United States
must allow an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, or perhaps abandon citi-
zenship-based taxation altogether, in order to remain competitive.
This Article analyzes how modern developments in the global economy affect the
case for citizenship-based taxation. The Article concludes that recent globalization
trends strengthen, rather than weaken, the case for taxing U.S. citizens living
abroad. Moreover, it concludes that these modern developments weaken the case
for giving preferential treatment to income earned by citizens working abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, policymakers and commentators have increas-
ingly asked whether existing U.S. income tax principles are adequate
to handle the challenges posed by an ever-more globalized economy.'
In particular, they have questioned whether tax policies developed in
the early or mid-twentieth century are appropriate in an era of instan-
taneous communication and information sharing, inexpensive and
rapid transportation, and lowered barriers to cross-border flows of
capital investment, goods, and personal services.:
These recent developments raise significant jurisdictional issues
in the international context. A fundamental question concerns the
extent to which the United States exercises taxing jurisdiction over
persons with connections to more than one country. Recent analysis
of this threshold question has focused on the business income of U.S.-
based multinational corporations.
3
This Article instead focuses on individuals, addressing the United
States' longstanding use of citizenship as a jurisdictional basis upon
which to impose income tax. With certain exceptions, the United
States taxes the worldwide income of its citizens regardless of whether
the citizen lives in the United States or abroad. On this issue, the
United States has long been an outlier in the international community.
No other economically developed country utilizes citizenship as a
basis upon which to tax income arising outside its borders.4 Even
among less economically developed countries, only Eritrea exercises
general income-taxing jurisdiction over its citizens living abroad.
5
I See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SELECTED TAX
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3 (1996), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/internet.pdf ("[T]echnological developments
dictate that the Internal Revenue Code and generally accepted principles of international
tax policy be reexamined."); Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX
LAW. 649, 657-58 (2006) (report authored by task force convened by American Bar Asso-
ciation, Section of Taxation) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] (describing need for tax
policy to consider recent changes in global economy and business practice).
2 For a more detailed discussion of these economic and political changes, see ABA
Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 657; infra Part If.
3 See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 746-55 (focusing on whether long-
standing test for defining corporate residence continues to make sense in world of modern
multinational corporate groups); Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corpo-
rate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Mul-
tinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 544-80 (2005) (same).
4 See infra note 15. Some countries apply an expanded definition of "resident" to
continue taxing such income, but only to citizens who move abroad for limited periods of
time. See infra note 15.
5 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., ISSUES PRESENTED BY PRO-
POSALS TO MODIFY THE TAX TREATMENT OF EXPATRIATION app. B, at 1 (Comm. Print
1995) ("The Philippines and Eritrea also tax their nonresident citizens on their worldwide
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The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) contains certain limita-
tions on this broad assertion of citizenship-based taxation. In partic-
ular, since 1926 Congress has allowed U.S. citizens living and working
abroad to exclude at least some earned income (i.e., income from
work, rather than investments) from tax.6 Although the original for-
eign earned income exclusion contained no cap, during the past half
century Congress has limited the amount that can be excluded from
income under this provision.7
Influential groups opposed to the U.S. taxation of citizens abroad
would like to focus public and legislative attention on this issue. 8 In
particular, they would like Congress to abandon citizenship-based tax-
ation altogether or, at a minimum, allow an unlimited exclusion for
income earned by citizens working abroad.
Calls for the elimination (or significant curtailment) of income
tax on U.S. citizens living overseas share a core argument with recent
calls for lessening the tax burden on U.S.-based multinational corpo-
rations. In both contexts, advocates argue that existing rules fail to
account for modern developments in the global economy, thereby
income."); Mihir A. Desai et al., Sharing the Spoils: Taxing International Human Capital
Flows, 11 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 663, 678 (2004) ("[Tlhree countries-the United States,
the Philippines, and Eritrea-use citizenship as the basis of ongoing taxation."). Although
these sources list the Philippines as a country that generally taxes citizens abroad, the
Philippines abandoned that approach in 1997. Tax Reform Act of 1997, Rep. Act No. 8424,
§ 23(c) (Phil.); cf Dennis C. Serfino, Govt Drafting Bill to Take Back OFWs' Tax-Exempt
Privilege, MANILA TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national!
2005/dec/07/yehey/business/20051207bus3.html (describing recent Philippine legislative
proposals to reinstate taxation of nonresident citizens). Mexico taxed the income of its
citizens abroad until 1981. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, app. B, at 1. The
Eritrean regime has met with little success. Desai et al., supra, at 689 n.39. Interest groups
representing U.S. citizens overseas have also asserted that North Korea and Vietnam tax
their citizens working abroad. See AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN H.K., TAXATION OF
AMERICANS WORKING OVERSEAS 1-2, available at http://www.amcham.org.hk/pr/position
_papers/taxation-of-americans.pdf. Given the unique circumstances in North Korea, it can
be assumed that the purported tax rule for that country has little practical effect.
6 See infra Parts I.B-C. Another important limitation is the foreign tax credit, which
reduces a U.S. citizen's tax to the extent that a foreign country also taxes the citizen's
foreign income, thereby avoiding double taxation. I.R.C. §§ 901(a)-(c), 903, 904(a) (2000).
The foreign tax credit is discussed infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
7 For example, under current law a U.S. citizen who satisfies certain foreign residency
tests can exclude up to $82,400 of foreign earned income, plus some housing expenses in
excess of a threshold amount. I.R.C. § 911(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2006); Rev. Proc. 2006-51,
2006-47 I.R.B. 945. Other income remains taxable, including a citizen's foreign earned
income in excess of the excluded amounts, as well as income earned from working in the
United States and any investment income. Recent amendments to the foreign earned
income exclusion are discussed infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
8 In May 2006, Congress modified the foreign earned income exclusion as a last-
minute revenue raiser in an unrelated tax bill, generating significant postenactment opposi-
tion from overseas citizens and business interests. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying
text.
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hampering the economic competitiveness of the United States in the
worldwide marketplace. 9 Because the most recent large-scale con-
gressional reconsideration of the taxation of citizens overseas
occurred more than a quarter century ago, before these globalization
developments, the time is ripe for a reexamination of the issue.
This Article considers whether recent economic, technological,
and other developments support calls to abandon or significantly cur-
tail individual taxation based on citizenship. 10 Whereas this author
and others have argued that modern developments undermine the
continuing viability of place of incorporation as the principal touch-
stone for imposing worldwide taxation on corporations," this Article
suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, that these modern developments
strengthen the case for using citizenship as a basis for taxing individ-
uals who live outside the United States.
Part I of this Article discusses the historical development of the
United States' reliance on citizenship as a jurisdictional basis for taxa-
tion. By focusing on the contemporaneous justifications provided for
the expansion and contraction of citizenship-based taxing jurisdiction,
the historical analysis provides an important frame of reference for
addressing citizenship-based taxation in the modern era. Part II pro-
9 For example, a recent op-ed article at washingtonpost.com begins with the warning
that "[gIlobalization is sending tax rates tumbling across the world, as jobs and capital
migrate across borders .... [This] makes it all the more imperative not only to roll back
the recent tax increases on U.S. expatriates, but to eliminate double-taxation of overseas
Americans altogether." Daniel J. Mitchell, Editorial, Tax Me Once, Shame on You... Tax
Me Twice and the System Needs Fixing, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 28, 2006, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/27/AR2006062701022.html. A Wall
Street Journal op-ed piece appearing on the same day claimed that the taxation of citizens
abroad "make[s] American business less competitive in the global economy." Newt
Gingrich & Ken Kies, Editorial, Our Taxed Expats, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2006, at A14; see
also, The Tithes That Bind, ECONOMIST, June 24, 2006, at 12-13 (citing globalization as
principal reason for eliminating tax on citizens working abroad).
10 International law generally focuses on "nationality" rather than "citizenship." As a
technical matter, a person can be a national of a country yet not be a citizen, although
under U.S. law the distinction has little practical relevance today. See Miller v. Albright,
523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The distinction has little practical
impact today ... for the only remaining noncitizen nationals are residents of American
Samoa and Swains Island."); cf. Alison Christians, Taxing the Global Worker: Three
Spheres of International Social Security Coordination, 26 VA. TAX REv. 81, 105 n.102
(2006) (noting that several U.S. social security totalization agreements apply to both citi-
zens and nationals). In accordance with the general usage in the Code, this article focuses
on citizenship. Federal tax law generally relies on the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) to determine whether a person is a citizen. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(c) (as amended
in 1974); Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375,
380-83 (2006) (discussing historic reliance on INA). But see id. (criticizing recently
enacted I.R.C. sections 877(g) and 7701(n), which in rare circumstances create special defi-
nitions of citizenship for tax purposes).
1 See supra note 3.
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vides a brief summary of recent economic, technological, and other
changes in the international context, with particular emphasis on
those factors relevant to the taxation of citizens abroad.
Part III considers a broad array of potential justifications for citi-
zenship-based taxation. It concludes that developments in the past
few decades strengthen, rather than weaken, the case for taxing the
income of citizens abroad, regardless of whether the income is earned
from working or arises from investments. Part IV addresses whether
other considerations-specifically, concerns about American competi-
tiveness in the twenty-first century global economy-warrant the
exclusion of income earned by U.S. citizens working abroad. The
analysis concludes that these concerns do not present a convincing
case for the foreign earned income exclusion. Part V briefly discusses
possible legislative proposals that flow from the analysis in the prior
parts.
I
THE RISE AND (PARTIAL) FALL OF CITIZENSHIP-
BASED TAXATION
While each country establishes its own income tax regime in
accordance with its unique needs,12 its choices reflect a significant
amount of convergence regarding the parameters for taxing income
that arises in an international setting. For example, all countries rec-
ognize (and most countries, including the United States, exercise) the
right of a country to tax income of a foreign person that arises within
the country's borders (so-called source-based taxation). 13 In addition,
all countries recognize (and many countries, including the United
States, 14 exercise) the right of a country to tax residents' income
12 As Professor Graetz observed in the general context of international tax policy, "Tax
policy decisions, including decisions regarding a country's tax treatment of international
income, should be, and inevitably are, decided based on a nation's capacity, culture, eco-
nomics, politics, and history." Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 279 (2001).
13 See FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT, AM. LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION: PROPOSALS ON U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PER-
SONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS 4-7 (1987); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 411 & rep.
notes (1987). Despite the unquestioned right to exercise source-based jurisdiction, some
countries, including the United States, choose not to exercise that right with respect to
certain income arising within their borders. For example, in order to encourage foreign
persons to invest in U.S. portfolio debt securities and to hold U.S. bank deposits, the
United States generally does not tax their interest income from these instruments. I.R.C.
§ 871(h)-(i) (West Supp. 2006).
14 See I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 2006) (establishing tax rates); Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as
amended in 1974). Section 1 of the Code does not differentiate among citizens, residents,
and nonresidents, thereby implying that all individuals are subject to tax on all of their
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(regardless of citizenship), even if that income arises outside of the
country's borders (so-called residence-based taxation). Almost all
countries ignore citizenship in creating taxing jurisdiction. 15
The United States, however, has a long history of taxing citizens
on at least some of their worldwide income, even if the citizen resides
outside the United States and the income is from foreign sources.
This Part examines the historical development of citizenship-based
taxation, paying particular attention to the contemporaneous justifica-
tions given for the expansion and contraction of this jurisdictional
exercise. This brief overview illustrates how the country's tax policy
has responded to changing perceptions of citizens abroad, as well as
changing developments in global economic affairs.
A. Establishing Citizenship as a Jurisdictional Basis
1. Civil War Tax Acts
Although historical analysis of the income tax (and the taxation
of citizens abroad) usually begins with the enactment of the "modern"
income tax in 1913,16 citizenship-based income taxation of overseas
Americans dates back to the Civil War. Congress enacted the first
U.S. income tax in 1861, shortly after the outbreak of the war. 17 The
income. Other sections of the Code, however, make clear that only source-based taxation
applies to nonresident alien individuals. I.R.C. § 2(d) (2000).
15 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at app. B (describing other
countries' practices); HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXA-
TION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347 (2d ed. 2004) ("Unlike other jurisdictions, the United
States . . . asserts personal [taxing] jurisdiction based on citizenship."). As a practical
matter, this statement must be qualified. Many countries, including Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, use expansive
definitions of "resident" to continue to tax citizens who move abroad for temporary
periods. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REVIEW OF THE PRESENT-
LAW TAX AND IMMIGRATION TREATMENT OF RELINQUISHMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND TER-
MINATION OF LONG-TERM RESIDENCY 140-48 (Comm. Print 2003) (explaining various
regimes); AULT & ARNOLD, supra, at 351-53 (same); see also Charles I. Kingson, A Some-
what Different View, 34 TAX LAW. 737, 738 (1981) (pointing out that claims that "only the
US does it" are slightly exaggerated); cf. Case C-513/03, Heirs of M.E.A. van Hilten, 11
45-52 (European Court of Justice Feb.23, 2006), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0513:EN:HTML (upholding Dutch law that continues to
treat national as resident for inheritance tax purposes for ten years after terminating
residence).
16 The 1913 tax was "modern" in the sense that it was enacted after ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. An income tax has been in effect at all
times since.
17 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, repealed by Act of July 1, 1862, ch.
119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473. Although a federal income tax had been proposed by the
Secretary of the Treasury during the War of 1812, that proposal never became law. EDWIN
R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 430 (2d ed. 1914); Joseph A. Hill, The Civil
War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 416 (1894). For early discussions of the legislative
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statute taxed residents of the United States (including resident citi-
zens) on their worldwide income, imposing a three percent rate on
income in excess of eight hundred dollars. 18 In contrast, nonresident
citizens were taxed only on income arising from "property, securities,
or stock owned in the United States," 19 but with no exemption
amount and at a five percent rate.20 Congress repealed the statute the
following year, before any taxes were actually collected, and enacted a
new one in its place. 21 The 1862 income tax statute22 contained a sim-
ilar distinction between citizens residing in the United States and
those residing abroad.
23
Because nonresident citizens were taxed only on their U.S. source
income (rather than their worldwide income), these provisions appear
to reflect a failure to assert citizenship-based jurisdiction. In context,
however, the statutes reflect an attempt to ensure that citizens abroad
paid their fair share of taxes under very roughly defined equity princi-
background of the Civil War tax acts, see SELIGMAN, supra, at 430-92; HARRY EDWIN
SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM 1861 TO 1871, at
45-97 (1914); Hill, supra, at 416-44. For more recent treatments, see generally SIDNEY
RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 57-110 (1967); STEVEN R. WEISMAN,
THE GREAT TAX WARS 9-104 (2002); Joe Thorndike, An Army of Officials: The Civil War
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 93 TAX NOTES 1739 (2001).
18 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, repealed by Act of July 1, 1862, ch.
119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473.
19 Id. Nonresident aliens were not taxed on their income arising from U.S. property.
20 Id.
21 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473 (repealed 1865). Because no
income tax was actually assessed under the 1861 legislation before its repeal, the 1862 Act
is often viewed as the first income tax. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1954) (describing political pressure to enact effective income tax in
1862); SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 435 (describing Treasury Secretary's reluctance to
enforce 1861 law); Hill, supra note 17, at 423 ("Under [the 1862 legislation] the income tax
first went into operation. The income tax sections of the act of 1861 had never been
enforced, and were now repealed.").
22 The 1862 tax act was actually enforced. For a comprehensive history of the imple-
mentation of the Civil War tax administration apparatus, see generally Thorndike, supra
note 17.
23 The 1862 legislation imposed progressive rates on persons (including citizens)
residing in the United States: a three percent rate for persons with incomes up to $10,000,
and five percent for incomes in excess of $10,000. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat.
432, 473. In both situations, a person residing in the United States was allowed to exclude
the first $600 of income. Id. With respect to citizens residing abroad, the 1862 Act
imposed a five percent rate on all income arising from U.S. sources with no exemption
amount. Id. Thus, for incomes up to $10,000, the nonresident citizen incurred a higher tax
rate than did a resident citizen, while for incomes over $10,000, the rates were.the same
(although the nonresident citizen was not allowed to exclude the first $600 of income). Cf.
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2486 (1862) (statement of Sen. Simmons) (suggesting,
in response to ultimately unsuccessful attempt to add seven and one-half percent rate
bracket for incomes over $50,000, that all income of citizens residing abroad should be
taxed at that highest rate).
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pies. In the context of the war and the realities of nineteenth-century
communications and international relations, it would have been
extremely difficult to collect tax on the foreign-source income of a
domestic citizen, let alone a citizen living abroad. 24 The tax base from
which the government could realistically collect taxes centered largely
on income arising from property in the United States. By subjecting
this income of citizens abroad to a higher rate and denying the exemp-
tion amount, the net result was a higher effective rate on citizens
abroad than on those in the United States with respect to the income
over which the United States could most easily collect tax.
A senator who served as a manager in the conference committee
that adopted the 1861 tax law described the purpose of taxing citizens
abroad at a higher rate:
[A] distinction is made as to the income tax between resident citi-
zens and non-resident citizens of the United States. We do not
desire that our citizens who have incomes in this country... should
go out of the country, reside in Paris or elsewhere, avoiding the risk
of being drafted or contributing anything personally to the require-
ments of the country at this time, and get off with as low a tax as
anybody else. The law .. makes a difference to those persons of
two percent in the income tax on account of the obligations which
are avoided by those who reside abroad, and endured by those who
stay at home.... If a man draws his income from our public debt, or
from property here, and resides in Paris, skulking away from con-
tributing his personal support to the Government in this day of its
extremity, he ought to pay a higher income tax.25
Thus, the 1861 and 1862 legislation reflect a desire to make citizens
abroad pay extra tax as a way to compensate for failing to contribute
their personal efforts to the Union "in this day of its extremity. '2 6
In 1864 Congress revised the tax laws to apply to income of
"every person residing in the United States, or of any citizen of the
United States residing abroad," regardless of whether the income
arose "in the United States or elsewhere. '27 With this modification,
24 As discussed infra Part III.A.3, these enforcement concerns still exist.
25 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2661 (1864) (statement of Sen. Collamer)
(reflecting on 1862 legislation).
26 Id.; cf. RATNER, supra note 17, at 86 (referring in passing to 1862 Act's "invidious
distinction" between rates on citizens living in United States and those living abroad).
Congress could also have imposed the higher rate on citizens abroad "with the idea... that
these citizens by spending their incomes in a foreign country were evading the taxes on
consumption which our laws imposed." Hill, supra note 17, at 426; see also Thorndike,
supra note 17, at 1746 n.49 (claiming that higher rate for overseas citizens compensated for
U.S. consumption taxes avoided while living abroad).
27 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281, amended by Act of Mar. 3,
1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 469, 479 (providing for tax collection until December 31, 1866)
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the 1864 legislation eliminated the disparity in rates between residents
and U.S. citizens abroad but extended the tax base for nonresident
citizens to include foreign source income rather than just income
arising in the United States. Thus, for the first time, Congress used
citizenship as a jurisdictional basis for imposing income tax on an indi-
vidual's worldwide income. Although the 1864 legislative record does
not provide an explicit rationale for the move to worldwide taxation
based on citizenship, 28 the shift occurred at a time when the meaning
and importance of federal citizenship had seized the national con-
sciousness.29 Congress included similar provisions taxing the world-
wide income of citizens abroad in subsequent amendments to the tax
laws 30 until the Civil War-era income taxes eventually expired in
1872.31 Ultimately, the Civil War-era statutes collected only a small
amount of income tax from citizens residing abroad.
32
and Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 478 (providing for tax collection until
December 31, 1868). Four days after the enactment of the 1864 Act, Congress passed an
additional one-time five percent income tax on both "persons residing within the United
States, [and] citizens of the United States residing abroad" in order to fund military enlist-
ment bonuses. H.R.J. Res. 77, 38th Cong. (1864); SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 446 (noting
purpose of additional tax).
28 Senator Collamer, who preferred the 1862 legislation's approach (i.e., taxing only the
U.S. source income of the citizen abroad, but at a higher rate) stated that he did "not know
exactly upon what ground" the House proposed the 1864 approach. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2661 (1864). Senator Collamer did not address the possibility that a
broader tax base (i.e., the inclusion of foreign source income of citizens abroad), while
raising significant compliance and enforcement issues, might result in a greater relative tax
liability than would a smaller tax base with a higher rate.
29 See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZEN-
SHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 243-346 (1997) (discussing changing views of federal citizenship
during Civil War and Reconstruction eras). See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
app. at 1 (1863) (message from President Lincoln) (discussing diplomatic problems that
had arisen with respect to protecting U.S. citizens overseas); Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249,
§ 3, 15 Stat. 223, 224 (emphasizing President's duty to intervene whenever foreign govern-
ment unjustly deprives U.S. citizen of liberty).
30 See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 469, 479 (imposing five percent tax on
income between $600 and $5000, and ten percent tax on income in excess of $5000); Act of
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 478 (imposing five percent tax on income over
$1000); Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257 (imposing 2.5% tax on income in
1870 and 1871).
31 The Act of July 14, 1870 lowered the previously existing rates and provided that the
income tax would no longer apply after 1871. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. at
257.
32 According to the annual reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, during
the years 1863-65, citizens residing abroad paid only $230,470 of income taxes (out of a
total $84,015,918 of income taxes paid by all taxpayers during those years). See SELIGMAN,
supra note 17, at 480 tbl. 1 (compiling data from Commissioner of Internal Revenue
annual reports). Because of the difficulty of estimating the relative actual incomes of citi-
zens abroad and citizens within the United States during that period, it is not possible to
determine the relative level of tax compliance of citizens abroad for those years.
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2. 1894 Tax Act
In 1894, more than twenty years after the Civil War income tax
had expired, Congress again enacted an income tax.33 Although the
1894 income tax was held to be unconstitutional the following year
34
and thus was never enforced, 35 it adopted an approach to citizenship-
based taxation similar to the 1864 tax law, taxing the worldwide
income of "every citizen of the United States, whether residing at
home or abroad.
'36
During the brief legislative discussion over the language of the
1894 Act, Senator George Hoar stated that the purpose of the provi-
sion was to ensure that "if an American citizen went abroad and car-
ried the protection of his country, of his citizenship with him, he did
not escape its burdens. ' 37 Echoing the concerns that had been raised
thirty years earlier,38 Senator Hoar observed:
There are a great many people, I am sorry to say, who go abroad for
that very purpose [of avoiding tax], and some of them went abroad
during the late [Civil W]ar. They lived in luxury, at the same time at
less cost, in a foreign capital; they had none of the voluntary obliga-
tions which rest upon citizens, of charity, or contributions, or sup-
porting churches, or anything of that sort, and they escaped
taxation.3
9
Thus, the legislative history of the Civil War tax acts and the 1894
legislation reflect unfavorable views of citizens living abroad, por-
traying them as living in luxury while avoiding the burdens of citizen-
ship. Unlike the original tax acts in 1861 and 1862, which purported to
penalize citizens abroad by subjecting some of their income to higher
rates, the subsequent nineteenth-century provisions focused on equity,
attempting to ensure that citizens abroad did not receive more
favorable tax treatment than those at home.
33 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553, invalidated by Pollack v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
34 See Pollack, 158 U.S. at 637 (holding entire income tax scheme invalid because cer-
tain aspects, unrelated to taxation of citizens abroad, violated Apportionment Clause).
35 See Charlotte Crane, The Income Tax and the Burden of Perfection, 100 Nw. U. L.
REV. 171, 171 & n.2 (2006) (describing delay in 1894 Act's enforcement pending Supreme
Court decision on its validity).
36 § 27, 28 Stat. at 553.
37 26 CONG. REC. 6632 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hoar); cf. id. at 6632-33 (discussing
change in statutory language to clarify that tax applied to citizens "whether residing at
home or abroad").
38 See supra text accompanying note 25.
39 26 CONG. REC. 6632-33 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
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3. The "Modern" Income Tax
Shortly after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in
1913, Congress enacted the first "modern" income tax. Continuing
the tradition of the 1864 and 1894 laws, the 1913 Act applied to "every
citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad,"
imposing tax on "the entire net income arising or accruing from all
sources. ' 40 All subsequent versions of the federal tax laws have con-
tinued to use citizenship as a jurisdictional basis for taxing worldwide
income.
41
Unlike the earlier income tax provisions applicable to citizens
abroad that generated little attention, the relevant provisions of the
1913 Act and subsequent legislation were taken more seriously by tax
authorities and taxpayers. 42 Several factors might explain the height-
ened attention given to these provisions. One factor is the very dif-
ferent position in international affairs the United States occupied in
40 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166.
41 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1(a), 39 Stat. 756, 756 (repealed 1918)
(taxing both citizens and residents of United States); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 210, 40
Stat. 1057, 1062 (1919) (same); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 210, 42 Stat. 227, 233
(repealed 1924) (same). When the federal income tax laws were codified as the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, and later as the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1986, the
general use of citizenship as a jurisdictional basis to tax was retained. See Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939, ch. 2, §§ 11, 211, 53 Stat. 1, 5, 75 (superseded by Internal Revenue
Code of 1954) (imposing tax on all individuals, with section 211 setting out guidelines and
limitations for nonresident aliens); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 1, 68A Stat.
3, 5 (imposing tax on all individuals, while maintaining certain exemptions permitted in
I.R.C. § 2(d) (2000) for nonresident aliens); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 1, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-99 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 2006)) (same);
see also supra note 14 (noting that source-based taxation only applies to nonresident alien
individuals, not citizens).
42 See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text. The citizenship-based tax provision of
the 1913 Act also received attention from U.S. diplomatic officials. Under the then-
existing nationality law, a citizen was presumed to have abandoned U.S. citizenship if he
resided abroad for a protracted period, unless he overcame the presumption with "satisfac-
tory evidence." ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX UNDER THE
Acr OF 1913, at 153 n.5 (2d ed. 1915). Soon after enactment of the 1913 Act, Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan informed consular officers overseas that payment of income
tax liability was a relevant factor in determining whether a person could overcome this
presumption and therefore obtain a passport or receive consular protection. Letter from
W.J. Bryan, Sec'y of State, to The American Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Mar. 18,
1914), in FOSTER, supra, at 153 n.5. For earlier examples of the Secretary of State treating
nonpayment of taxes as a factor in determining abandonment of citizenship, and therefore
denying a person U.S. consular protection, see PRENTISS WEBSTER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 221-22 (Albany, Matthew Bender 1891).
Today, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967),
a person no longer can lose U.S. citizenship merely by committing a particular act, unless
the act is done with the intention to lose citizenship. See generally Kirsch, supra note 10, at
381-83 (describing current constitutional, statutory, and administrative procedures for
renouncing U.S. citizenship).
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1913 than it had during the Civil War era. During the earlier period,
the country was not yet a major power; indeed, it was struggling for its
very existence. In contrast, by 1913, and particularly after World War
I, the United States had become a significant world power that was
more engaged in international business and political affairs.43 Conse-
quently, many U.S.-based manufacturing corporations that were
attempting to expand sales into foreign markets took an interest in the
tax treatment of the U.S. citizens they employed abroad. Another
important factor concerned the machinery of tax administration.
During the Civil War era, significant effort was needed to create a
basic tax enforcement agency,44 whereas an existing tax collection
agency already was in place in 1913.4 5
Because the United States taxed the worldwide income of its citi-
zens and residents, the potential for multiple taxation existed.4 6 In
particular, if a U.S. taxpayer had income from foreign sources, that
foreign country might impose its own tax under source-based princi-
ples. In the Revenue Act of 1918, 4 7 Congress enacted a credit for for-
eign taxes paid by a U.S. taxpayer. The House debate over this
legislation indicates that the foreign tax credit was enacted not only
out of a sense of fairness,48 but also to maintain the competitiveness of
U.S. corporations and to eliminate an incentive for U.S. citizens to
43 Even during the late-nineteenth century, some U.S.-based companies had already
begun expanding abroad. See infra note 106 (discussing Singer Sewing Machine Com-
pany). Even by the time of the short-lived 1894 tax act, tax policymakers were comparing
the "former times" when things were relatively "simple" with the "modern" times of
increasing capital and labor mobility. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATnON 98-99
(Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1969) (1895).
44 Indeed, the original 1861 income tax failed principally because of a lack of an effec-
tive collection and enforcement mechanism. See SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 435 (noting
income tax provisions of 1861 Act were never enforced); Hill, supra note 17, at 423 (same).
45 For example, the Bureau of Internal Revenue already was enforcing the Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins
of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 132-33 (1990) (describing Bureau's role in
enforcing 1909 legislation); cf SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 529 (having learned from slow
administrative start-up during Civil War era, Commissioner of Internal Revenue had made
"comprehensive preparations" in anticipation of 1894 Act, but those efforts became moot
due to Supreme Court's prompt invalidation of 1894 Act). Of course, even with improved
administrative capabilities, significant enforcement issues remained inherent in collecting
tax from citizens residing abroad. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
46 Numerous commentators focused on this potential for double taxation soon after the
enactment of the 1913 statute. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 517-18 (basing oppo-
sition to citizenship-based taxation, in part, on potential for multiple taxation).
47 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073 (1919) (repealed 1921).
48 The foreign tax credit was referred to as a "just provision." 56 CONG. REC. app. at
677-78 (1918) (statement of Rep. Kitchin); see also Graetz, supra note 12, at 296 (quoting
recollections of T.S. Adams, influential figure in adoption of foreign tax credit).
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renounce their citizenship.49 The foreign tax credit remains a funda-
mental part of U.S. income tax law today, although in much altered
form. 50
The foreign tax credit reflects an acknowledgment that the
country in which income arises has the first claim on taxing that
income, and that a country exercising residence-based (or citizenship-
based) taxation will only collect tax on that foreign income to the
extent the source country does not. As a result of the foreign tax
credit, U.S. taxpayers who pay relatively high rates of foreign income
tax on their foreign-source income owe little or no residual U.S.
income tax on that income.51 However, U.S. taxpayers who pay rela-
tively low rates of foreign income tax on their foreign-source income
would owe residual U.S. tax on that income even after claiming the
credit.
4. Constitutional Validation
The Supreme Court's 1924 decision in Cook v. Tait52 marked the
final stage in the establishment of U.S. citizenship as a jurisdictional
basis to impose income tax. A U.S. citizen residing in Mexico chal-
lenged Congress's power to tax his income arising in Mexico. 53 In
upholding the tax, the Court stated that the power to tax did not
depend on the situs of the property or the domicile of the citizen but is
instead based "upon his relation as citizen to the United States and
the relation of the latter to him as citizen. ' 54 In explaining that rela-
tionship, the court focused on the benefits of citizenship, observing
that "the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his
property wherever found and, therefore, has the power to make the
benefit complete. '55
49 56 CONG. REC. app. at 677-78 (1918) (statement of Rep. Kitchin). Soon after the
enactment of the 1913 Act, the New York Times reported that the new tax law had induced
several individuals residing abroad to renounce their U.S. citizenship and obtain citizen-
ship in their countries of residence. To Become British Because of Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1914, at 4.
50 See I.R.C. §§ 901, 903-904 (2000) (setting out credit allowance and limitations).
51 Indeed, because of the broad manner in which the original foreign tax credit was
structured, such a taxpayer might also have been able to use the foreign tax credit to mini-
mize his U.S. income tax on his U.S.-source income. In 1921 Congress enacted a limitation
on the foreign tax credit in order to address this problem. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 222(a)(5), 42 Stat. 227, 249 (repealed 1924); cf. I.R.C. § 904 (setting out current version
of foreign tax credit limitation, under which potential tax planning benefits remain).
52 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
53 Id. at 54. The tax had been imposed under the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 210,
42 Stat. 227, 233 (repealed 1924) (cited in Cook, 265 U.S. at 53).
54 Cook, 265 U.S. at 56.
55 Id.
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B. Eighty Years of Exceptions
With the global spread of U.S. business interests after World War
I, affected taxpayers launched active political campaigns against U.S.
taxes on overseas activities, 56 targeting citizenship-based taxation. For
example, in 1923 the Associated American Chambers of Commerce of
China adopted a resolution criticizing the tax's practical impact on
business interests and competition. 57 It noted that other governments
did not require their citizens abroad to pay income taxes and that
"[t]he handicap which this places upon the American citizen in his
competition with the British, Japanese, French, German and other for-
eigners interested in foreign trade in this part of the world is self-evi-
dent. ' 58 The resolution concluded with a call for "Congress in
framing the next Revenue Bill [to] exempt Americans residing over-
seas and deriving their income from non-American sources from the
operation of current domestic income tax law." 59 As this resolution
illustrates, although the early arguments criticized the tax's impact on
business operations, the requested relief was phrased in terms of
exempting citizens abroad from all U.S. income tax, rather than just
tax on foreign earned income. 6
0
After legislative hearings in which business interests emphasized
the importance of keeping American business competitive in the
world economy,61 Congress provided very generous relief in the Rev-
enue Act of 1926.62 A U.S. citizen was allowed to exclude all "earned
56 See 67 CONG. REc. 3782 (1926) (statement of Richard P. Momsen, president of
American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil) (noting that affected taxpayers began
emphasizing congressional action after their defeat in courts).
57 See Am. Chamber of Commerce of the Phil. Is., American Chambers of China
Approve Income Tax Stand, 3 AM. CHAMBER OF COM. J. (Manila), Dec. 1923, at 9.
58 Id. According to a study conducted in the early 1920s by the National Foreign Trade
Council (NFTC), the United States at the time was the only country that taxed its nationals
abroad on income that they earned from working in their country of residence. See Rev-
enue Revision, 1925: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 69th Cong. 178
(1925) [hereinafter 1925 Ways & Means Hearing] (statement of O.K. Davis, NFTC
representative).
59 Am. Chamber of Commerce of the Phil. Is., supra note 57, at 9.
60 See Am. Chamber of Commerce of the Phil. Is., Congressman Dyer Addresses
Chamber, 3 AM. CHAMBER OF COM. J. (Manila), Mar. 1923, at 7 (summarizing position of
Congressman L.C. Dyer that "the American trader abroad should be relieved of all
domestic taxes, particularly the income tax").
61 The NFTC representative, after emphasizing the new importance of foreign trade,
criticized national policies, such as the taxation of citizens abroad, that "hamper and
restrict" the sales of U.S.-produced goods abroad. 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra
note 58, at 180-81 (statement of O.K. Davis); see also 67 CONG. REC. 3782 (1926) (state-
ment of Richard P. Momsen, president of American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil)
(describing negative impact of national policies on American business abroad).
62 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213(b)(14), 44 Stat. 9, 24-26. For evidence that the
Senate might have agreed to an unlimited exclusion at least in part because of misstate-
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income" received from sources outside the United States, provided
that the individual was a bona fide nonresident of the United States
for more than six months of the taxable year.63 Earned income
included any "wages, salaries, professional fees, and other amounts
received as compensation for personal services. '64 Thus, despite the
strong focus on foreign trade during the legislative hearings, the final
legislation covered a broad range of income from the performance of
services and was not limited to income derived from the sale abroad
of U.S.-produced goods.
65
The testimony supporting the 1926 foreign earned income exclu-
sion painted a very different picture of citizens abroad than had the
Civil War and 1894 legislative debates. Whereas earlier discussions
had focused on independently wealthy individuals residing abroad for
personal pleasure (or even tax avoidance), 66 the 1926 testimony
described an army of hardworking salesmen moving abroad, often at
great personal discomfort and sacrifice, 67 in order to expand their U.S.
employers' (and, accordingly, America's) interests throughout the
world.6
8
Following the enactment of the unlimited foreign earned income
exclusion in 1926, Congress embarked on a still-ongoing struggle with
the provision. Although at times this debate has centered on whether
to repeal the exclusion, 69 most of the legislative activity has focused
ments by the Chairman of the Finance Committee regarding its effects, see ELISABETH A.
OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT 549-50 (1961).
63 Revenue Act of 1926 § 213(b)(14).
64 Revenue Act of 1926 § 209(a)(1).
65 See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 95TH CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK
FORCE ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 16 (Comm. Print 1977) (noting irony of fact that
1926 law was called "foreign trader" exemption, although it was not limited to U.S. citizens
working abroad to sell U.S.-made goods).
66 See supra notes 25, 37-39 and accompanying text.
67 The NFTC representative testified that "it has always been difficult to induce compe-
tent Americans to take up long residence abroad in such countries. They know just as well
as we do that this is God's country, and they would rather live here." 1925 Ways & Means
Hearing, supra note 58, at 182 (statement of O.K. Davis).
68 This shift in attitude was evident in remarks by a U.S. Congressman speaking to U.S.
business representatives in the Philippines a few years earlier. Reports of the speech
described the Congressman as stating:
The old notion that the American who goes abroad to do business must have
something wrong with him . . . no longer holds with a great majority of the
American people. He is no longer regarded as acting from some unworthy
motive, but is looked upon as a trade emissary and as such entitled to every
encouragement.
Am. Chamber of Commerce of the Phil. Is., supra note 60, at 7.
69 See Walter A. Slowinski & B. John Williams, Jr., The Formative Years of the Foreign
Source Earned Income Exclusion: Section 911, 51 TAXES 355, 355 (1973) (observing that
"whenever one of the houses of Congress proposed elimination or drastic alteration of
Section 911 or its predecessors, the other house restored the exclusion"). As recently as
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on defining its contours. 70 The changes have focused on eligibility for
relief,71 the amount of earned income that can be excluded, 72 and
issues concerning administration and potential abuses.
73
For a brief period, from 1978 through 1981, Congress experi-
mented with an alternative to the foreign earned income exclusion
approach. 74 Under the 1978 legislation, Congress continued to
2003 the Senate passed legislation that would repeal the exclusion. See H.R. 2, 108th
Cong. § 350 (as passed by Senate, May 15, 2003) (incorporating S. 1054). The repeal was
dropped by the Conference Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 132-33 (2003)
(Conf. Rep.).
70 The details of these statutory changes to the provision (section 911 of the current
Internal Revenue Code) have been described elsewhere. See OWENS, supra note 62, at
547-52 (legislative history from 1926 through 1960); Pamela B. Gann, The Concept of an
Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit, 38 TAX L. REV. 1, 60-61 & n.176 (1982) (legislative
history from 1926 through 1980); Slowinski & Williams, supra note 69, at 356-62 (legisla-
tive history from 1926 through 1966); Ren6e Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its
Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101, 119-46 (1985) (legislative
history from 1926 through 1981).
71 Eligibility for relief has usually hinged on the amount of time that a person spends
abroad and whether the person is a bona fide resident of a foreign country. See Revenue
Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 148(a), 56 Stat. 798, 841-42 (tightening eligibility by requiring that
taxpayer be "bona fide resident of a foreign country" and increasing length of time to be
spent abroad from six months to one year); Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 321(a), 65 Stat.
452, 498 (loosening eligibility requirements by providing alternative standard for individ-
uals who were physically present in foreign country or countries for at least 510 days-
approximately seventeen months-during an eighteen-month period). The alternative
standard added in 1951 was directed at technicians and other skilled workers who might go
abroad for a particular long-term project but not have the requisite intent to become bona
fide residents of the foreign country. See Slowinski & Williams, supra note 69, at 359.
72 The issue has been whether the exclusion should be unlimited, as it was for some
citizens from 1926 through 1962, or whether it should be capped at a specific dollar amount
as it generally has been since 1962. See 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 58, at 178
(question by Rep. Hull) (suggesting limit to exclusion); Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch.
512, § 204(a), 67 Stat. 615, 618 (capping exclusion at $20,000 for citizens claiming eligibility
through physical presence test); Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 11(a), 76 Stat.
960, 1003-04 (capping exclusion at $20,000 per year for first three years and at $35,000
thereafter for citizens claiming eligibility through bona fide residence test); Revenue Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 237(a), 78 Stat. 19, 128 (lowering $35,000 cap to $25,000); Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1011(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1610 (lowering caps to
$15,000).
73 See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 72(b), 72 Stat. 1606,
1660 (amending I.R.C. § 6012(c)) (requiring filing of tax return by individuals with gross
income of at least $600 to ensure compliance with foreign earned income exclusion); Rev-
enue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 11(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1005 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 6012 (Supp. 2002)) (ensuring that taxpayer takes consistent position in United
States and foreign country regarding bona fide residence status); Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1011(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1610 (eliminating foreign tax credit for
excluded foreign earned income); Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 1011(b)(3) (modifying tax
calculation to tax included income at marginal rate that would have applied had no earned
income been excluded).
74 The Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978 was the result of extensive congressional
hearings in the wake of complaints that the 1976 legislation, which had significantly low-
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acknowledge that citizens living outside the United States should
receive some kind of tax relief. However, instead of providing an
exclusion for foreign earned income, Congress required all income to
be included and allowed deductions targeted at five specific areas
reflecting the potentially higher costs of living abroad: cost-of-living
differentials, housing expenses, schooling expenses, home leave travel
expenses, and hardship area pay. 75
As a practical matter, the targeted relief of the 1978 provisions
generally increased the tax benefits available to taxpayers in low-tax,
high-cost jurisdictions.76 However, those in low-tax, low-cost areas
received less relief than they had been receiving under the pre-1976
earned income exclusion. 77 In response to complaints from this latter
group that the new rules handicapped U.S. businesses by failing to
give sufficient tax relief 78 and general dissatisfaction with the com-
plexity of the regime, 79 Congress reinstated the foreign earned income
exclusion in 1981.80 In its new form, the provision was much more
generous than the pre-1978 legislation had been. The provision raised
the exclusion limitation to $75,000 and scheduled the limitation to
increase to $95,000 by 1986.81 For individuals whose foreign earned
income exceeded this limitation, the legislation allowed an additional
exclusion for the amount of "excess" housing costs above a threshold
level.82
ered the exclusion limits and added other limitations, was too restrictive. See Gann, supra
note 70, at 61 n.176. Because of concerns about the 1976 legislation, Congress subse-
quently delayed its effective date until it was replaced by the 1978 legislation. Id. In 1978
taxpayers had the option of applying either the lower exclusion of the 1976 law, or the
targeted deductions of the 1978 law.
75 See Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 203(a), 92 Stat. 3097,
3100 (1978), repealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 112(a),
95 Stat. 172, 194. Under the 1978 legislation, a citizen living and working in a designated
hardship area could exclude $20,000. See Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977 § 202(a)
(amending I.R.C. § 911). Alternatively, the citizen could claim other deductions as well as
an additional $5000. See § 203(a) (adding I.R.C. § 913(h)).
76 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAXATION OF AMERICANS WORKING OVERSEAS:
THE OPERATION OF THE FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION IN 1983, at 7 (1989).
77 Id.
78 See Sobel, supra note 70, at 138-40 (describing political pressure to reinstate foreign
earned income exclusion).
79 Id. But cf Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E. Stern, Innocents Abroad? The 1978
Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Repeal, 65 VA. L. REV. 1093,1095, 1114-15
(1979) (arguing that 1978 legislation was too beneficial to taxpayers and that all special
exclusions and deductions for citizens residing overseas should be repealed).
80 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 111(a), 95 Stat. 172,
190-94 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 911 (West Supp. 2006)).
81 Id.
82 Id.
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C. Recent Developments
The basic structure of the foreign earned income exclusion cre-
ated in 1981 remains in effect today.8 3 However, as a result of subse-
quent budgetary concerns, the exclusion limitation has never reached
the anticipated sum of $95,000. Instead, through a series of legislative
changes, the limitation has fluctuated between $70,000 and $80,000 for
the past twenty-five years.
84
In May 2006, Congress enacted several changes to section 911,
the foreign earned income exclusion, as a last-minute revenue raiser
for an unrelated tax bill.85 These changes provided a small benefit to
taxpayers by accelerating cost-of-living adjustments, thereby
increasing the exclusion limitation from $80,000 to $82,400 in 2006.86
However, the law simultaneously reduced benefits in two ways. First,
the legislation modified the tax calculation so that any income that
remains taxable after application of the exclusion will be taxed at the
marginal rates that would have applied had no earned income been
excluded. 87 Second, it imposed a cap on the additional exclusion for
83 See I.R.C. § 911 (West Supp. 2006) (describing exclusion).
84 Economic Recovery Act of 1981 § 111(a) (establishing $75,000 limitation for 1982
and $80,000 limitation for 1983); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 17,
98 Stat. 494, 505 (stabilizing limitation at $80,000 through 1987); Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1233(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2564 (reducing limitation to $70,000 after
1987); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1172(a)(1)-(2), 111 Stat. 788, 988
(increasing limitation to $72,000 in 1998 and scheduling $2000 annual increases until it
reached $80,000 in 2002, where it was scheduled to remain until 2008, when cost-of-living
increases would begin).
85 Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 § 515; see also Keith
Bradsher & David Cay Johnston, Americans Living Abroad Get a Nasty Tax Surprise, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2006, at C3 (stating that "[in an effort to raise revenues," Congress had
added "a last-minute provision . . . [t]he suddenness of [which] meant that [lobbying
groups] did not have a chance to mobilize against the idea as they had in previous sessions
of Congress"). These changes were based on recommendations by the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 174-77 (Comm. Print
2005).
86 I.R.C. § 911(b)(2)(D); Rev. Proc. 2006-51, 2006-47 I.R.B. 945-46 (explaining that
increase resulted from statute's acceleration to 2006 of cost-of-living adjustments that pre-
viously had been scheduled to begin in 2008); see also Press Release, Senate Comm. on
Fin., Background Fact Sheet on Section 911 (May 25, 2006), available at http://finance
.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg052506.pdf (describing 2006 amendments generally).
87 I.R.C. § 911(f). This is the same approach that had been adopted in the 1976 legisla-
tion before its repeal in 1978. See supra note 73.
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"excess" housing costs. 88 The cap was $11,536 for 2006 and is subject
to future cost-of-living adjustments. 89
Because this change will potentially have a significant impact on
those citizens residing in foreign countries with relatively low taxes
and high housing costs,90 the legislation authorizes the Treasury
Department to provide relief in such circumstances by issuing "regula-
tions or other guidance providing for the adjustment of the [maximum
housing cost exclusion] on the basis of geographic differences in
housing costs relative to housing costs in the United States." 91 A
Senate Finance Committee press release stated that this provision was
included so that the "Treasury can appropriately address the concerns
of those living and working in higher-housing-cost locations like Hong
Kong, Paris or Dubai. ' '92 The IRS published guidance under this pro-
vision in October 2006, 9 3 establishing significantly higher housing
expense caps for individuals residing in many high-cost foreign
locales. 94
88 I.R.C. § 911(c) (West Supp. 2006). Under prior law, the only limitation on the for-
eign housing cost exclusion was that the housing expenses be "reasonable" (i.e., not "lavish
or extravagant"), I.R.C. § 911(c)(2)(A), and that the total of the foreign earned income
exclusion and housing cost exclusion not exceed the taxpayer's foreign earned income,
I.R.C. § 911(d)(7).
89 The maximum housing cost exclusion equals thirty percent of the $82,400 general
exclusion amount ($24,720), minus a floor of sixteen percent of the $82,400 general exclu-
sion amount ($13,184), resulting in a $11,536 maximum exclusion. See I.R.C. § 911(c). The
$13,184 nonexcludable floor "represents an estimate of housing costs that taxpayers would
incur on housing regardless of whether they decided to live and work abroad." Press
Release, Senate Comm. on Fin., supra note 86. The legislation also made technical
changes to the way the floor is calculated. See I.R.C. § 911(c)(1)(B)(i) (calculating floor as
function of exclusion limitation amount rather than as function of government employee
salary levels).
90 Those citizens living in high-tax jurisdictions, such as much of Europe, do not rely as
heavily on the foreign earned income exclusion because the U.S. foreign tax credit elimi-
nates much or all of their U.S. tax liability. See Bradsher & Johnston, supra note 85; Tom
Herman & Jane Spencer, U.S. Expatriates Puzzle over New Tax Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
2006, at D1 (noting that American citizens working in Europe are unlikely to be affected
by recent changes to foreign earned income exclusion).
91 I.R.C. § 911(c)(2)(B).
92 Press Release, Senate Comm. on Fin., supra note 86.
93 I.R.S. Notice 2006-87, 2006-43 I.R.B. 766; see also I.R.S. Notice 2007-25, 2007-12
I.R.B. 760 (modifying and supplementing I.R.S. Notice 2006-87). The housing expense
amounts in the guidance are based on Living Quarters Allowance tables prepared by the
State Department for overseas foreign service personnel. I.R.S. Notice 2006-87.
94 For example, U.S. citizens residing in Hong Kong (the highest-cost jurisdiction iden-
tified in the guidance) can exclude $101,116 of housing expenses, in addition to the general
$82,400 foreign earned income exclusion amount. I.R.S. Notice 2006-87, 2006-43 I.R.B.
768 (setting housing expense limitation for Hong Kong at $114,300); I.R.C. § 911(c)(1)(B)
(West Supp. 2006) (setting $13,184 floor). Although the guidance provides increased
housing expense limits for many foreign locales, it is not comprehensive. For example, no
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Organizations and lobbyists representing overseas citizens and
multinational corporations reacted quickly to the unfavorable 2006
legislative changes.95 Numerous articles and op-ed pieces emphasized
that, in an era of globalization, the taxation of citizens outside the
United States-in particular those who are working abroad for U.S.
companies-is harmful to U.S. businesses and the U.S. economy, and
that the 2006 changes exacerbated this problem.96 In response, at
least one bill was introduced in Congress to provide an unlimited
exclusion for U.S. citizens' foreign earned income,97 and a Washington
Post Online op-ed piece optimistically claimed that the bill had "a
decent chance of getting enacted in the next two years." 98
II
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
Groups opposed to the taxation of citizens abroad would like
Congress to reconsider the issue. As reflected in the response to the
2006 legislation, these groups are likely to emphasize modern devel-
opments in the global economy and the United States' role in it.
Advocates will claim that the United States must either eliminate citi-
zenship-based taxation or, at least, exclude all income earned by U.S.
citizens working abroad in order to enable America to compete in the
modern global economy. Given the many changes in the global
economy since Congress enacted the existing framework more than a
quarter century ago, a debate over the proper scope of citizenship-
based taxation might be useful.99
However, it is important that statements regarding globalization
do not become bromides justifying the uncritical abandonment of, or
significant retreat from, longstanding U.S. tax principles. This Part
briefly summarizes the relevant changes that have occurred in the past
few decades, particularly as they relate to the factors that influenced
Russian cities other than Moscow are included. Brian Knowlton, New Rules Grant Tax
Relief to Some American Expats, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 12, 2006, at 4.
95 See AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN H.K., supra note 5, at 2 (urging revision of
section 911); Brian Knowlton, Cap For Expat Taxes Is Lifted in New Plan: U.S. Firms
Would Benefit, Senator Says, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 15, 2006, at 5 (describing lobbying
efforts of American Business Council of Gulf Countries and other organizations).
96 See supra note 9.
97 S. 3496, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
98 See Mitchell, supra note 9.
99 As the ABA Task Force Report recently observed in a broader context, "[o]ur inter-
national tax rules need to take account of the economic and political context in which they
are applied, including our relations with other countries and their peoples." ABA Task
Force Report, supra note 1, at 657; see also Graetz, supra note 12, at 334 ("The taxation of
wages earned abroad ...merits reexamination in light of the increasing mobility of
workers.").
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Congress's treatment of citizenship-based taxation in earlier genera-
tions. This Part does not purport to engage in a comprehensive anal-
ysis of these changes. Rather, it highlights the changes that are
relevant to the arguments for and against citizenship-based taxation.
The recent ABA Task Force Report provides a succinct summary
of many of the relevant economic and political changes that affect
international tax policy:
Over the last half century, elimination of exchange controls and
adoption of free exchangeability of currencies, increasingly efficient
global capital markets, revolutions in communications and informa-
tion processing, reductions in barriers to trade and movements of
people, and faster and cheaper transportation of goods and people
have contributed to a reconfiguration of our economy and its rela-
tionship to the global economy. The transaction costs of cross-
border economic activity have been dramatically reduced. 1°°
When Congress first adopted the foreign earned income exclusion in
1926, it did so with a particular business model in mind: U.S. compa-
nies employing U.S. workers in the United States to manufacture tan-
gible goods, which U.S. citizen-salesmen abroad would sell in foreign
markets.10 1 Indeed, during the course of his Ways and Means Com-
mittee testimony, the principal witness representing U.S. business
interests repeatedly clarified that the foreign earned income exclusion
envisioned this model: "I am interested, sir, solely in Americans who
are promoting in foreign countries the foreign trade of the United
States.... They are the only people that I am interested in .... The
ones that are promoting the sale in foreign countries of the products
of American labor here at home. ' 10 2 This same paradigm served as an
underlying premise in subsequent congressional reconsiderations of
the foreign earned income exclusion, including the most recent major
revisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 103
100 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 657.
101 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
102 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 58, at 177 (statement of O.K. Davis, NFTC
representative). In expressing agreement with Davis, Representative John Nance Garner
clarified that the premise underlying the exclusion was "that Americans would become
business men in foreign countries, therefore selling a larger proportion of American
goods." Id.
103 See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 35-36 (1981), quoted in Gann, supra note 70, at 62 n.179;
OWENS, supra note 62, at 551 ("The arguments of the proponents of the exemption in 1942
were not substantially different from what they had been in 1926, although they were
presented in much greater detail."); Slowinski & Williams, supra note 69, at 362 ("In 1973,
with emphasis on export expansion, it should be noted that many U.S. citizens are working
abroad to build markets for U.S. manufactured products and services. They should be
encouraged because U.S. marketing and selling techniques are still among the best in the
world.").
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 82:443
TAXING CITIZENS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
The recent ABA Task Force Report observed that "[i]nternational
tax rules based on a paradigm of property being manufactured and
sold do not readily accommodate the deconstruction of economic
functions that characterizes modern business. ' 10 4 The report
explained that "[s]ervices are outsourced to related or unrelated prov-
iders[, and m]anufacturing is performed at multiple locations, using
related or unrelated vendors and employing just-in-time inventory
and modern logistics.' 10 5 Although the report was not discussing the
foreign earned income exclusion specifically, its description of how
modern business has shifted away from the old paradigm is relevant
for purposes of the citizenship-based taxation inquiry. In particular,
the fact that a company is incorporated in the United States does not
per se imply that its products are necessarily manufactured in the
United States or that its income generated outside the United States
through the performance of services will make its way into the U.S.
economy. 106
This "deconstruction of economic functions" has also evolved in
tandem with a globalization of corporate management and ownership
for many companies. Whereas an "American" company in the 1920s
would typically have been incorporated in the United States, had its
management and headquarters in the United States, and have been
owned primarily by U.S. persons, an "American" company today
often looks nothing like this.10 7 Consequently, an approach that treats
104 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 658.
105 Id.
106 The purported unity of interests did not always exist even in 1926 when Congress
relied on the traditional paradigm as a reason for enacting the foreign earned income
exclusion. During the Ways and Means Committee hearing, the only company explicitly
mentioned by the representative of U.S. business interests was the Singer Sewing Machine
Company. See 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 58, at 179 (statement of O.K.
Davis, NFFC representative). Although the Singer company was billed as the prototypical
U.S. company operating abroad, the company billed itself as a multinational corporation,
with salespersons abroad arranging orders in Germany and Russia that would be filled by
factories in Scotland. See Andrew Godley, Selling the Sewing Machine Around the World:
Singer's International Marketing Strategies, 1850-1920, 7 ENr. & Soc'y 266, 272-75 (2006)
(describing Singer's expansion in Europe). Even today, the company's website describes
Singer as "the world's first international company." Singer Sewing Co. History, http://www
.singerco.com/company/history.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
107 These changes are starkly apparent in the recent corporate inversion phenomenon,
in which well-known "American" companies attempted to restructure their ownership so
that a foreign parent would be at the top of the corporate group. See generally Kirsch,
supra note 3 (discussing congressional response to corporate expatriation). This effect can
also result from cross-border mergers and acquisition. Perhaps the most well-known
example involves the 1998 merger of Chrysler Corporation, one of the "big three"
"American" automobile manufacturers, with Daimler-Benz AG, resulting in
DaimlerChrysler AG, a German company. See David Steinhart, Daimler-Chrysler Merger
Puts an End to 'Big Three': North American Market May Open Up, Analysts Predict,
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the interests of U.S. companies, their citizen-employees abroad,
domestic workers, and the U.S. economy as interchangeable is no
longer tenable.
In addition to the changes in corporate business practice and
structure, modern technological advances have had a significant
impact on citizens living and working overseas. For example, in the
1920s a citizen living overseas had very limited, and expensive, oppor-
tunities for communicating with family members or friends in the
United States. Accordingly, residence abroad often caused a signifi-
cant disruption in ties to communities in the United States. In con-
trast, citizens abroad today can speak to someone in the United States
for pennies per minute,10 8 and, with the increasing availability of the
Internet, 109 can correspond instantaneously by e-mail. Moreover, per-
sons with access to the Internet can keep in touch with developments
in the United States by accessing national and local news via the many
online newspapers and other news sources.
In addition, technology has had a significant impact on the global
spread of American culture in the past twenty-five years. In the early
twentieth century, many foreign persons' only immediate contact with
American culture was through contact with a U.S. citizen living over-
seas or a relative living in the United States. As the century
NAT'L POST, Nov. 13, 1998 (noting end of "big three" American automakers following
merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler). An extreme example of the changes in cor-
porate structure from the 1920s until today is provided by the Singer Sewing Machine
Company which, as discussed supra note 106, was explicitly mentioned during the 1926
legislative hearings on the foreign earned income exclusion. In 1926, it was a New Jersey
corporation with its headquarters in an eponymous skyscraper in Manhattan and signifi-
cant factories in the United States (as well as abroad). Today, after restructurings and a
bankruptcy, ownership of the Singer brand and worldwide sewing business is split among
several foreign companies. See Singer Sewing Company Sold to Affiliate of Kohlberg &
Company, P.R. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.prnewswire.com (go to
"Archive Search" and enter full title of article in the "Headline" field) (describing sale of
Singer brand and principal operations by Singer, N.V., to KSIN Holdings, Ltd.); RETAIL
HOLDINGS, N.V., SUMMARY SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT: FOR THE SEMI-ANNUAL PERIOD
ENDED JUNE 30, 2006, at 3-4, (2006) available at http://www.retailholdings.com/disclosure
Statements/disclosureStatementsFile_57.pdf (summarizing current ownership of Singer
brand and operations).
108 For persons with access to the Internet, programs such as Skype permit free com-
puter-to-computer calls from anywhere in the world. Skype, http://www.skype.com (last
visited Mar. 21, 2007). Moreover, technology now permits individuals moving abroad to
retain their U.S. telephone number, with its calls automatically forwarded to their phone
abroad-the caller need never be aware that the call recipient is outside the United States.
See, e.g., David Pogue, Overseas Calls Made Cheap, If Not Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007,
at C1 (describing voice-over-Internet protocol technology).
109 See Doris Estelle Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of
Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 229 (2002) ("[O]f the ten fastest
growing countries for Internet penetration for the year 2001, almost all of them are so-
called developing countries.").
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progressed, the increasing export of American-branded goods, as well
as Hollywood movies and other entertainment, provided additional
points of contact. Today, with the expanding availability of satellite
television networks, as well as the increasing spread of the Internet,
technology has facilitated an unprecedented saturation of U.S. cul-
ture, as well as the English language, into ever-expanding parts of the
globe.
The spread of the Internet also has important consequences for
tax compliance by citizens abroad. Through much of the twentieth
century, citizens living outside the United States had difficulty com-
plying with U.S. tax laws because of limited access to tax forms and
guidance.110 With the widespread availability of the Internet, citizens
abroad can download relevant tax forms and obtain extensive infor-
mation on the tax obligations of citizens living outside the United
States.
Professor Peroni concludes that, given these modern develop-
ments and the increasing difficulty of "associating items of income and
expense with a particular geographic location," international tax
policy should move away from source-based taxation. 1 To the extent
tax policy principles move away from source-based taxation in the
future, additional pressure will be placed on the definition of who is a
U.S. person for tax purposes. Accordingly, the question of whether
citizens living abroad should be taxed in the same way as persons
residing in the United States becomes even more important.
III
THE STRENGTHENED VALIDITY OF CITIZENSHIP AS A
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
Part I demonstrated how political and economic developments
have influenced the way citizens abroad are taxed. During the Civil
War era, with the United States focused on survival and the evolving
importance of federal citizenship, income tax law emphasized citizen-
ship as a jurisdictional tool. In the early twentieth century, U.S. busi-
ness interests convinced Congress that relaxing citizenship-based
taxation would facilitate global expansion by U.S. companies in a
newly internationalized world economy. This latter view has con-
tinued to influence U.S. tax policy for the last eighty years.
110 For example, soon after enactment of the 1913 tax act, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue instructed tax collectors to allow nonresident citizens extensions of time to file
returns and pay taxes. See T.D. 1953, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 34 (1914); T.D. 2028, 16
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 134 (1914).
l Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. Inter-
national Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 984 (1997).
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This Part examines the continuing viability of citizenship-based
taxation in light of the recent developments described in Part II. In
particular, it evaluates citizenship as a jurisdictional basis to tax citi-
zens living abroad, regardless of whether the income is earned from
working in a foreign country or derives from passive investments. The
question of whether income from working abroad should receive spe-
cial treatment, e.g., a foreign earned income exclusion, is reserved for
Part IV.
Although most analyses of citizenship-based taxation focus
almost exclusively on the merits of the foreign earned income exclu-
sion,112 it is important to treat the threshold question of citizenship-
based jurisdiction separately from the analysis of the exclusion for two
reasons. First, some critics of the current tax regime advocate the
elimination of U.S. tax on all foreign income of citizens abroad.
113
Second, the inquiry into the appropriate treatment of foreign earned
income cannot be answered in isolation. Rather, as discussed in Part
IV, it requires a trade-off between the purported benefits of favorable
treatment for earned income against the underlying rationale for
imposing citizenship-based taxation. Accordingly, it is important to
discuss the threshold issue in this Part before turning to the special
case of earned income in Part IV.
112 Perhaps in recognition of the political difficulties of eliminating tax on the invest-
ment income of wealthy Americans living abroad, many have focused on the narrower goal
of eliminating tax only on foreign earned income. Testifying before the House Subcom-
mittee on International Operations, one advocate of eliminating tax on foreign earned
income argued that:
Politically, I think that [exemption of overseas citizens' passive income] is a
non-starter. Certainly the idea that an American with an investment portfolio
can choose to become a bona fide resident overseas-and be exempted from
United States tax [sic] is nonsense. Those coming [to this hearing] and asking
for it are fooling themselves. Our group does not so request.
U.S. Citizens Overseas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Operations of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. 65 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing, U.S. Citizens
Overseas] (statement of Peter Alegi, Chair, Federated League of Americans Around the
Globe). Recently introduced legislation would accomplish this goal by making the foreign
earned income exclusion unlimited. See S. 3496, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
113 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L.
REV. 483, 486 (2004) ("It is doubtful ... whether the United States should continue to
insist on taxing its citizens living overseas."). For an earlier, more extensive argument for
the elimination of U.S. taxation on all income of overseas citizens, see Brainard L. Patton,
Jr., United States Individual Income Tax Policy as It Applies to Americans Resident Over-
seas, 1975 DUKE L.J. 691, 730-35; for a presentation of the position of the World Federa-
tion of Americans Abroad see Hearing, U.S. Citizens Overseas, supra note 112, at 49-51.
As Elisabeth Owens recognized, legislative debate sometimes confuses arguments for
exempting all foreign income with arguments for exempting only foreign earned income.
See OWENS, supra note 62, at 551-52 (explaining that there was "no obvious logical con-
nection" between 1942 Senate Finance Committee arguments generally relating to citizens
living overseas and exemption that applies only to foreign earned income).
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A final preliminary note concerns international law. At the most
fundamental level, citizenship-based taxation might be justified by
reason of the United States' inherent sovereign powers with respect to
its citizens. This relationship creates a recognized basis to tax under
customary international law, 114 and the Supreme Court has relied on
it in upholding jurisdiction over citizens abroad. 15 While this prin-
ciple permits the United States to tax its citizens abroad, it does not,
standing alone, provide a useful basis for determining whether the
United States should exercise that power.116 Accordingly, the fol-
lowing subparts consider theories that might provide a normative
basis for taxing citizens abroad.
A. Tax Policy Principles
This subpart considers whether the taxation of citizens abroad is
justified by traditional tax policy criteria-equity (fairness), neutrality,
and administrability. 11 7 In addressing the equity criterion, the analysis
114 See, e.g., L. VON BAR, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 247 (G.R. Gillespie trans., Edinburgh, William Green & Sons 2d rev. ed. 1892) ("On
principles of public law, no objection can be taken to the State taxing its citizens, who are
living in a foreign country .... "). For a more recent discussion, reluctantly concluding that
citizenship-based taxation is permissible, see F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 14 (1990). Note also that each of the United States' income tax treaties make
clear that the United States reserves the right to tax its citizens as if the treaty had not
entered into effect, even though the citizen might be a resident of the other treaty country.
Additionally, the United States reserved this right in the Commentaries to the OECD
Model Income Tax Treaty. MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, Com-
mentary on Art. 1, $ 28 (OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs 2005) [hereinafter OECD
MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY]. While the treaty partner agrees to allow the United States
to impose worldwide tax on U.S. citizens, some treaty partners refuse to allow U.S. citizens
who do not have a substantial residence connection to the United States to claim benefits
against the treaty partner. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr.,
Aug. 31, 1994, art. 4, 2(a), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-32.
115 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text; see also Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (holding that U.S. citizen residing abroad remained subject to
legislative and judicial power of United States because "[hie continued to owe allegiance
to the United States [and, bly virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States
retained its authority over him").
116 As long ago as 1923, a League of Nations report concluded that in "the modern
age... political allegiance no longer forms an adequate test of individual fiscal obligation.
It is fast breaking down in practice, and it is clearly insufficient in theory." Report
Presented by the Econ. and Fin. Comm'n on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of
Nations Doc. F.19 at 19 (1923); see also Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in
Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 23 (1989) (claiming that
"[c]urrently, the sovereignty theory has few followers" as basis for taxation).
117 As Professor Graetz observed, "since Adam Smith, it has been commonplace to say
that a tax system should be fair, economically efficient, and reasonably easy to administer
and comply with." Graetz, supra note 12, at 294. Professor Graetz makes the important
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
May 2007]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
focuses on the frequently cited benefits and ability-to-pay theories,118




One of the earliest arguments for taxing citizens abroad is that
these individuals continue to enjoy the benefits of citizenship while
abroad and, accordingly, should continue to bear the corresponding
burdens-in particular, the payment of taxes. Both the Civil War
income tax and 1894 income tax were justified, at least in part, on this
basis. Moreover, in Cook v. Tait,119 the Supreme Court explicitly
relied on a benefits theory as a principal justification for upholding
Congress's right to tax the foreign income of citizens abroad. 120 More
recently, some commentators have suggested in passing that the bene-
fits theory justifies worldwide taxation of citizens, 121 while others have
briefly posited that it does not.122 The following analysis provides a
more thorough consideration of the benefits theory in light of modern
developments.
In today's world, do the benefits of U.S. citizenship accruing to a
citizen abroad justify the taxation of that person's worldwide income?
In addressing this question, it is important to acknowledge the
theory's limits in the context of an income tax. Benefits theory gener-
point that claims regarding fairness remain important in the analysis of an income tax,
despite the recent focus on economic efficiency in the international context. Id. at 307.
118 For recent debates regarding the general relevance of benefits and ability-to-pay the-
ories as justifications for a progressive income tax, compare Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of
Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX
L. REV. 399 (2005), with Deborah A. Geier, Time to Bring Back the 'Benefit' Norm?, 33
TAX NOTES INT'L 899 (2004). See generally ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 678
n.27 (discussing literature regarding benefits and ability-to-pay theories).
119 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
120 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 111, at 1009 (arguing that foreign earned income exclu-
sion "violates fairness by allowing U.S. citizens... to retain the benefits of their citizen-
ship... without paying their fair share of the costs of providing those benefits"); cf. STAFF
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM:
BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES
AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. BUSINESSES 4 (Comm. Print 2006) (suggesting that
benefits theory might support citizenship-based taxation); Stephen E. Shay et al., "What's
Source Got to Do with It?" Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV.
81, 90-91 (2002) (arguing that benefit rationale supports source-based taxation of nonresi-
dent aliens).
122 Professor Avi-Yonah recently implied in passing that the benefits might not be suffi-
cient to justify taxation. Avi-Yonah, supra note 113, at 484 ("[Alre these benefits really so
great?"); see also Gann, supra note 70, at 66 (implicitly expressing doubt by asking, "[I]s
[this nexus] sufficient politically?").
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ally arises in the context of fee-for-service transactions, where there is
a quid pro quo. 123 In the context of an income tax, where the tax level
does not directly depend on the benefits received, there is no neces-
sary correlation between the benefits and the taxes paid. 124 Accord-
ingly, while the existence of significant benefits might provide a strong
basis to claim that the overseas citizen should pay some level of tax by
reason of his citizenship, 125 it might not dictate the form or amount of
that tax.
i. Personal Protection
The benefits received by a U.S. citizen include both collective
benefits and individualized benefits. Throughout much of the twen-
tieth century, collective benefits-in particular, military expendi-
tures-were often cited as justifying citizenship-based taxation.
126
However, commentators have observed that it is difficult to defend
citizenship-based taxation based solely on collective benefits because
123 See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 31 (1985) (suggesting that even though usually associated with fee-for-service situa-
tions, benefits theory often plays role in analysis of income taxes "where the issue is who
benefits from broad government programs").
124 Some scholars have argued that a correlation might exist in the sense that a high-
income person can be viewed as receiving greater benefits than a low-income person from
the stability provided by the government. See Geier, supra note 118, at 900-01 (justifying
progressive income tax on theory that high-income taxpayers benefit disproportionately
from country's regulated capitalist system). But see Dodge, supra note 118, at 427-28 (dis-
agreeing with Professor Geier's theory); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfair-
ness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221, 225-26 (1995) (rejecting benefits argument as justification for
imposing progressive tax rates on high-income individuals).
125 As Professor Dodge recently observed in a more general context, "The 'benefit' idea
is just a kind of relevant 'minimum contact' that supports tax jurisdiction, just as other
kinds of contacts support the jurisdiction of courts." Dodge, supra note 118, at 440 n.161;
see also OWENS, supra note 62, at 565-66 (suggesting that benefits rationale is valid
method for determining generally whether people should come within government's taxing
jurisdiction, even though income tax does not directly correlate to benefits received);
Palmer, supra note 116, at 40-41 ("At most, application of the [benefits] doctrine leads to
the view that some levy on nationals is appropriate ....").
126 In 1959, at the height of the Cold War, a paper published in a Ways and Means
Committee compendium on tax reform observed that "the argument [against citizenship-
based taxation] might be more convincing if military expenditures did not constitute so
large a fraction of the total U.S. budget. Expenditures devoted to military and other for-
eign policy purposes are as important to U.S. business abroad as they are to domestic
business." H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 2147
(Comm. Print 1959) (report of Roy Blough, Taxation of Income from Foreign Sources); see
also Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1121 (arguing that expenditures for national
defense and other collective societal goals benefit Americans abroad as much as, if not
more than, they benefit domestic citizens).
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these collective benefits are not limited to U.S. citizens, but also
accrue to residents and nationals of other countries.1 27
The individualized benefits available to citizens abroad are often
of significant value and therefore provide a stronger justification for
taxing citizens abroad. Historically, the most frequently cited benefit
for citizens overseas is protection-both personal and property-in
times of crises outside the United States. As previously noted, this
benefit served as a principal justification for utilizing citizenship-based
taxation in the earliest U.S. income tax laws.
The relevant question for purposes of the present analysis is
whether this right to protection constitutes a meaningful benefit in the
twenty-first century. One commentator, writing in the mid-1970s,
stated that the protection benefit referred to in the 1924 Cook v. Tait
decision had lost its value: "[Ilt now appears that the days when
United States citizens had need to call upon the government to come
forth to protect their foreign personal and property rights are gone
forever, at least at the level of the individual citizen in all but the most
extraordinary cases." 128
Developments in the last thirty years suggest that the commen-
tator's optimistic observation may have been premature. For
example, the United States recently helped thousands of U.S. citizens
evacuate Lebanon in response to fighting there. 129 Moreover, the
heightened focus on terrorism in recent years suggests an increased
role for governmental protection of individual citizens overseas.
Indeed, a Senate subcommittee recently held a hearing addressing the
State Department's efforts to protect overseas U.S. citizens from ter-
rorism.1 30 Some aspects of the U.S. government's efforts to combat
127 See, e.g., Gann, supra note 70, at 65 (stating that "collective benefit argument proves
too much, since the benefits ... are not confined to U.S. citizens").
128 Patton, supra note 113, at 700.
129 See, e.g., Gary Gately, Plucked to Safety from Lebanon, American Evacuees Return
and Lament the Destruction, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A8 (describing State Depart-
ment evacuation of U.S. citizens from Lebanon).
130 Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad from Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
International Operations and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong.
(2002) [hereinafter Hearing, Protecting Citizens]. The personal protection and benefits
provided by the U.S. government also extend to overseas citizens in many less drastic cir-
cumstances, such as situations involving arrest, medical evacuation, and other emergencies.
See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Consuls Help Americans
Abroad, available at http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures-1222.html (last
visited Dec. 29, 2006) (listing services provided by State Department for citizens abroad);
see also Dep't of State Appropriations Authorization, FY 1974: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong. 526 (1973) ("Every case of the arrest of an
American citizen abroad on whatever charge is an actual or potential 'protection' case for
the consular officer."). But see Patton, supra note 113, at 699 n.28 (claiming that general
services provided by U.S. consular officials overseas may be of little practical use to citizen
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terrorism-such as sharing intelligence with other countries-might
be viewed as collective benefits that accrue to both citizens and nonci-
tizens alike. To the extent that the U.S. government focuses its efforts
on threats directed primarily at U.S. persons abroad-such as the pro-
tection of U.S. citizens working in the Persian Gulf131-the benefits to
citizens are more direct.
More fundamentally, even assuming that some citizens will never
need the services of the U.S. government for personal protection, it
does not necessarily follow that this benefit has no value. Just as
homeowner's insurance has value because the possibility exists that a
home will be destroyed by fire or other casualty, so does government
protection have value because it might be needed. In addition, the
mere fact that the United States provides protection for its citizens
abroad might deter at least some harm to U.S. citizens, although this
assertion might be less persuasive in an age of global terrorism than it
was in the Cold War era.
ii. Property Protection
Another modern development, which provides a more practical
benefit to citizens overseas, is the protection of personal property
abroad. In the past two decades the United States has greatly
expanded the protection afforded to property such as the investments
and business operations of U.S. citizens overseas. For example, the
State Department has negotiated dozens of Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, which ensure that nationals (as well as companies incorporated in
the United States) receive basic protection for their investment and
business operations in other countries, including protections against
discriminatory treatment, restrictions on expropriation, and the right
to transfer funds into and out of the host country.
132
residing abroad who often has locally established legal and social connections to assist
him).
131 See, e.g., Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Travel Warning: Saudi
Arabia (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis-pa-wtw/tw_932.html.
This example is particularly relevant because organizations representing U.S. citizens in
Persian Gulf countries are among the most vocal critics of citizenship-based taxation. See
Knowlton, supra note 95 (describing recent lobbying efforts of American Business Council
of the Gulf Countries).
132 Of particular relevance to citizens working abroad for a foreign branch of a U.S.
company, the treaties guarantee a company's right to hire top managerial personnel of its
choice, regardless of nationality. Thus, it is possible that a U.S. citizen working for a U.S.
company abroad might, at least indirectly, owe his position to the investment treaties nego-
tiated by the United States. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2004 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf.
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
May 20071
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
iii. Right to Vote
The political rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens abroad provide
another justification for citizenship-based taxation. A U.S. citizen
residing abroad retains the right to vote for President, Vice President,
and members of Congress. Pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act,133 a citizen abroad can exercise this
right by casting an absentee ballot in the state in which he last resided
prior to moving outside the United States. In order to ease the pro-
cess for registering and requesting a ballot, the Act mandates a uni-
form postcard that all states must accept. Modern technology has also
eased the burden of absentee voting-the postcard, as well as detailed
instructions, are available on a website sponsored by the U.S.
government.
34
Some overseas citizen advocacy groups contend that inherent lim-
itations on the voting right undermine its value for purposes of any
benefits-based taxing jurisdiction. In particular, they argue that over-
seas citizens have no effective voice in the legislative process because
their votes are spread among the fifty states rather than channeled
into electing a single member of Congress (or nonvoting delegate)
who represents the interests of overseas citizens. 13
5
Both theoretical and practical considerations undermine this
argument. It is reasonable to assume that overseas citizens are a
diverse group, with a broad range of views on most social, political,
and economic issues. They just happen to share common interests in
certain issues, such as the tax treatment of citizens living abroad, by
reason of their circumstances. 36 In this regard, they are like any
133 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
134 U.S. Dep't of Defense, Federal Voting Assistance Program, http://www.fvap.gov (last
visited Dec. 29, 2006). In addition, several overseas citizens groups have created extensive
websites that enable any citizen abroad with Internet access to obtain necessary informa-
tion instantly and easily print the necessary absentee registration forms. See, e.g., Overseas
Vote Foundation, http://overseasvotefoundation.org (last visited Jan. 4, 2007) (enabling
overseas citizens to enter necessary information, print, and sign form for absentee voter
registration); Vote from Abroad, http://www.votefromabroad.org (last visited Jan. 3, 2007)
(containing online wizard that guides viewer through steps necessary to complete and print
absentee ballot requests).
135 See, e.g., Am. Citizens Abroad, Congressional Representation for Overseas
Americans, http://www.aca.ch/oplOa.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (advocating proposal
to permit overseas citizens to elect their own congressional delegate).
136 Even with respect to citizenship-based taxation, the interests of overseas citizens are
not identical. The issue is of greater concern to those citizens living in low- or no-tax
countries because they will owe more residual U.S. tax after taking the foreign tax credit.
Cf 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 58, at 179 (statement of O.K. Davis) (noting
that U.S. citizens living in London did not lobby for foreign earned income exclusion
because British income taxes were higher than U.S. income tax).
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other interest group that has an interest in a particular tax policy but
whose political strength is diluted among the fifty states.
Moreover, Congress has acted on several significant concerns of
overseas citizens' groups, suggesting that claims of underrepresenta-
tion are overstated. 137 For example, the Uniformed and Overseas Cit-
izens Absentee Voting Act itself reflects significant lobbying by
overseas citizens' groups. Not only does it provide a practical method
by which overseas citizens can exercise their voting rights, but it also
contains a tax-related provision long desired by overseas citizens: The
state in which the citizen casts an absentee ballot for a federal election
cannot treat the individual as a state resident, subject to state taxes,
merely because of that federal vote.138 Overseas citizens also have
had some success in their attempt to be included in the 2010 decennial
census,139 although a sampling conducted by the Census Bureau sug-
137 Indeed, during a recent hearing seeking to have overseas citizens included in the
2010 census, a witness cited a list of "past battles and victories" achieved on behalf of
citizens abroad "with the active support of Congress," including the absentee voting provi-
sions discussed in the text, securing the right of overseas citizens to work in U.S. embassies
and consulates, streamlined provisions for naturalizing the children of overseas citizens
when the U.S. citizen-parent had spent insufficient time in the United States to pass citi-
zenship by birth, and the provision of educational materials to certain American and inter-
national schools around the world that educated the children of overseas citizens.
Americans Abroad, How Can We Count Them?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Census of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 74-75 (2001) [hereinafter
Hearing, How Can We Count Them?] (statement of T.B. McClelland, Member of the
Board of Directors, American Business Council of the Gulf Countries); see also AM. CITI-
ZENS ABROAD, A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZENS LIVING ABROAD 4 (1990) (claiming that
American Citizens Abroad has "been very active and successful in proposing changes to
U.S. laws and regulations that affect overseas citizens"). Of course, the interests of over-
seas citizens do not always prevail, as evidenced by the May 2006 modifications to the
foreign earned income exclusion. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
138 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-5 (2000). Prior to 1975, when a predecessor of this statute was
enacted, some states attempted to treat an overseas citizen as a state resident for tax pur-
poses based on voter registration in the state, even if the individual only voted for federal
offices. Voting by U.S. Citizens Residing Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Privi-
leges and Elections of the S. Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong. 23 (1973)
[hereinafter Hearing, Voting Abroad] (statement of William G. Whyte, Vice President,
United States Steel Corporation). A state still can use a citizen's vote or registration as
evidence of state residence for tax purposes if the individual also votes for state office-
holders, rather than just federal candidates. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-5 (providing that pro-
tection from state tax residence determination applies only to exercise of rights under
relevant subchapter, which addresses federal, not state, elections).
139 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2010 CENSUS: OVERSEAS ENUMERATION TEST
RAISES NEED FOR CLEAR POLICY DIRECTION 2 (2004) (describing response to requests
from representatives of overseas American citizens to include U.S. citizens living abroad in
census). Overseas citizens groups argue that the lack of an official census of U.S. citizens
living overseas not only skews apportionment and redistricting but also causes a misalloca-
tion of federal benefit distributions. See Hearing, How Can We Count Them?, supra note
137, at 51-54 (statement of Thomas W. Fina, Executive Director, Democrats Abroad).
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gests that practical limitations might prevent their inclusion.140
Finally, particular legislators have been willing to advocate the inter-
ests of overseas citizens, despite the fact that they do not exclusively
represent overseas citizens.
141
iv. Right to Enter
Another important right possessed by U.S. citizens overseas is the
ability to enter the United States at any time.142 Again, different citi-
zens might place different value on this right, depending on how fre-
quently they visit the United States and the likelihood that they might
return permanently. A person who has lived abroad most of his life
with no intention of settling in the United States might place little
value on this benefit, whereas a citizen who was raised in the United
States might place great value in eventually returning. The right is
also valuable for citizens who live in areas beset by political turmoil or
subject to terrorist threats due to the higher possibility that these per-
sons might suddenly need to leave such areas. While it is impossible
to place a precise value on this benefit, variable among individuals,
the right to enter the United States as a U.S. citizen undoubtedly has
some value.
v. Past Benefits
A more tenuous argument can be made based on prior benefits
received by citizens abroad. For example, a commentator in the late
1950s argued that in addition to the benefits of protection while over-
seas, "[a] person who was born and reared in the United States, edu-
cated at public expense, [and] trained in U.S. industry... derives his
income in part from the United States regardless of the geographical
140 See Lessons Learned from the 2004 Overseas Census Test: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovermental Relations and Census of the H.
Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 12-13 (2004) (statement of Charles Louis
Kincannon, Director, U.S. Census Bureau) (identifying obstacles to attaining data, such as
inability to produce address files and mapping system for citizens abroad); Survey Abroad
Disappoints Census Bureau, WASH. POST, June 7, 2004, at A21 (reporting disappointing
response rate, with only 4500 forms completed since initiation of test).
141 For example, between 1999 and 2003, Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York
sponsored at least five bills to facilitate the inclusion of overseas citizens in the 2010 census.
See H.R. 1619, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 680, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 4568, 106th Cong.
(2000); H.R. 3649, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 2444, 106th Cong. (1999).
142 As Professor Gann has observed, "A significant value of U.S. citizenship is the
ability to return to a nation with particular social and economic institutions and to a nation
that is a going concern." Gann, supra note 70, at 65-66; see also Peroni, supra note 111, at
1009 (noting value of "ability to return to the United States without limitation and enjoy
the legal, economic, and social institutions of this country").
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area of his operations."'1 43 More recently, commentators concerned
about the "brain drain" in less economically developed countries have
used this rationale to suggest that the less economically developed
countries should tax the foreign income of their nationals living over-
seas. In particular, these advocates note that "[a]n important benefit
often received by LDC [less-developed country] citizens before they
emigrate is state-subsidized educational services. . . [Some] tax
should be imposed to compensate LDCs for the loss of human capital
that they experience as a result of emigration.
144
The assumptions underlying this approach for nonresident
nationals of less-developed countries do not necessarily apply to the
overseas U.S. citizen population. While many citizens abroad were
raised in the United States and benefited from its education system,
others might have lived abroad for most or all of their lives, receiving
little or no education in the United States. Even if a U.S. citizen was
raised and educated in the United States, he would have received dif-
ferent levels of government benefits based on whether he attended a
private or public school, and whether he funded his education using
federally guaranteed student loans. Moreover, some citizens may
have already lived and worked in the United States for many years,
paying taxes well in excess of the value of past benefits, while others
may go abroad straight from college, without having yet contributed
significantly to U.S. tax revenues. Because of these significant differ-
ences among citizens, relying on past benefits as a justification for citi-
zenship-based taxation is dubious.
vi. Additional Considerations
Opponents of citizenship-based taxation often focus on the bene-
fits that are available to citizens within the United States but not to
those outside the country. 145 For example, citizens abroad do not
143 See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86Tm CONG., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 2146
(Comm. Print 1959) (report of Roy Blough, Taxation of Income from Foreign Sources); see
also Kingson, supra note 15, at 740 ("Many of these people may have grown up in FHA-
insured homes [and] are having their parents cared for by federal programs rather than
having to pay the medical expenses themselves .... As American citizens, they know how
to take. Now let them, as American citizens, learn how to give.").
144 INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 5 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John
Douglas Wilson eds., 1989); cf. Desai et al., supra note 5, at 682-83 (advocating potential
use of citizenship-based taxation to address less-developed countries' concerns about brain
drain).
145 See, e.g., John D. Maiers, The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: Reinventing the
Wheel, 34 TAX LAW. 691, 726 (1981) ("Americans abroad must often use after-tax income
to buy substitutes for government and municipal services, such as Medicare and public
education, which their taxes buy at home."); Patton, supra note 113, at 699 ("[I]t should be
clear that an American overseas is not benefiting from the expenditure of any government
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enjoy infrastructure benefits, such as highways and schools, that are
financed, at least in part, with federal revenue. Moreover, certain
individual benefits-in particular, Medicare benefits146-are not avail-
able to U.S. citizens residing overseas.
While citizens abroad do not enjoy some of the benefits available
to citizens within the United States, U.S. citizens at home do not enjoy
some of the benefits provided to citizens abroad such as the personal
and property protection discussed above. More fundamentally, as dis-
cussed above, a benefits analysis generally does not dictate the proper
level of income-based taxation. Rather, it merely determines whether
sufficient grounds exist for exercising some kind of tax jurisdiction. In
this regard, as long as citizens abroad receive significant benefits from
holding citizenship, the fact that other citizens might receive greater
benefits is not directly relevant. 147 In the domestic context, not all
citizens enjoy identical benefits from the federal government, yet ben-
efits theory is sometimes used to justify taxing jurisdiction over
residents of the United States.
The foreign tax credit further weakens the argument that citizens
abroad should not be subject to taxation because they receive fewer
benefits. As Elisabeth Owens noted in her work on the foreign tax
credit, "If a national of the United States with foreign income does
receive a lesser amount of benefit from the United States than one
who has only domestic source income, he also pays less tax to the
United States because of the foreign tax credit. ' 148 The foreign tax
credit's reduction of U.S. tax does not necessarily correlate to the
lesser benefits a citizen abroad might enjoy. 149 Nonetheless, the for-
funds in the United States .... "); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 113, at 484 (asking
whether benefits received by citizens abroad are sufficient to justify citizenship-based
taxation).
146 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, supra note 139, at 3. According to recent testi-
mony by a representative of overseas citizens, the denial of Medicare to citizens abroad is
"[olne of the sorest points ... for overseas American[s]." Hearing, How Can We Count
Them?, supra note 137, at 46 (statement of Thomas W. Fina, Executive Director, Demo-
crats Abroad).
147 In order to support the position that extraterritorial taxation is wrong in prin-
ciple ... it is necessary to show not that a United States national receiving only
foreign source income receives fewer benefits than one receiving only domestic
source income, but that he receives no benefits whatever from the United
States government, or benefits so insubstantial that they should be disregarded
for practical purposes.
OWENS, supra note 62, at 565-66.
148 Id. at 565; see also Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1121 (noting that U.S.
government through foreign tax credit acknowledges benefits received by American citi-
zens abroad from host governments).
149 Rather, the credit depends on the extent to which the foreign country chooses to
exercise its source-based taxing rights. Accordingly, a U.S. citizen residing in a high-tax
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eign tax credit can be viewed as a rough acknowledgment that the
United States does not confer full benefits on a U.S. citizen living
abroad with respect to his foreign source income (or, perhaps more
accurately, an acknowledgment that the foreign country benefits the
U.S. citizen to some extent).
In summary, the benefits available to U.S. citizens residing
abroad provide a basis for concluding that the United States is justi-
fied in exercising some type of taxing jurisdiction over those citi-
zens. 150 The next subpart considers whether the United States is
justified in taxing citizens abroad under another familiar theory of
equity: ability-to-pay.
b. Ability-to-Pay Theory
This section considers the extent to which ability-to-pay princi-
ples support the extension of the income tax to citizens living abroad.
Although traditionally applied to questions of distribution,151 ability-
to-pay principles raise the jurisdictional question in two ways. First,
before asking whether one person has the same ability to pay taxes as
another, one must identify the universe of comparison. The jurisdic-
tional question becomes equivalent to asking whose ability to pay.
Second, assuming citizens abroad are properly included within this
universe, the question remains whether unique aspects of living
abroad require the United States to impose no more than a nominal
tax burden on these citizens.
foreign jurisdiction might pay little or no U.S. income tax after the foreign tax credit, while
a U.S. citizen residing in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction might pay significant U.S. income
taxes, even though both citizens might receive the same benefits from the United States.
150 The list of benefits in this subpart is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, a
U.S. citizen also has the benefit of traveling on a U.S. passport. See Stephen Gray, Second
Citizenships, in LEGAL ISSUES IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL SERVICES 41, 41-58 (Rose-Marie
B. Antoine ed., 2004) (summarizing costs and merits of various countries' citizenship
acquisition programs); Marshall Langer, Introduction to Economic Citizenship/Second Citi-
zenship, in LEGAL ISSUES IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra, at 37-40 (same);
Marie Tyler, U.S. Visitor Crackdown Spurs Passport Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES, June 22, 2006,
at Al (noting practical limitations on traveling with U.S. passport).
151 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. TAXATION OF CITIZENS WORKING IN OTHER
COUNTRIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 44 (1978), reprinted in Taxation of Americans
Working Abroad: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 171 (1978) ("U.S.
tax system is progressive, based on the notion of ability to pay .... ). This Article does not
revisit the debates regarding the underlying merits of ability-to-pay principles. See gener-
ally supra note 118 (citing sources debating ability-to-pay and benefits theories); cf J.
Clifton Fleming et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for
Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299 (2001) (applying ability-to-pay principles
to justify worldwide taxation of U.S. residents).
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i. Defining the Community
Before comparing people's ability to pay, the relevant universe
must be defined. The threshold question is whether ability-to-pay
analysis should adopt a worldwide perspective, which would consider
the relative incomes of all individuals worldwide, or whether it should
adopt a national perspective, looking only at the incomes of members
of U.S. society (however defined). Commentators who have
addressed this issue have generally concluded that, for both practical
and theoretical reasons, U.S. tax policy should take a national per-
spective. 152 As the ABA Task Force Report observed, "It would be an
impossible goal for U.S. tax policy to achieve global distributive
justice."
153
Given this, the question still remains: Do citizens residing
outside the United States fit within this national perspective? Is their
connection to "U.S. society .. so substantial that fundamental fair-
ness requires their net incomes to be compared with the net incomes
of.. . U.S. residents for purposes of making an equitable allocation of
the tax burden under an ability-to-pay system[?]' 1 54 Commentators
often make general references to citizens and residents as coming
within this definition.155 Professor Gann, however, has questioned
whether citizens residing abroad are necessarily a part of U.S. society
for the purposes of this inquiry. 156 For example, a U.S. citizen who
has resided for many years in a foreign country might argue that she
should be compared to other residents of that foreign country, rather
than to persons residing in the United States.
The fact that a person might be considered a member of another
country's society for purposes of ability-to-pay analysis-whether
because he is a dual citizen of that other country or because he resides
there-should not necessarily preclude the United States from
treating him as a member of U.S. society in this context. Given
modern improvements in communication and mobility, an individual
152 See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 679 (stating that U.S. tax policy
should focus on citizens and residents because it cannot achieve global distributive justice);
Graetz, supra note 12, at 301 (arguing that "national rather than worldwide perspective
seems appropriate").
153 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 679.
154 Fleming et al., supra note 151, at 309.
155 See Gann, supra note 70, at 64 (noting that many commentators merely "assume that
the appropriate comparison is of all U.S. citizens, regardless of where they live").
156 Id. at 64-65 (raising question about proper equity comparison but concluding that
this is question of judgment that cannot be answered objectively). Professors Fleming,
Peroni, and Shay also raise this issue, although they do not address it in detail because it
only tangentially relates to their principal analysis and therefore is "outside the scope of
[their] article." Fleming et al., supra note 151, at 309-10 & n.18.
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might have significant ties to more than one place. Indeed, this phe-
nomenon often occurs in the context of residence-based (as opposed
to citizenship-based) taxation. Because there is no uniform definition
of residence for tax purposes, a taxpayer who spends significant time
in two countries over the course of the year may be treated as a resi-
dent under each country's tax law.157 Just as residence-based taxation
does not necessarily preclude multiple countries from taxing an indi-
vidual's worldwide income under ability-to-pay principles, citizenship-
based taxation should not preclude this potential result. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the United States allows a
foreign tax credit with respect to foreign taxes paid on foreign
income.158 By providing this unilateral relief, the United States
ensures that citizenship-based taxation (as well as residence-based
taxation) generally does not result in double taxation of income for
taxpayers with residence or dual citizenship in another country.
159
There are strong arguments for treating citizens abroad as mem-
bers of U.S. society for purposes of the distributional equity analysis.
The individual, by retaining his U.S. citizenship, is expressing a volun-
tary identification with the United States. 160 After all, a citizen living
abroad has the right to renounce U.S. citizenship if he desires. 16'
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the retention of U.S.
citizenship reflects a self-identification with the population of the
United States (or the belief that the benefits of citizenship are worth
the tax cost).
In addition to this implicit voluntary expression by the individual
himself, organizations representing the interests of U.S. citizens
abroad often highlight the significant ongoing ties between overseas
157 Indeed, bilateral tax treaties generally contain a provision to address these situations.
See OECD MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY, supra note 114, art. 4(2) (establishing how to
determine residency status of individuals who are residents of two countries). While each
country's tax law might mitigate the potential double taxation in this setting unilaterally, a
tax treaty, by establishing tiebreaker rules that treat the taxpayer as a resident of only one
country, provides more comprehensive relief.
158 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
159 While the foreign tax credit eliminates double taxation in most situations, it might
fail to do so in rare circumstances. For example, if both the United States and the tax-
payer's country of residence consider the income to have a domestic source under their tax
laws, neither country might be willing to give a foreign tax credit for tax paid to the other
country. Such problems can often be addressed through a bilateral tax treaty if one is in
force between the two countries.
160 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that many citizens living abroad express
significant interest in ensuring that any children born abroad have U.S. citizenship,
reflecting a continued identification by the parent with the United States. See AM. CITI-
ZENS ABROAD, supra note 137, at 24-35 (answering variety of questions concerning citi-
zenship status of children born abroad).
161 See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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citizens and U.S. society. 162 In the context of congressional hearings
aimed at securing legislation that would benefit overseas Americans,
these organizations stressed the relationship of these individuals to
U.S. society. In a typical example, a witness testified:
Most Americans living overseas are just as "home grown" as I am,
and many have family situations similar to mine .... We keep our
links to the United States as strong as possible, visiting "home" as
often as possible, educating our children in U.S. schools if we can
afford it and if they are available where we live. We go to great
lengths to make sure that our children have U.S. citizenship and
valid passports. We struggle to ensure that our U.S. tax obligations
are met. We vote in U.S. elections despite the difficulties with
absentee balloting.
163
More recently, during hearings addressing the feasibility of con-
ducting an official census of U.S. citizens residing overseas, a witness
stated that such a census "will respond to the patriotic desire of the
American community around the world to be counted, to be mea-
sured, to be seen in its proper proportions as a dynamic part of our
society. '' 164 Another witness, stating that his family's story, "as
Americans abroad, is not unusual," explained that "American institu-
tions and the American way of life remain very important to me and
my family."'165 Granted, these statements might reflect self-serving
declarations in the context of lobbying for desired legislation. None-
theless, to the extent these assertions regarding societal ties are rele-
vant in securing legislation favored by overseas citizens, they seem
equally relevant in less favorable contexts, such as defining societal
ties for tax equity purposes.
Recent technological developments create even stronger links
between citizens residing abroad and those living in the United States.
162 In its guide for citizens abroad, American Citizens Abroad includes an extensive list
of "U.S. organizations of a benevolent or social nature abroad" and assures citizens who
are considering moving abroad that "[u]nless it is in the most remote spot, you will not
have to worry about getting homesick." AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, supra note 137, at 3-4.
163 Hearing, U.S. Citizens Overseas, supra note 112, at 38 (statement of Stephanie H.
Simonard).
164 Hearing, How Can We Count Them?, supra note 137, at 46 (statement of Thomas W.
Fina, Executive Director, Democrats Abroad) (emphasis added).
165 Id. (statement of T.B. McClelland). Similarly, overseas citizens groups, in advo-
cating an expansion of the foreign earned income exclusion, often stress the benefits to
U.S. society that purportedly accrue when U.S. citizens reside abroad. In particular, they
argue that U.S. citizens abroad act as cultural ambassadors on behalf of the United States
and have a natural tendency to prefer the purchase of U.S.-manufactured goods. Although
this Article suggests that these arguments are insufficient to justify an expansion of the
foreign earned income exclusion, see infra notes 344-52 and accompanying text, they none-
theless suggest that overseas citizens view themselves as having ongoing ties to U.S.
society.
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More than three decades ago, a witness testifying for absentee voting
legislation presciently commented on the correlation between techno-
logical improvements and overseas citizens' membership in U.S.
society. In assuring a 1973 Senate subcommittee that overseas citizens
were informed about issues and candidates, she observed that,
[I]n this jet age the world is getting smaller and smaller, and the
media is stronger and stronger. Everything that daily occurs in [the
United States] is brought to the attention of Americans overseas
just as promptly and just as completely as read in your morning
newspaper or heard in your evening television or radio newscast.166
Of course, the growth of the Internet has expanded these ties tre-
mendously, enabling a citizen abroad to view U.S. websites that pro-
vide up-to-date national and local news. 167 Similarly e-mail and
inexpensive international telephone service enable citizens overseas to
maintain constant contact with friends and relatives living in the
United States.
Citizens living in the United States also view U.S. citizens living
overseas as part of U.S. society, particularly in times of crisis. For
example, during the recent conflict in Lebanon, U.S. media focused
extensively on efforts by the State Department and U.S. Marines to
help thousands of U.S. citizens evacuate the country, implying that
citizens abroad are viewed as having special connections to the United
States that persons of other nationalities do not.168
This tendency of citizens in the United States to consider citizens
abroad to be part of their society might, at least in part, be due to the
country's history as a nation of immigrants. 169 Unlike other countries
that have experienced significantly greater emigration than immigra-
tion, the United States does not have a long history of its citizens
leaving the country permanently. 170 Accordingly, even those citizens
166 Hearing, Voting Abroad, supra note 138 (statement by Mitchell H. Cohen, Federa-
tion of American Women's Club Overseas).
167 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text; cf Ford O'Connell, Dual Citizenship
Comes with Dual Voting Responsibilities, MEDILL NEWS SERV., June 7, 2006, http://
mesh.medill.northwestern.edu/mnschicago/archives/2006/06/dualcitz-the-u.html (noting
how dual U.S.-Italian citizen who lives in United States and voted in Italian election keeps
abreast of Italian politics by watching 24-hour cable news).
168 See, e.g., Gately, supra note 129 (describing evacuation of U.S. citizens from
Lebanon); Sudarsan Raghavan, For Evacuees from Lebanon, a Bittersweet Arrival at BWI,
WASH. POST, July 21, 2006, at All (same).
169 Cf Desai et al., supra note 5, at 665, 687 n.2 (noting that United States is one of few
"traditional" immigration countries).
170 In contrast to the approximately 889,000 foreign persons who acquired U.S. citizen-
ship in a recent year, approximately 48,000 U.S.-born citizens emigrate to foreign countries
each year. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 30, 32 (2004), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/
nativedocuments/Citizenship_2004.pdf. The vast majority of these emigrants retain their
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who move abroad for extended periods might be viewed as likely to
return (whether this assumption is, in fact, true or not), and therefore
might be considered to be a continuing part of U.S. society by persons
who live here.
Of course, some persons living abroad who hold U.S. citizenship
might have only a tenuous connection to U.S. society under the above
factors. For example, a person born abroad who holds dual nation-
ality in the United States and his country of birth might never have
lived in the United States and might have no family or friends
there. 171 Nonetheless, given that large segments of the U.S. citizen
population abroad do have connections with the United States under
the factors discussed above, and that persons with few personal ties to
the United States maintain the option of voluntarily surrendering
their U.S. citizenship, 172 the general inclusion of U.S. citizens within
U.S. society for purposes of applying tax equity principles seems
reasonable.
ii. Unique Aspects of Living Abroad
Even if, as suggested in the prior subpart, citizens abroad should
be included within the universe of people whose ability to pay is rele-
vant for purposes of the U.S. income tax, equity principles might sup-
port special tax relief for these citizens.173 This subpart considers the
possibility of providing tax relief based on equitable treatment of the
citizen abroad. Whereas other arguments might support tax relief for
a particular type of taxpayer or income (e.g., earned income of a cit-
U.S. citizenship. See Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law:
Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy,
89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 890 n.127 (2004) (noting that between 1995 and 2001, approximately
600 people lost U.S. citizenship annually). In addition, between 220,000 and 300,000 for-
eign-born residents emigrate from the United States annually, although this number
includes noncitizens. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra, at 30.
171 In some cases, the person might not realize that he derived U.S. citizenship by reason
of birth to a U.S. citizen-parent. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE BY U.S. CITIZENS AND U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT
RESIDENTS RESIDING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED ISSUES 38-40 (1998)
(suggesting that tax relief might be appropriate for some of these "unknowing citizens"
who demonstrate that they were unaware of citizenship status and never claimed benefits
of citizenship). In the interest of disclosure, it should be noted that the author participated
in the drafting of the previously cited study while working at the Internal Revenue Service
and later at the Treasury Department.
172 See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
173 The 1978 tax act, which temporarily replaced the foreign earned income exclusion
with a set of targeted deductions aimed at the excess costs incurred by citizens working
abroad, reflected an attempt to achieve rough equity between citizens in the United States
and those abroad. It bears noting, however, that these deductions were available only to
citizens working abroad and not to those merely living off of investment income. See gen-
erally Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79 (critiquing 1978 act on equity and other grounds).
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izen working abroad) general equity-based arguments might, if appli-
cable, support relief for all citizens living abroad, including those
receiving passive investment income.
174
Citizens abroad might argue that they are not comparable to citi-
zens living in the United States merely because their gross incomes
are the same. Due to additional expenses and foreign taxes associated
with living overseas, a citizen living abroad might be more properly
compared to a domestic citizen receiving a lower income. If such a
comparison is proper, the overseas citizen's U.S. tax liability should be
correspondingly reduced.
1 75
While many citizens residing abroad incur living expenses that
are substantially higher than those paid by citizens living in certain
parts of the United States, it is difficult to generalize. 76 For example,
the cost of living in Moscow is significantly higher than the cost of
living in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.177 However, some citizens
residing abroad might have lower living expenses than citizens living
in certain parts of the United States. For example, the cost of living in
New York City is much higher than that of Melbourne, Australia, or
Asunci6n, Paraguay. 1
78
Relief (such as a deduction) targeted at citizens living in high-cost
foreign jurisdictions might not be justified under equity principles. In
the domestic context, the Code generally does not differentiate
174 At least one commentator has previously argued for tax relief based on equity. See
Patton, supra note 113, at 730-32 (concluding that "It]he simplest and fairest answer... is
to exempt the American citizen resident overseas from United States income tax jurisdic-
tion altogether"). Most advocacy of special tax relief for overseas citizens, however, has
focused on other policy concerns such as competitiveness. These concerns are addressed in
Part IV.
175 This could be viewed as either a horizontal equity or a vertical equity argument. To
the extent it compares two persons who have the same nominal income, the one in the
higher-cost jurisdiction could argue that his ability to pay is less, and therefore that his tax
liability should be lower under vertical equity ability-to-pay criteria. Cf. Michael S. Knoll
& Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living Costs and
Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) (using ability-to-pay language with respect
to proposal for cost-of-living adjustments in domestic context). To the extent a person in a
higher-cost jurisdiction suggests that he is similarly situated to a person with lower nominal
income in the United States and should be taxed accordingly, it could be viewed as a hori-
zontal equity argument.
176 See Sobel, supra note 70, at 107 ("Because the circumstances of the expatriate may
vary greatly from one locale to another, little definite can be said .... ").
177 See Mercer Human Resource Consulting, Worldwide Cost of Living Survey 2006-
City Rankings (June 26, 2006), http://www.mercerhr.com/referencecontent.jhtml?
idContent=1142150 (listing Moscow as most expensive city worldwide and Winston-Salem
as cheapest U.S. city). This survey claims to be the "world's most comprehensive cost-of-
living survey and is used to help multinational companies and governments determine
compensation allowances for their expatriate employees." Id.
178 See id. (ranking New York City as most expensive, Asunci6n as least, and Melbourne
as squarely in between).
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between high-cost and low-cost cities.179 A person living in New York
City and earning $50,000 does not receive a special cost-of-living
deduction even though his real purchasing power may be less than
that of a person earning $50,000 in Springfield, Missouri. Because
these concerns are endemic to the tax system even in a domestic con-
text,180 it is difficult to justify granting relief on these grounds solely to
citizens living abroad.181 Moreover, to the extent that the costs of
living are higher abroad, these higher costs might generate larger
deductions under existing tax provisions.
82
Another possible equity-based argument is that a citizen residing
abroad incurs unique expenses that warrant tax relief.1 83 For example,
a person living abroad might incur expenses if he flies back to the
United States periodically to visit friends or family. Also, citizens
living abroad might have to pay tuition to send their children to a
private school if the local schools are inadequate or in order to ensure
that their children are taught in English.184 While the 1978 tax act
provided deductions for these particular expenses, 85 it is important to
note that they too are not unique to citizens living abroad. For
example, many citizens might be raised in one region of the United
States and then move to another region for employment purposes.
These people might incur costs if they fly "home" periodically, yet the
179 See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 95TH CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK
FORCE ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 14 (Comm. Print 1977) ("[N]one of the deductions,
credits, exemptions, or exclusions provided in the Code are predicated upon cost-of-living
differences that may exist between different localities in the United States."); CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., supra note 151, at 14 ("The U.S. tax system is not ... indexed to account
for variations in costs of living among areas within the United States .... ").
180 Cf. Knoll & Griffith, supra note 175, at 989 (proposing tax adjustments to reflect
regional cost-of-living differences within United States, based on efficiency rather than
equity grounds). To the extent Congress ever adopted this type of relief in the domestic
context, similar cost-of-living adjustments might also be warranted for citizens living
outside the United States.
181 The argument for equity-based relief is even weaker when a citizen is working
abroad for a company that provides an incentive package to offset the higher costs. See
Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1119-21 (making similar arguments).
182 For example, the home mortgage interest deduction applies regardless of whether
the residence is in the United States or a foreign country. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2000); cf. I.R.C.
§ 121 (2000) (stating that exclusion for gain from sale of principal residence is not limited
to U.S. residences).
183 This argument often is made in the context of ensuring American competitiveness
overseas. However, it also raises issues of equity to the extent it compares the status of
citizens residing abroad to that of citizens living in the United States. See Postlewaite &
Stern, supra note 79, at 1114-18 (critiquing cost-of-living differential and related benefits
of 1978 tax act on equity grounds).
184 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 75.
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Code provides no deduction for these expenses. 18 6 Similarly, a large
number of people living in the United States send their children to
private school in lieu of public school for a variety of reasons,187 yet
the costs of private elementary and secondary school tuition are gen-
erally not deductible.188 In this context, it is difficult to justify on
equity grounds special tax benefits only for citizens abroad who incur
these expenses.
Finally, a potential equity argument is that citizens abroad pay
other taxes in addition to the U.S. federal income tax. Commentators
have suggested that citizens living abroad should not be subject to
U.S. income tax because they often incur high foreign taxes.
189 Of
course, to the extent these foreign taxes are income taxes, the foreign
tax credit generally ensures equity by reducing the U.S. tax accord-
ingly. 190 However, to the extent that foreign taxes are consumption-
based, as is the case with value-added taxes (VATs), the foreign tax
credit will not apply.
Several factors reduce the adverse equitable impact of foreign
VATs. First, many countries with VATs also have high income tax
rates, 191 in which case the foreign tax credit might eliminate all U.S.
186 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 151, at 42-43 (noting that home travel tax
benefit for citizens working abroad is difficult to defend under such circumstances).
187 In 2006, approximately 6.4 million students were enrolled in private elementary and
high schools in the United States, representing just under twelve percent of the total U.S.
school enrollment. See Thomas D. Snyder et al., Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005, at 15 tbl.3 (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/d05/tables/dt05_003.asp.
188 Cf. I.R.C. § 222 (Supp. III 2003), amended by Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922 (allowing deduction only for certain col-
lege-level tuition). Moreover, unlike the citizen in the United States, the citizen abroad is
not subject to the U.S. state property taxes that often support public schools. See
Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1118 (arguing that any tax relief for schooling of
citizens abroad should be reduced by domestic property taxes avoided). However, the
taxes paid by the citizen abroad to his country of residence might offset this potential
advantage.
189 See, e.g., Patton, supra note 113, at 697-98, 730 (discussing high income and con-
sumption taxes paid by many U.S. citizens living in foreign countries).
190 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. If the effective foreign income tax
rate exceeds the U.S. tax rate, the citizen living abroad might pay higher total income taxes
than a citizen living in the United States. This result, however, is a function of the high
rates imposed by the foreign country, not the imposition of U.S. tax, because the foreign
tax credit generally would eliminate all of the U.S. income tax on that foreign income.
191 For a recent summary of the VAT rates in various OECD countries, see ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONSUMPTION TAx TRENDS: VAT/GST AND EXCISE
RATES, TRENDS AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES 30-31 tbl.3.5 (2006). Among OECD coun-
tries, the standard VAT rates range from five percent (Japan) to twenty-five percent
(Denmark, Hungary, Norway, and Sweden), id., although "a wide range of lower rates,
exemptions and special arrangements" are often available, id. at 24. The unweighted
average VAT rate in OECD countries is approximately 17.7%. Id. at 31 tbl.3.5.
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income tax. Thus, this equity argument would apply only with respect
to high-VAT, low-income-tax countries. As a practical matter, many
low-income-tax jurisdictions for which overseas citizens groups seek
U.S. tax relief do not fit this category. 192 Furthermore, a citizen living
in the United States might incur both state and local income taxes.
Unlike foreign income taxes, which are creditable (whether imposed
at the federal or local level in the foreign country), U.S. state and local
income taxes are only deductible. 193 In addition, a citizen living in the
United States might pay significant consumption taxes in the form of
state sales taxes. For many taxpayers, these sales taxes are not
deductible for federal income tax purposes. 194 Because of these
various factors, it is difficult to determine the extent, if any, that citi-
zens living abroad bear a heavier overall tax burden than those living
in the United States 195 and therefore difficult to justify eliminating cit-
izenship-based taxation on equity grounds.
2. Neutrality-Where to Live and Whether to Renounce Citizenship
Questions of neutrality play an important role in tax policy anal-
ysis. These inquiries generally focus on the efficient allocation of cap-
ital investment. 196 However, the threshold question of whether the
192 For example, Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong do not have VATs, while Singapore has
only a five percent consumption tax (in the form of a goods and services tax). The Fed'n of
Int'l Trade Ass'n, Country Profiles and Resources, http://www.fita.org/countries/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2007).
193 I.R.C. § 164(a) (2000).. A deduction only reduces the net federal tax liability by an
amount equal to the state tax multiplied by the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, whereas a
credit would reduce the federal tax liability by the full amount of the creditable tax.
194 I.R.C. § 164(b)(5) (West Supp. 2005), amended by Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 103, 120 Stat. 2922. Because a taxpayer electing to deduct
state sales taxes must forego the deduction for state and local income taxes, this deduction
generally is of benefit only for taxpayers who reside in the few states without income taxes.
195 See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 95TH CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK
FORCE ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 15-16 (Comm. Print 1977) ("[I]t is difficult to deter-
mine whether individuals working abroad are generally better off or worse off than those
working in the United States from a tax standpoint.").
196 There are two principal competing approaches for determining whether a U.S. tax is
"neutral" with respect to capital investment: capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital
import neutrality (CIN). See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 17-19 (3d ed. 2006)
(describing these and third approach, "national" neutrality). CEN focuses on whether a
U.S. person (however defined) pays the same total tax (U.S. and foreign) on his investment
income, regardless of where the income is earned, leaving that person's decision on
whether to invest in the United States or abroad dependent only on the risk-adjusted
return of the investment, rather than on tax considerations. Id. at 18. CEN generally sup-
ports taxing U.S. persons on their worldwide income, with some form of foreign tax credit
to alleviate double taxation from foreign investments. In contrast, CIN attempts to achieve
neutrality from the perspective of the country where investments are made. Id. Under a
CIN perspective, all investments made within a particular country should be taxed the
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United States should use citizenship as a jurisdictional basis does not
fit squarely within this capital-focused framework. 97 Instead, the
threshold jurisdictional question impacts more fundamental aspects of
neutrality: the effect of this tax policy on where a citizen chooses to
live and whether those living abroad choose to renounce their U.S.
citizenship.
A person might choose to live in a particular country for a variety
of reasons including personal and family history, social or cultural
connections, nationality status, economic opportunities, and climate
preferences. A person's nationality is usually a function of his place of
birth and/or the nationality of his parents, but he might choose to
acquire a new nationality (and possibly renounce an existing one) for
similar reasons. Because of the personal nature of these issues, this
analysis assumes that a neutral tax policy-one that neither encour-
ages nor discourages decisions regarding place of residence or nation-
ality-is preferable to a policy that actively attempts to influence
these decisions.198 Moreover, in order to isolate the threshold juris-
dictional question from additional issues that may arise in the context
of foreign earned income, 199 the neutrality inquiry in this subpart
focuses on a hypothetical U.S. citizen who principally receives invest-
ment-type income.
same (i.e., at the rate imposed by the destination country of the investment). Accordingly,
CIN supports a territorial system where the United States would not tax the foreign invest-
ment income of U.S. persons (however defined). Id. Economists and analysts disagree as
to which approach is preferable. Id. at 17-19; cf. Graetz, supra note 12, at 269-97
(explaining competing theories and suggesting that less reliance should be placed on
them).
197 Whereas the jurisdictional question asks whether a U.S. citizen abroad should be
considered a U.S. person, CEN, by focusing on neutral treatment of a U.S. person's
domestic and foreign investments, presupposes that the taxpayer whose investment deci-
sion is being examined is a U.S. person. The jurisdictional determination undoubtedly will
have economic effects. For example, if the United States decides not to tax based on citi-
zenship, a U.S. citizen abroad might prefer an investment in a no-tax jurisdiction over a
slightly better investment in the United States that would be subject to U.S. source-based
taxation. However, this result is no different than that faced by any nonresident alien (who
also is treated as a non-U.S. person by the Code), and is a function of the United States'
decision to impose source-based taxation on non-U.S. persons (however defined), with the
resulting possibility that it might lose some investments at the margin from foreign persons.
198 Some commentators have suggested that under certain circumstances-in particular,
when economically less developed countries face the "brain drain" of educated persons
leaving to accept jobs in more developed countries-a country's tax code should be used to
offset the adverse impacts of emigration. See Desai et al., supra note 5, 682-83 (discussing
theoretical benefits and practical enforcement difficulties of economically developing
countries taxing worldwide income of citizens abroad).
199 For a discussion of these issues, see infra Part IV.
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a. Choice of Residence
A citizenship-based tax regime minimizes the role of taxes in a
citizen's residency decision. If a citizen is subject to U.S. tax regard-
less of where he lives, his residency decision will be governed prima-
rily by the nontax factors discussed in the preceding paragraph. In
contrast, a tax system that does not use citizenship as a basis to tax
might significantly impact a U.S. citizen's choice of where to live.200
While many citizens, for the personal reasons listed above, might
choose to continue residing in the United States, and thereby be taxed
as residents on their worldwide income, many might decide that signif-
icant tax savings justify moving from the United States to a low- or no-
tax jurisdiction. 201 Indeed, other economically developed countries
that generally do not tax their citizens abroad face significant
problems with citizens moving abroad to avoid tax liability. 20 2
This concern was raised during the 1926 hearings regarding the
foreign earned income exclusion, although at the time one commen-
tator insisted that, in light of the difficulties American companies
encountered trying to induce American employees to relocate abroad,
he had "no fear" of tax-motivated changes in residence. 20 3 Similarly,
in 1975 a commentator claimed that such concerns were unwarranted,
because "the frequent occurrence of abuse would require a mobility
of population which probably does not exist. '20 4 Regardless of the
accuracy of these assertions when they were made in 1926 and 1975,
subsequent improvements in communication and travel may have so
increased individual mobility that a significant number of persons
today might be willing to move abroad, at least for relatively short
200 See Peroni, supra note 111, at 1008 (noting "social behavior" effect regarding cit-
izen's choice of residence in context of section 911 foreign earned income exclusion).
201 Cf. Shay et al., supra note 121, at 111 n.96 (citing corporate inversion phenomenon
as evidence that "if it is possible for a resident to achieve higher after-tax income by
earning it as a nonresident, then resident taxpayers will take steps to do so"). Similarly,
citizens who live abroad and would like to return to the United States for personal reasons
might be discouraged from doing so under such a system because reestablishing U.S. resi-
dence would subject them to U.S. income taxation.
202 For example, the French government estimates that at least one millionaire per day
abandons French residence in order to avoid Fre:ch taxes. Molly Moore, Old Money, New
Money Flee France and Its Wealth Tax, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at A12. Another recent
example involves members of the Rolling Stones, who, despite their U.K. nationality,
reportedly have paid an effective U.K. tax rate of only 1.6% on their royalties and other
income during the past twenty years because they have maintained their tax residence
outside the United Kingdom. Katie Hind, A Rolling Stone Gathers No Tax (Or Just 1.6pc
on E354m), DAILY MAIL (London), Aug. 2, 2006, at 29.
203 67 CONG. REc. 3782 (1926).
204 Patton, supra note 113, at 733.
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periods, if doing so resulted in significant tax savings (e.g., arranging
to sell a significantly appreciated asset during that period). 20 5
The number of citizens who would establish foreign residence
under such a system would depend, in part, on the extent to which
they could continue to spend time in the United States without being
treated as a "resident" for tax purposes. This would put significant
pressure on the definition of resident. If the current "substantial pres-
ence" residence test applicable to aliens were extended to citizens, 20 6
a citizen could spend approximately four months in the United States
without becoming a U.S. resident and still avoid taxation on both
investment and earned income from foreign sources. 20 7 Such a test
might encourage many high-income Americans to relocate outside the
United States for eight months per year. Even if a more stringent
standard were used for citizens leaving the country, such as requiring
the citizen to establish "bona fide" residence outside the United
States for a minimum length of time,20 8 a significant number of people
might do so if the tax savings were high enough.
In order to avoid abuses that might occur if Congress were to
eliminate the taxation of citizens abroad, some commentators suggest
coupling the elimination of citizenship-based tax with an anti-abuse
tax regime targeting citizens who cease to be U.S. residents.20 9 For
example, Congress could extend Code section 877 (the special regime
that taxes certain U.S.-source income for ten years following a
205 After all, significant numbers of (presumably high income) "snow birds" already
move from colder areas of the United States to Florida or the U.S. Southwest during the
winter months without any federal tax incentive (although some of them might seek state
tax benefits by claiming a Florida domicile).
206 The substantial presence test treats an alien as a U.S. tax resident if the individual
has at least 183 days of physical presence in the United States under a three-year weighted
formula (the number of days of physical presence in the current year, plus 1/3 of the days
of physical presence in the immediately prior year, plus 1/6 of the days of physical presence
in the second prior year). I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (2000).
207 Presumably, the U.S. citizen would continue to be taxed on U.S. source income in
the same manner as nonresident aliens. This approach would enable the U.S. citizen to
receive interest from U.S. banks and U.S. corporate debt obligations without tax, because
nonresident aliens generally are not taxed on these items of U.S. source income. I.R.C.
§ 871(h)-(i) (2000).
208 See Patton, supra note 113, at 733 ("[T]wo full years of bona fide residence should be
sufficient .... "). Some legislative proposals to eliminate citizenship-based taxation have
focused on a combination of these tests. See H.R. 4562, 102d Cong. (1992) (proposing to
eliminate most taxation of foreign income of U.S. citizen who is either bona fide resident
of foreign country for entire taxable year or present in foreign countries for at least seven-
teen months in eighteen-month period); H.R. 2430, 102d Cong. (1991) (same); supra note 4
(describing other countries' extension of "residence" test to prevent citizens from escaping
tax by leaving for short periods).
209 See Gann, supra note 70, at 67-68 (suggesting revision of section 877 to apply to
citizens who shift residence abroad and addition of departure tax on unrealized gains).
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person's renunciation of citizenship) to these citizens or treat the loss
of residence as a realization event, requiring the citizen to pay tax on
the gain in certain appreciated assets at the time of residence
termination.
210
This approach has difficulties, both from a practical and theoret-
ical perspective. As a practical matter, despite several rounds of legis-
lative changes, section 877 has been largely unenforceable against
individuals who renounce their citizenship. 211 Although enforcement
might be easier in the proposed context because an ongoing citizen
might be more willing to comply than would a former citizen, it would
allow a person with significant foreign holdings, or one who is patient
enough to wait ten years before selling his stock, to reap significant
tax benefits.212 A mark-to-market approach, treating the residence
change as a realization event, might have an impact on some citizens,
particularly if most of their assets consist of highly appreciated prop-
erty.213 However, it would not affect individuals whose assets consist
primarily of unappreciated property.
214
Thus, to the extent these proposals are intended to introduce
neutrality into a citizen's decision to establish residence abroad, they
accomplish their goal in an unpredictable and selective way.215 Some
citizens might trigger a significant tax burden by changing residence,
and therefore would have a strong incentive to avoid it. Others would
face no significant adverse tax consequences and could reap signifi-
cant future benefits by moving abroad.
Even if such an approach succeeded in achieving neutrality, it
would merely remove one objection to eliminating the citizenship tax.
Unlike retaining the tax, a choice already neutral with respect to resi-
dence decisions, eliminating the tax and imposing an anti-abuse
regime fails to comport with the fundamental justifications discussed
in the previous subparts for imposing citizenship-based taxation. As
discussed previously, a citizen who moves abroad continues to be a
part of U.S. society in a significant sense and retains the benefits of
210 Id.
211 See Kirsch, supra note 170, at 886-87 (describing enforcement issues and other
problems with section 877 regime).
212 Id. Indeed, this provision would encourage a citizen contemplating moving abroad
to shift his investments to foreign assets well in advance of the move.
213 For a discussion of mark-to-market proposals in the context of citizens surrendering
citizenship, see id. at 883-85.
214 That is, property whose value does not significantly exceed its tax basis. Many fixed-
income instruments might fit this category, as well as property that was recently inherited
(because the recipient generally receives a stepped-up basis upon inherited property).
215 Cf Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1087, 1109-20 (1996) (dis-
cussing nonneutrality of proposed mark-to-market regime for individuals who surrender
citizenship for tax-avoidance purposes).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 82:443
TAXING CITIZENS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
U.S. citizenship. An anti-abuse regime, focusing only on "settling up"
a citizen's existing tax liabilities at the time he ceases to reside in the
United States and not taxing the citizen thereafter, allows the nonresi-
dent citizen to continue being a part of U.S. society and retain the
benefits of U.S. citizenship for subsequent periods without supporting
the country through tax payments.
b. Renunciation of Citizenship
Whereas citizenship-based taxation is neutral with regard to resi-
dency decisions, it might not be neutral with regard to a person's deci-
sion to retain or surrender citizenship. A citizen living abroad might
decide that the privilege of returning to the United States, as well as
the other benefits of citizenship, do not justify the "price" of that citi-
zenship in the form of taxes. If so, he could obtain another nation-
ality216 and subsequently renounce or otherwise terminate his U.S.
citizenship. 217 In contrast, a tax system that does not use citizenship as
a basis to tax would not impact a person's citizenship decision.
The number of U.S. citizens who have renounced their citizenship
under the current citizenship-based tax regime is relatively small,
21 8
although the list includes several high-profile, wealthy individuals.
219
This reluctance to renounce citizenship for tax purposes might be the
result of various factors such as a perception that the benefits of citi-
zenship justify the taxes, patriotism or other feelings of personal
attachment to the country, or a concern about potentially adverse con-
sequences under existing tax and immigration laws.
Despite the low incidence of renunciation, this issue has received
significant political attention, with Congress enacting several provi-
216 An active market currently exists for those seeking to purchase citizenship in a
second country. See Gray, supra note 150, at 45-56 (summarizing costs and merits of
various countries' citizenship acquisition programs); Langer, supra note 150, at 37-40
(presenting basic rationales for second citizenships).
217 See Kirsch, supra note 10, at 381-83 (describing current constitutional, statutory, and
administrative procedures for renouncing U.S. citizenship). In contemplating the adoption
of citizenship-based taxation by economically less developed countries, Professors Desai,
Kapur, and McHale noted that "many citizens of rich countries working overseas have the
incentive to remain tax compliant because of their intention to return home," whereas
citizens of less developed countries might not place as much value on the right to return
home and therefore might view the "price of citizenship" as too high, resulting in waves of
citizenship renunciations by the latter group. Desai et al., supra note 5, at 683.
218 Between 1991 and 2001, an average of fewer than 600 individuals per year (0.00023%
of the citizenship population) renounced or otherwise lost U.S. citizenship. Kirsch, supra
note 170, at 876. No reliable data exist to indicate how many of these individuals
renounced citizenship for tax purposes, but it is believed that the large majority were not
tax motivated. See id. at 876 & n.51 (providing examples of citizens who surrendered citi-
zenship for nontax purposes).
219 See id. at 893 n.142, 897-98 nn.156-59 (listing selective names).
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sions aimed at penalizing individuals who surrender citizenship for tax
purposes. For example, legislation enacted in 1996 attempts to pub-
licly shame these expatriates via name publication 220 and bans them
from future entry into the United States by including them on a no-
admit list with terrorists, World War II-era Nazis, practicing
polygamists, and others. 221 Legislation enacted in 2004 creates a spe-
cial definition of "citizenship" that applies only for tax purposes, pro-
viding that under certain circumstances a person might continue to be
taxed on his worldwide income as a "citizen" even when he is actually
no longer a citizen under U.S. nationality law.
222
Although most people probably find the thought of renouncing
citizenship to save taxes highly objectionable, 223 it is important that
Congress not enact tax provisions penalizing it or making it overly
burdensome. The right to renounce citizenship has played an impor-
tant role in U.S. history. More importantly for purposes of this
Article, the right to renounce citizenship plays an important role in
the earlier analysis of the equitable grounds for imposing citizenship-
based taxation. As discussed above, an important justification for
treating an overseas citizen as a member of U.S. society for purposes
of ability-to-pay equity analysis is the fact that the person, by retaining
citizenship, voluntarily remains a part of that society. If unreasonable
barriers are imposed on citizenship renunciation, a person's retention
of citizenship might not reflect a voluntary retention of ties with the
United States. Thus, the possibility that some citizens might find the
tax costs of citizenship too high, and might choose to surrender citi-
zenship, is a necessary corollary to this justification for citizenship-
based taxation.
The extent to which the United States could impose some tax
consequences on a person's loss of citizenship without undermining
the case for citizenship-based taxation is unclear. Of course, the elimi-
nation of all special tax consequences, as Professor Abreu has advo-
cated, 224 would be consistent with imposing taxation based on the fact
220 I.R.C. § 6039G (West Supp. 2005); see also Kirsch, supra note 170, at 888-89, 906-12
(criticizing shaming sanctions).
221 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) (2000); see also Kirsch, supra note 170, at 890-92, 896-906
(criticizing banishment sanction).
222 See I.R.C. §§ 877(g), 7701(n) (West Supp. 2005); see generally Kirsch, supra note 10
(suggesting that provision is inconsistent with jurisdictional bases to tax under interna-
tional law and may violate Constitution).
223 As Professor Abreu observed, "Expatriation, like flag burning, seems like a good
thing to be against." Abreu, supra note 215, at 1162.
224 In analyzing the merits of various proposals targeting tax-motivated renunciations,
Professor Abreu concluded that no tax consequences should flow from a person's renunci-
ation of citizenship because it is not possible to create neutral tax rules in this area and,
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that an overseas citizen has voluntarily retained citizenship. Legisla-
tive proposals that would treat renunciation of citizenship as a realiza-
tion event, and thereby cause the recognition of gain with respect to
certain assets, might also be consistent with equity principles. Such
provisions cannot be fully neutral and might have disparate impacts
because some persons with significantly appreciated assets would owe
significant taxes, while those holding cash or nonappreciated assets
might not. Nevertheless, these provisions generally reflect an effort to
collect tax only with respect to economic appreciation that has
accrued during the period of citizenship and therefore can be viewed
as nonpunitive. 225 Moreover, to the extent these provisions mitigate
significant hardships, as, for example, when they allow the taxpayer to
delay payment of tax until the asset is actually sold, they might not
interfere with a person's decision to renounce citizenship. While this
type of anti-abuse measure is inappropriate for citizens residing
abroad, 26 the criticisms of these measures do not apply in the context
of renouncing citizenship. In the earlier analysis, because the tax-
payer continued to hold citizenship and thereby retained its benefits
and remained a part of U.S. society, an attempt to "settle up" and
impose no future taxes once residency was lost was inconsistent with
equity and benefits concerns. Where the person is actually losing citi-
zenship, an attempt to "settle up" and impose no future taxation
might be consistent with the equity concerns as well as the benefits
analysis.
Accordingly, if no special tax regime applied upon surrender of
citizenship, or even if a reasonably restricted mark-to-market provi-
sion were enacted with respect to persons who surrender citizenship, a
person who continues to hold citizenship could be viewed as doing so
voluntarily, thereby supporting the imposition of citizenship-based
taxation for citizens living abroad. However, provisions such as those
present in current immigration law that attempt to punish or impose
significant sanctions on tax-motivated renunciations undermine the
case for taxing those persons who live abroad and retain citizenship.
3. Compliance and Enforcement
The third traditional tax policy criterion focuses on administra-
tion and enforcement. In particular, it looks to whether a tax is rea-
sonably easy for the IRS to administer and enforce, and for taxpayers
more importantly, because the loss of citizenship has high inherent costs (i.e., the loss of
citizenship benefits). See Abreu, supra note 215, at 1109-20, 1158.
225 But see id. at 1120-31 (discussing potential penal nature of proposed mark-to-market
regime in context of tax-motivated citizenship renunciation).
226 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text for this criticism.
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to comply with. While there are frequent calls to simplify the Code in
order to improve enforcement and compliance, 27 these criteria are
often overlooked in the actual legislative process.
In the context of taxing citizens overseas, questions of enforce-
ment play a critical role.2 28 To the extent the tax on citizens living
abroad cannot be enforced, the equity and efficiency concerns dis-
cussed above may be moot. 22 9 Almost a century ago, Professor
Seligman, in questioning the advisability of the 1894 Act's purported
taxation of citizens abroad, noted that it might be "virtually impos-
sible" to reach the foreign income of a nonresident citizen.2 30 The
Philippines faced significant enforcement problems in the years before
it abandoned citizenship-based taxation in 1997.231 Even today, con-
cerns about enforcement might provide the strongest argument
against taxing the foreign source income of citizens residing abroad.
232
As a very broad generalization, citizens overseas can be viewed in
one of two categories with respect to compliance and enforcement
issues: those citizens who work for U.S. multinationals and those who
do not. Those who work for U.S. multinational corporations often
have employment contracts that make compliance more likely, con-
taining tax equalization or tax protection clauses that entitle them to
additional compensation to offset extra taxes and other expenses
227 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR AND
PRo-GRoWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 2-3 (2005) (criticizing com-
plexity of federal tax system); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF
THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIM-
PLIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECT-ION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF
1986 (Comm. Print 2001) (analyzing sources of complexity in tax code and making simplifi-
cation recommendations).
228 For a general discussion of the enforcement problems that arise in an international
context with respect to both individual and corporate taxpayers, see David R. Tillinghast,
Issues of International Tax Enforcement, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 38, 38-60
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
229 A recent study on the relationship between tax administration and tax design noted
that without considering administration issues, "the efficiency cost and the equity impact of
a real world tax system cannot be assessed." Arindam Das-Gupta, Implications of Tax
Administration for Tax Design: A Tentative Assessment, in THE CHALLENGES OF TAX
REFORM IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 363, 368 (James Alm et al. eds., 2006).
230 SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 517. In addition to this practical concern, Seligman,
writing in the period before the foreign tax credit had been enacted, opposed citizenship-
based taxation on principle because of the potential for double taxation. See id. at 517-18.
231 See Richard D. Pomp, The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing Its Nonresident
Citizens, in INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY, supra note 144, at 43, 45
("The Philippines appears to have been markedly unsuccessful in enforcing its tax on
emigrants. Noncompliance among this group is apparently widespread, and the
Philippines lacks any effective response or sanctions.").
232 Professor Avi-Yonah recently cited enforcement difficulties as a factor in concluding
that the advisability of citizenship-based taxation is "doubtful." Avi-Yonah, supra note
113, at 486.
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incurred by reason of accepting overseas employment.233 Moreover,
if citizens are working abroad for a U.S. employer, the IRS will
receive wage data from that employer, 234 making it easier to enforce
reporting requirements. 235 However, this aspect of enforcement
might decrease in the future to the extent that the Code, by defining
whether a corporation is a U.S. person based on place of incorpora-
tion, encourages more corporations to incorporate outside the United
States.
Citizens who do not work for U.S.-based multinationals do not
have this latter check on underreporting. This check will be entirely
absent for a citizen who derives all of his income from foreign sources
and has little ongoing contact with the United States. The IRS might
not be aware of the overseas citizen's existence, and even if the IRS is
aware, it might have significant difficulty determining the individual's
income and tax liability.236 Even if the IRS determines that an over-
seas citizen owes taxes, collection problems arise to the extent the
individual's assets are outside the United States.237
233 For a recent summary of these clauses and the way that they help tax compliance, see
Desai et al., supra note 5, at 681.
234 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 171, at 13 (describing limitations on wage
and salary information received by IRS); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINIS-
TRATION: NON-FILING AMONG U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD 13 (1998) (same). In addition, the
U.S. employer might be required to withhold U.S. income tax from the U.S. citizen's pay
unless foreign income tax withholding is also required. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL'N No. 54, TAX GUIDE FOR U.S. CITIZENS AND RESIDENT
ALIENS ABROAD 7 (2005). Research in the domestic context suggests that individuals
"covered by information reporting and tax withholding pay a far greater share of their true
tax liabilities than those who are not subject to them." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra, at 13.
235 A recent analysis focusing on citizens employed by U.S. firms concludes that "the
U.S. experience demonstrates the possibility of an expansive definition of individual taxa-
tion in a world characterized by global labor mobility." Desai et al., supra note 5, at 682.
Of course, the filing of the return does not necessarily mean that the return is accurate,
particularly with respect to income not related to the employment abroad. More generally,
a commentator observed that corporate executives transferred abroad might "quickly
catch the spirit of tax 'avoidance' found in parts of Europe." Patton, supra note 113, at
734.
236 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 171, at 13-14 (describing these difficulties).
The mere fact that a citizen overseas does not file a tax return does not necessarily indicate
that he is failing to pay U.S. taxes that are owed. In particular, the foreign earned income
exclusion and the foreign tax credit might eliminate any residual U.S. tax. See id. at 2-4
(noting that fifty percent of returns filed by overseas citizens or resident aliens report no
tax liability due to foreign earned income exclusion and foreign tax credit); cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.911-7(a)(2) (as amended in 1993) (describing circumstances when foreign earned
income exclusion is conditioned on filing return). For a discussion of additional adminis-
trative problems faced by the IRS in enforcing the tax laws against citizens overseas, see
generally OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 171.
237 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 171, at 14. For detailed discussions of the
issues raised with offshore collection, see SUSAN A. BERSON, FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION
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These difficulties combine to render almost impossible any esti-
mate of compliance by citizens residing overseas.2 38 Moreover, the
lack of a reliable estimate of the number of U.S. citizens residing
abroad only compounds the problem. In recent congressional testi-
mony, State Department officials provided estimates in the three to
four million range.239 As noted above, the U.S. Census Bureau con-
ducted, with disappointing results, a preliminary test in 2004 to deter-
mine the feasibility of counting citizens abroad for purposes of the
2010 census.
240
Despite the lack of reliable data, studies suggest that "nonfiling
may be relatively prevalent in some segments of the U.S. population
abroad. ' 241 The IRS has attempted various initiatives in order to
increase compliance by overseas citizens, such as simplifying reporting
requirements, increasing taxpayer education, and enlisting the assis-
tance of overseas organizations with U.S. citizen members.242
Although these efforts might improve compliance among certain citi-
zens, they generally will not help the IRS enforce the laws against
those who actively seek to evade taxes. Indeed, even in the case of
§ 13.10[31 (2003) and William M. Sharp, Sr. & Hale E. Sheppard, Defending Against IRS
Discovery in the International Arena, 101 TAX NOTES 889, 890, 897-900 (2003).
238 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 234, at 21 ("The extent and impact
of nonfiling abroad remain largely unknown ....").
239 Hearing, Protecting Citizens, supra note 130, at 5 (statement of Dianne M. Andruch,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Overseas Citizens Service, Bureau of Consular
Affairs). The U.S. Census Bureau submitted a report to Congress in 2001 in which it men-
tioned a State Department estimate that there were 3.8 million nonofficial U.S. citizens
living abroad, although the Census Bureau stated that "this number is not accurate"
because "[t]he Department of State does not officially track either the number or location
of U.S. citizens living in other countries." U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ISSUES OF COUNTING
AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN FUTURE CENSUSES 9 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/socdemo/overseas/overseas-congress-report.pdf. Other less reliable esti-
mates in proposed legislation or congressional testimony range as high as ten million,
although their providers might have had incentives to inflate the numbers. See, e.g., H.R.
1619, 108th Cong. (2003) (estimating three to six million in "Findings" section of bill advo-
cating inclusion of citizens abroad in 2010 census); S. 1682, 108th Cong. (2003) (same);
Hearing, How Can We Count Them?, supra note 137, at 63 (testimony of T.B. McClelland,
Member of the Board of Directors, American Business Council of the Gulf Countries).
The U.S. Census Bureau collected data on private citizens living abroad in 1960 and 1970.
See KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TECHNICAL PAPER 62, AMERICANS
OVERSEAS IN U.S. CENSUSES 37, 45-46 (1993), available at http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www/socdemo/overseas/techn62-3.pdf, http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/overseas/techn62-4.pdf. However, the data was deemed to be unreliable and was
not used for apportionment purposes. Id. For example, the Census Bureau estimated that
the 1970 data collection might have missed ninety percent of the U.S. citizens residing in
Canada and Mexico. Id. at 46.
240 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
241 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 234, at 21.
242 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 171, at 8-13 (discussing various IRS overseas
compliance intiatives).
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citizens living in the United States, the IRS has significant difficulties
preventing tax evasion with respect to income-producing assets held
outside the United States.
243
While compliance and enforcement remain very real concerns in
evaluating the merits of citizenship-based taxation, recent develop-
ments indicate that compliance by and enforcement against citizens
residing abroad is improving. For example, to the extent noncompli-
ance was a function of a lack of information or the difficulty of
obtaining necessary forms, the widespread availability of the Internet
provides significant relief.244 With respect to the collection of infor-
mation for enforcement, the IRS has undertaken high-profile efforts
to obtain information through third parties on offshore credit cards
held by U.S. persons. 245 Although this effort may have little direct
impact on citizens living abroad, 246 it reflects creative approaches to
the difficulties of enforcement in an international context. 247 As
Stephen Shay has observed, to the extent the IRS is able to obtain
information through new enforcement methods, it is important that
"successes be publicized. In the international arena, success in
obtaining information can have a high deterrence effect, particularly
after a long period of inactivity. '2 48
More importantly, the United States and other jurisdictions have
undertaken significant efforts to increase international cooperation in
243 See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOME-
LAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE
ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 1-2 (Comm. Print 2006) (describing use of offshore
tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions); David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Con-
trol, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at C1 (describing Senate subcommittee hearings on offshore
tax haven abuses).
244 See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra
note 171, at 10 (including improved Internet access to tax forms among "numerous [IRS]
measures to improve voluntary compliance by taxpayers overseas").
245 See Tillinghast, supra note 228, at 51-54 (discussing IRS's use of summonses to
obtain information about taxpayers from American credit card companies); Internal Rev-
enue Serv., Offshore Credit Card Program, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/o,,id=
105698,00.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (detailing measures taken by IRS's Offshore
Credit Card Program "to combat tax-avoidance schemes involving credit cards issued by
offshore banks").
246 For example, a John Doe summons issued on American Express required the com-
pany to provide records where the mailing address was in certain tax haven countries but
the transactions occurred in the United States. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 245. To
the extent a U.S. citizen living abroad did not have transactions in the United States, the
information resulting from this summons would not identify him.
247 See Tillinghast, supra note 228, at 54 (arguing that United States "needs to further
extend these innovations to keep up with a more complex financial world, in an era of
diminishing resources for tax law enforcement").
248 Stephen E. Shay, Comment on David R. Tillinghast, in THE CRISIS IN THE TAX
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 228, at 38, 66.
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tax enforcement matters.2 49 The United States has continued to
expand its income tax treaty network250 and has placed significant
emphasis on negotiating Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs).251 These agreements are primarily aimed at increasing
enforcement against U.S. citizens living in the United States who fail
to report income from outside the United States. However, the
TIEAs may also be useful with respect to an overseas citizen who fails
to report income from a country covered by a TIEA.2 52 The expan-
sion of the TIEA network is particularly noteworthy because recent
agreements have been signed with low- or no-tax jurisdictions that
might be viewed as possible locales for tax evasion, including Antigua
& Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and the
Netherlands Antilles.253 These TIEAs, however, will not necessarily
eliminate all tax evasion by citizens with investments in these coun-
249 These efforts correspond with efforts undertaken by the European Union as well as
the OECD. See Tillinghast, supra note 228, at 40-44 (discussing IRS measures to improve
exchange of information and implement "mutual-agreement procedure" for tax treaties).
250 In addition, the IRS has increased administrative efforts to secure information under
existing income tax treaties. See, e.g., Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information
with Other Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX
REV. 579, 600-01 (2004) (describing recent mutual agreement for enhanced information
sharing under U.S.-Switzerland tax treaty).
251 See Donald L. Korb, Chief Counsel, IRS, Remarks at the 18th Annual George
Washington University/IRS Institute on Current Issues in International Taxation (Dec. 8,
2005), in TAX NoTEs TODAY, Dec. 9, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com (commercial
electronic database requiring registration) (enter "2005 TNT 236-24" in "Get by Citation")
(describing recent increase in TIEAs). In addition, the IRS, in cooperation with U.S.
embassies located in countries that are members of the Organization of American States
(OAS), is attempting to revise the OAS Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty so that member
states will provide information in criminal tax cases (currently the treaty requires them to
provide information if the tax offense involves laundering of proceeds from certain speci-
fied nontax offenses). See Corporate and Partnership Enforcement Issues: Hearing Before
the S. Finance Comm., 105th Cong. (2006) (statement of Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Tax Division), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2005
test/061306testeo.pdf (discussing international cooperation in tax evasion investigations).
252 For example, some TIEAs explicitly state that the country will provide information
"without regard to whether the person to whom the information relates is. . . a resident of
a party [to this agreement]." E.g., Agreement for the Exchange of Information Relating to
Taxes, U.S.-Jersey, art. 2, Nov. 4, 2002, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5303, at 116,601; Agree-
ment for the Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes, U.S.-Guersey, art. 2, Sept. 19,
2002, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3613, at 88,601. The omission of this language from some
TIEAs does not necessarily indicate that the country would not exchange information with
respect to the income of a nonresident (e.g., a U.S. citizen who lives in a third country but
has income in the TIEA country), but it "leaves an open question that could result in
future litigation." William M. Sharp, Sr. et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Channel
Islands and Isle of Man Treaties, 98 TAX NOTES 737, 740 (2003) (comparing inclusion of
language in Guernsey/Jersey TIEAs with omission in Isle of Man TIEA).
253 Korb, supra note 251. See generally Sharp et al., supra note 252 (comparing
Guernsey/Jersey TIEAs with Isle of Man TIEA); William M. Sharp, Sr. et al., U.S. Tax
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tries. In particular, many TIEAs narrowly define the circumstances in
which an exchange is required, thereby limiting their usefulness with
respect to citizens residing abroad.254 Nonetheless, the fact that the
United States is undertaking these significant efforts to expand inter-
national cooperation in tax matters "provides a powerful deterrent to
taxpayers contemplating evasion by moving funds offshore." 255
The difficulties of enforcing a tax against citizens abroad-partic-
ularly those who intentionally structure their activities to evade
taxation-should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, given the
equity-based arguments addressed above, it is difficult to justify aban-
doning all taxation of citizens abroad merely because of these enforce-
ment concerns, particularly when it is difficult to evaluate how
widespread the problem actually is.
B. Effect on Social Norms
Tax law's expressive effects on social norms provide a further jus-
tification for taxing citizens residing abroad.256 In particular, the taxa-
tion of citizens abroad might have important implications for tax
compliance among citizens living in the United States. 257 An exten-
Information Exchange Agreements: A Comparative Analysis, 97 TAX NoTEs 827 (2002)
(comparing Cayman Islands, Bahamas, and British Virgin Islands TIEA).
254 For example, the U.S.-Cayman Islands TIEA requires the Cayman Islands to provide
information only if the IRS has a "valid reason" for suspecting a specific taxpayer of crim-
inal tax evasion. See Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in
Cayman Accounts, 103 TAX NoTEs 956, 962 (2004) (discussing practical limitations of U.S.-
Cayman Islands TIEAs).
255 Id. at 961. Sullivan, however, tempers his observation by noting that statements
claiming that offshore bank secrecy is evaporating are "probably overly optimistic assess-
ments of the current situation." Id.; see also Sharp et al., supra note 252, at 738 ("The...
most recent TIEAs clearly signal that the sun is setting on the abusive tax haven
industry."); Paula N. Singer, U.S. Policy on Taxing Citizens and Residents Abroad: A
Closer Look, 42 TAX NoTEs INT'L 1033, 1040 (2006) ("Taxes on [income from assets that
U.S. citizens and residents maintain abroad] can be expected to increase substantially over
the next few years through improved IRS processes using automated exchange of informa-
tion with treaty partners and income reported by qualified intermediaries."); Tillinghast,
supra note 228, at 42 ("[T]he tax haven agreements are a big step forward and will prove
useful to the IRS. If nothing else, [they] may scare some taxpayers away from these tax
havens.").
256 See Kirsch, supra note 170, at 913-16 (summarizing literature discussing expressive
effects of law); see also Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 311, 424 (2002) (observing in context of exercise of legal jurisdiction in cyberspace
that "assertion of jurisdiction, like all legal acts, can also be viewed as a meaning-producing
cultural product").
257 The assertion of taxing jurisdiction over all citizens, both at home and abroad, might
also be viewed as a statement about the importance of citizenship itself. This was perhaps
most evident in the Civil War income tax acts, where the exercise of citizenship-based
taxation could be viewed as a statement about the meaning of federal citizenship at a time
when the country was struggling with that issue. See supra note 29.
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sive body of literature suggests that people's willingness to comply
with tax law depends in part on their perception that others are paying
their fair share of taxes.258 As discussed above, it is reasonable to
believe that citizens living in the United States view citizens living
abroad as members of a common society.259 If the United States were
to eliminate taxation of citizens living abroad, those at home might
conclude that citizens abroad are "getting away with something" and
consequently lose confidence in the tax system and the social norm of
tax compliance.
Nonetheless, Congress should be cautious of relying on the
expressive function of tax law because it sometimes can have unin-
tended effects.260 For example, an argument can be made that the
exercise of citizenship-based taxation might undermine, rather than
further, social norms in the United States regarding tax compliance.
As discussed above, the IRS faces significant enforcement challenges
with respect to overseas citizens. If the public believes that a signifi-
cant number of citizens overseas are failing to comply with their filing
and payment obligations, citizens in the United States might become
less willing to comply with their own.
Thus, tax compliance norms might be undermined if Congress
eliminates citizenship-based taxation altogether, but they also might
be undermined if Congress imposes citizenship-based taxation and the
IRS is viewed as failing to enforce it. Given a choice between the two,
the risks seem greater in the first instance. If Congress eliminates citi-
zenship-based taxation so that citizens living abroad are no longer
subject to U.S. tax, the media is likely to highlight people who move
from the United States in order to escape taxes. 261 Indeed, such sto-
ries occur frequently in those jurisdictions that do not tax their citizens
abroad.2 62 In contrast, the norm-altering effect in the latter circum-
stance would occur only to the extent citizens already living overseas
258 See, e.g., John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and
Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY T&xis 43, 47 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (citing studies); Dan
M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 341 & n.33 (2001)
(same); see also Kirsch, supra note 170, at 917-18, 937 (same).
259 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
260 I have argued this point elsewhere. See Kirsch, supra note 170, at 916-21 (discussing
problems with banishment and shaming sanctions targeting tax-motivated expatriates).
261 It could be argued that the change in the tax law itself, by de-emphasizing citizen-
ship, might cause citizens in the United States to stop viewing citizens abroad as part of a
common society. If so, citizens in the United States would be less likely to view the non-
payment of taxes by citizens abroad as an abuse, and the adverse effects on compliance
within the United States would be minimized. However, given the strong identification
most U.S. citizens attach to citizenship, see supra notes 169-70, it is doubtful that a change
in the tax law itself would have this expressive effect.
262 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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are publicly identified as not complying with their U.S. tax obligations,
a relatively rare occurrence given the uncertainty regarding the gen-
eral level of noncompliance. Thus, eliminating citizenship-based taxa-
tion would probably have a greater adverse impact on tax compliance
norms than would its retention.
IV
THE WEAKENED CASE FOR EARNED INCOME EXCLUSIONS
As Part III demonstrates, the case for using citizenship as a juris-
dictional basis to tax remains in the twenty-first century. This Part
focuses on income earned by taxpayers living and working abroad and
considers whether that income should receive special treatment if the
United States continues to impose citizenship-based taxation. In par-
ticular, it focuses on whether foreign earned income (as opposed to
investment income) should be excluded from an overseas citizen's
gross income. As noted earlier, the Code currently excludes up to
$82,400, plus a limited amount attributable to housing costs. 263 Many
overseas citizens groups and business organizations, however, advo-
cate making the foreign earned income exclusion unlimited.264 The
following analysis evaluates the merits of such an unlimited
exclusion. 265
A. Double Taxation Arguments
Advocates of an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, per-
haps in an effort to simplify the issues and make their position more
appealing to legislators and the general public, often overstate the
problem of double taxation. 266 For example, a recent legislative press
263 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g., AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN H.K., supra note 5, at 2 ("Ideally, the U.S.
should revise its tax laws to join the international norm of not taxing the foreign earned
income of citizens who are working and living overseas."); AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, STOP
KILLING THE GOOSE THAT LAYS THE GOLDEN EGG, STOP THE DOUBLE TAXATION ON
AMERICANS WORKING ABROAD 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.aca.ch/goldgoos.pdf
(supporting legislation making exclusion unlimited).
265 Because the exclusion applies only to "earned" income, the U.S. citizen would
continue to have U.S. tax liability on investment income. Cf supra note 87 and accompa-
nying text (describing alternative methods for determining applicable marginal tax rate on
income not excluded). While focusing on an unlimited exclusion, the following analysis
highlights areas where a capped exclusion for foreign earned income would lead to signifi-
cantly different results.
266 An earlier commentator, observing the legislative debate on this issue a quarter cen-
tury ago, cited other examples of overstatements made by advocates of an unlimited for-
eign earned income exclusion, concluding that "[t]he sad part about expatriate taxation is
that many of the arguments may be justified; but so many of them are infuriating that the
good ones are often lost." Kingson, supra note 15, at 738.
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release 267 and several op-ed pieces,268 as well as earlier legislative tes-
timony,269 complain about the "double taxation" faced by citizens
abroad and advocate an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion as
necessary to eliminate this problem. This double taxation emphasis
fails to acknowledge that many foreign countries impose little or no
income tax on a U.S. citizen working there.270 Indeed, the press
release accompanying a recent legislative proposal implies the oppo-
site, claiming that once an unlimited exclusion is enacted, "[o]ther
nations would continue to tax that income, just as the United States
taxes the income of foreigners who live and work in America. '271
Thus, these arguments fail to acknowledge that in the case of U.S.
citizens living in certain countries, the U.S. tax is the only income tax
they pay and that if an unlimited exclusion were enacted, these indi-
viduals would pay no income tax to any country on their foreign
earned income.
272
Even in the context of citizens living and working in relatively
high-tax jurisdictions, such as many European countries, the double
taxation emphasis is misplaced. As discussed earlier, a citizen with
foreign source income may claim a foreign tax credit for income taxes
267 Press Release, Senator Jim DeMint, DeMint Bill Would End Double Tax on
Americans Working Abroad (June 13, 2006), available at http://demint.senate.gov/index
.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-id=387&Type=Press%2ORelease&
Month=6&Year=2006.
268 See, e.g., Gingrich & Kies, supra note 9 ("We are subject not only to U.S. tax on
these amounts, but also to taxes imposed by the foreign country."); Mitchell, supra note 9
("Since U.S. citizens living overseas are already, in most cases, paying local taxes in the
countries where they work, that means they end up being taxed twice ... .
269 For example, Representative Bill Alexander, in testimony before a House subcom-
mittee, was asked by a congressional colleague, "[H]ow many Americans abroad are sub-
ject to double taxation? Are most of them in that position? Do most countries tax their
earnings in addition?" Hearing, U.S. Citizens Overseas, supra note 112, at 12 (question of
Rep. Snowe). In response, Representative Alexander stated, "All of them ... [, a]ll
Americans pay double taxation, whereas their competitors do not." Id. (statement of Rep.
Alexander).
270 See Bradsher & Johnston, supra note 85 (citing "Bermuda, the Middle East,
Singapore and Hong Kong" as low-tax jurisdictions); Sharon Reier, Uncle Sam Takes a Bite
out of Expatriate Incomes: Burden of New Tax Law Expected to Fall on the Middle Class
and Semi-Retired, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 27, 2006, at 19 (citing "no-tax and low-tax
areas like much of the Middle East, some Caribbean nations and Hong Kong").
271 Press Release, Senator Jim DeMint, supra note 267.
272 As a technical matter, the advocates of these arguments might be referring to the
high VATs imposed by some countries as the "second" tax. However, such usage would be
misleading for several reasons: The context of the arguments usually conveys the impres-
sion that "double taxation" involves both countries imposing an income tax; whereas the
arguments generally focus on all of the income (including cost-of-living adjustments)
earned by the citizen, a VAT only applies to the amount of consumption in the foreign
country; and the arguments never mention the U.S. state sales and income taxes that a
citizen abroad avoids. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
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paid to the foreign government and thereby reduce his U.S. income
tax liability by a corresponding amount.2 73 Accordingly, even without
a foreign earned income exclusion, the United States' imposition of
tax generally does not result in a second layer of tax on the foreign
income of a citizen working abroad.
B. Tax Policy Principles Revisited
1. Equity
As discussed above, an important premise underlying equity
arguments is that U.S. citizens living abroad remain a part of U.S.
society and therefore should be included in allocating tax burdens
based on ability to pay. The ongoing connection with U.S. society is
often strongest in the case of a U.S. citizen raised in the United States
who is transferred abroad by a corporate employer. Even if the
assignment is open-ended with no fixed return date, these individuals
often maintain significant family and other personal contacts in the
United States and often intend to return to the United States once
their assignment is over. Moreover, several of the factors often
invoked for providing tax relief to citizens abroad, such as the high
cost of sending children to an "American" rather than local school, or
the cost of annual flights "home" to the United States, underscore the
ongoing societal connection of these individuals to the United
States.274 Accordingly, the equity-based arguments for taxing over-
seas citizens is often strongest in the typical fact pattern used to justify
the foreign earned income exclusion.
When applying principles of equity, it is important to acknowl-
edge that some citizens working abroad, whether in high- or low-
income tax jurisdictions, might face other costs in excess of those
faced by resident citizens such as costs of living higher than in many
areas of the United States or VATs greater than U.S. state sales
taxes.275 The same equity concerns discussed in Part III, however,
273 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
274 For example, a recent op-ed piece by Newt Gingrich and Ken Kies, which advocates
an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, refers to "'stranger in a strange land' assis-
tance that our employer[s] may provide (e.g., the cost of sending our kids to an English-
speaking school, or airfare for an annual trip home)." Gingrich & Kies, supra note 9.
275 Currency exchange controls might also be viewed as creating equity disparities to the
extent the citizen is paid in a foreign currency that is subject to significant restrictions. This
issue was raised during the legislative debates leading to the enactment of the current for-
eign earned income regime in 1981. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
96TH CONG., U.S. LAW AFFECrING AMERICANS LIVING AND WORKING ABROAD 21
(Comm. Print 1980) (describing issue); see also Sobel, supra note 70, at 108 (describing
case in which currency conversion to satisfy U.S. tax obligations exposed taxpayer to risk
of imprisonment in country of residence). However, there have been significant reductions
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apply in the present context of earned income.276 As with the earlier
analysis,277 it is difficult to generalize regarding these potential bur-
dens. For those incurring lower costs than individuals in the United
States, and even for many incurring higher costs abroad, an unlimited
foreign income exclusion might result in disproportionate tax savings.
To take a simplified example, consider a U.S. citizen living in the
United States and earning $300,000 as a corporate executive who pays
$90,000 of federal income taxes, leaving him with $210,000 after taxes.
If he were to move abroad to work in a no-income-tax jurisdiction and
there was an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, he would pay
no income tax. Accordingly, even if he were to incur up to $90,000 of
extra expenses and VAT abroad, he would still be better off finan-
cially living and working abroad. 278 To the extent his expenses abroad
were lower than those in the United States, his windfall would be that
much greater. For lower income taxpayers, the amount saved by
avoiding an income tax would be lower, and, consequently, there
would be fewer opportunities to incur additional expenses. Again, the
fact-dependent nature of the results indicates that an unlimited for-
eign earned income exclusion is difficult to justify on equity grounds.
An argument might be made that a limited foreign earned
income exclusion, such as that available under current law, might be
justifiable to the extent it results in tax savings that more closely
approximate the additional costs associated with working abroad.
While this approach might provide fewer extreme windfalls for very
high-earning citizens, it still suffers from unpredictable and selective
results. In particular, persons with lower expenses overseas, and even
those with moderately higher expenses overseas, might receive wind-
falls. More fundamentally, as discussed above, it may not be equitable
to give citizens living abroad tax benefits for higher expenses given
that citizens who move from a low-cost to a high-cost city within the
United States generally do not get to claim additional federal tax
benefits.
279
in currency exchange controls in the past decades, see ABA Task Force Report, supra note
1, at 657, thereby reducing the significance of this argument for many taxpayers.
276 The equity arguments might be weaker in the case of a citizen transferred abroad to
the extent his employer provides a tax equalization package, thereby relieving the citizen
of potentially higher taxes. See supra note 181.
277 See supra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (discussing burdens of higher living
expenses); supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (discussing burdens of foreign
VAT).
278 He might be able to incur even more than $90,000 in additional expenses and VAT to
the extent he is no longer subject to U.S. state taxes by moving abroad.
279 See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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A related argument concerns housing costs incurred by citizens
who move abroad for employment reasons. If housing costs are a sig-
nificant cost increase faced by citizens transferred abroad by their
employers, it might be argued that the May 2006 legislative changes,
which place a dollar cap on the housing cost exclusion,280 violate prin-
ciples of equity. Employers often provide additional compensation to
the employee to offset this increase in housing costs, 281 but that
housing allowance is included in gross income under general tax prin-
ciples. Accordingly, equity might suggest that the pre-2006 rules
should be reinstated, allowing an exclusion for all housing costs above
a relatively low floor.
As others have observed, the principal problem with an unlimited
housing cost exclusion is that it also violates equity principles by cre-
ating a tax benefit that is available only to citizens working abroad.2 8
2
For example, a person transferred to New York City from a lower-cost
U.S. city might receive a higher salary at the new location, in part to
compensate for the higher housing costs. The higher salary will be
included in the domestic taxpayer's income. Although the citizen
abroad might have his extra compensation for housing costs listed as a
separate part of his compensation package, the economic result is the
same as the person who moves to New York City. Thus, it is difficult
to justify a special tax benefit for the person moving abroad.
The one circumstance in which equity might support an exclusion
or deduction for housing costs is when the foreign housing costs are
significantly higher than those in the highest-cost city in the United
States. 28 3 In that situation, the citizen moving abroad incurs a disad-
vantage beyond any faced by a domestically based citizen. This situa-
tion, however, does not justify the pre-2006 unlimited housing cost
exclusion in excess of a relatively low floor. Rather, it would support
an exclusion only for the amount by which housing costs exceed the
costs in the most expensive U.S. housing market.284 The possibility of
280 See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
281 Equity arguments in favor of the citizen abroad are undermined to the extent that
the employer pays not only the extra housing cost amount, but also the tax with respect to
that amount.
282 See, e.g., Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1117 ("[S]uch an approach deviates
from horizontal equity for those domestic taxpayers living in areas of the United States
that have higher than average housing costs.").
283 Id.
284 Even this more restricted housing cost exclusion might not be warranted under
equity principles. If the concern is that the move abroad results in higher housing costs,
perhaps the equity comparison should be between the increase in housing costs, not the
absolute amount of the costs. For example, a person moving from New York City to a
higher-cost foreign city might receive a $20,000 allowance for the increased housing costs
and, under this more restricted housing cost exclusion (which would use New York City
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implementing a deduction for these expenses in lieu of a foreign
earned income exclusion is discussed in more detail in Part V.
Equity concerns might support one other criticism leveled against
the May 2006 legislative changes. As noted above, the recent legisla-
tion changes the way in which a person claiming the foreign earned
income exclusion calculates his tax liability with respect to his nonex-
cluded income.285 Prior to the 2006 legislation, the taxpayer simply
applied the regular tax rates to the taxable income that remained after
the exclusion. The 2006 legislation, in order to subject the remaining
income to higher progressive tax rates (and thereby generate higher
tax revenues), requires the taxpayer to calculate his tax liability as if
there were no exclusion, and then subtract the amount of tax liability
that would apply to the income that is excluded. In effect, this causes
the income that is included after application of the exclusion to be
taxed at the higher marginal rates that would have applied had no
earned income been excluded.
This so-called "exemption with progression" approach 286 might
be inequitable. In particular, to the extent that a limited exclusion is
warranted as a proxy for increased expenses, its purpose should be to
return the citizen's tax base to that which it would have been had he
remained in the United States. This is most evident in the simple case
where an individual claims an $80,000 foreign earned income exclu-
sion based on an $80,000 salary increase that his employer gives him
to offset the higher costs of living overseas. To the extent that
Congress believes that the foreign earned income exclusion is justified
on equity grounds, requiring this individual to apply higher marginal
tax rates to the remaining income (which is the same as his base
income before the foreign transfer) seems inappropriate.
This equity-based argument against exemption with progression
is subject to two significant limitations. First, the $82,400 cap on the
exclusion is itself an arbitrary number that does not necessarily guar-
antee equitable treatment with respect to extra expenses incurred
abroad. As noted above, some individuals will receive a windfall from
the provision, while others might not receive full relief. Thus, the new
exemption with progression method of calculating tax liability might
housing expenses as its floor, assuming it is the highest-cost U.S. market), could exclude
that full $20,000. However, a person moving from Springfield, Missouri to New York City
might experience an increase in housing costs even greater than that $20,000, most or all of
which might be reflected in a higher salary, yet he will not be able to exclude any portion
of his salary increase under the Code.
285 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
286 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109IH CONG., supra note 121, at 9 (discussing
exemption with progression in context of territorial tax systems).
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merely reflect an alternative way of tweaking an already arbitrary line
in a way that costs higher-bracket taxpayers more than it does lower-
bracket taxpayers. Under this view, it might be justified under vertical
equity principles as restoring a bit of progressivity to a flawed provi-
sion that generally benefits higher-income taxpayers-even if it does
so in a roundabout and complex way.
Second, equity principles may not be relevant. An equity-based
argument against exemption with progression is strongest when the
underlying provision itself is based on equity concerns. However, as
discussed above, the foreign earned income exclusion is difficult to
justify on equity grounds. To the extent the earned income exclusion
is based on other considerations, such as the "competitiveness" con-
cerns discussed in the next subpart,287 the use of exemption with pro-
gression seems justified to remove some of the benefit of an exclusion
that itself is not supported on equity grounds.
2. Neutrality
The neutrality concerns raised by an unlimited foreign earned
income exclusion-in particular, the possibility that a citizen might
establish residence abroad in a low-tax jurisdiction-are similar to
those that arose in the discussion of taxing citizens abroad in gen-
eral.288 These concerns, however, are somewhat less persuasive here
than they were in the general case. If foreign earned income (and not
investment income) is excluded from the tax base, a person would
seek tax benefits by moving abroad only if he is able to work effec-
tively outside the United States, whereas a termination of all citizen-
ship-based taxation would also allow retirees and others living off of
investment income to move abroad for tax purposes. Additional neu-
trality concerns surrounding a foreign earned income exclusion-in
particular, its effect on business decisions regarding the location of
jobs and the hiring of employees-arise in the more detailed discus-
sion of "competitiveness" arguments in Part IV.C, infra.
3. Compliance and Enforcement
As others have noted, a foreign earned income exclusion creates
administrative complexities, particularly with respect to the definition
of who is qualified to claim its benefits.289 Indeed, the early legislative
changes to the foreign earned income exclusion primarily focused on
287 See infra Part IV.C.
288 See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 111, at 1009 (describing complications regarding qualifi-
cations and exclusions).
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efforts to properly define the scope of eligible beneficiaries. 290 Even
today, both taxpayers and the IRS must often dedicate significant
administrative and legal resources to determinations of whether a U.S.
citizen is a "qualified individual" under section 911.291 The calcula-
tions necessary to determine the amount of the exclusion add addi-
tional complexity.
These administrative concerns, however, do not point toward a
single response. Some commentators suggest that the complications
arising from the need to define a qualified individual and calculate the
amount of the exclusion support the complete abandonment of the
foreign earned income exclusion.292 Of course, if the exclusion were
abandoned, citizens living abroad would be taxable on all of their
income, whether earned or from investments. On the other hand, as
discussed above, significant compliance and enforcement problems
exist with respect to citizens living abroad. 293 It could be argued that
the limited foreign earned income exclusion, as it currently exists,
might reduce some of these compliance and enforcement concerns by
eliminating the need for many citizens abroad-particularly those
with relatively modest incomes-to comply with (and for the IRS to
enforce) potentially complicated rules.
This argument, however, taken to its extreme, implies that the
United States should not tax any foreign income of a citizen abroad,
whether earned or from investments. After all, if no citizenship-based
taxation is imposed on foreign income, the only enforcement problem
the IRS would have to deal with would be answering the threshold
question of whether an individual qualifies as a nonresident. Of
course, such an approach would place even greater pressure on the
definition of who is a nonresident. In the end, concerns about
enforcement and compliance are ultimately subsumed within the
larger equity and efficiency considerations addressed in this Article, at
least as long as a reasonable expectation exists that whatever rules are
290 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
291 For example, individuals relying on the physical presence prong of the I.R.C.
§ 911(d) (West Supp. 2006) test must keep detailed records to ensure that they are present
in foreign countries for at least 330 full days during any consecutive twelve-month period,
while those relying on the bona fide resident test must often seek legal advice to determine
if this standard is satisfied. See Tobias M. Lederberg, The Qualified Individual Under
I. R. C. Section 911 (d) After Jones v. Commissioner: Rethinking Characteristics of Eligibility
for the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 143, 154-57 (1992) (noting
recordkeeping requirement of physical presence test and discussing vagueness of bona fide
resident test).
292 See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 111, at 1008-09 (arguing that complexity is one of three
principal reasons for repealing provision).
293 See supra Part III.A.3.
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As the preceding subpart demonstrates, many of the potential
justifications for a foreign earned income exclusion are similar to
those discussed and generally rejected in the context of using citizen-
ship as a basis to tax foreign income of citizens living abroad. Under
this analysis, there is no significant reason for taxing U.S. citizens
working abroad more favorably than those living on investment
income abroad.
This subpart considers the principal argument advanced for not
taxing the income earned by citizens working outside the United
States. According to this "competitiveness" argument, the tax burden
imposed on U.S. citizens overseas harms the ability of American busi-
ness to compete in the world economy, and therefore hurts the United
States as a whole. To the extent that proponents of this theory
acknowledge any equity, efficiency, or administration problems
arising from an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, 294 they
contend that such concerns are outweighed by the economic benefits
to the United States from the exclusion.295
These competitiveness arguments are not new. Indeed, they were
at the core of testimony supporting the original 1926 foreign earned
income exclusion. 296 The short-lived 1978 legislation, in eliminating
the foreign earned income exclusion and replacing it with deductions
for certain excess living costs abroad, moved closer to the equity prin-
ciples discussed previously.297 Acknowledging that it was driven by
294 Many proponents of the competitiveness argument would not necessarily concede
that a foreign earned income exclusion creates equity problems and, instead, would claim
that the absence of an exclusion creates unfairness for citizens abroad. See, e.g., Patton,
supra note 113, at 706-12 (citing examples of unfairness for citizens abroad resulting from
exceptions to foreign earned income exclusion). But see supra notes 275-82 and accompa-
nying text (rejecting claims of unfairness for citizens abroad, particularly in context of
unlimited foreign earned income exclusion).
295 See, e.g., Maiers, supra note 145, at 727 ("[T]he tax equity issue should not block the
approval of significant new tax incentives for Americans to work abroad where foreign
trade or other policy considerations warrant more favorable tax treatment.").
296 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
297 The 1978 provisions were criticized as being overly complex, and some argued that
they did not go far enough toward horizontal equity. See Postlewaite & Stern, supra note
79, at 1114-15 (stating that 1978 "deductions are an improvement over the flat exclusion
because they more accurately reflect costs actually incurred by the taxpayer," but asserting
that they continued to violate horizontal equity principles by "granting preferential treat-
ment to Americans abroad"); see also supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting
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competitiveness concerns, Congress made a quick about-face in 1981
and enacted a more generous exclusion and housing allowance than
had existed under the pre-1978 law.298
2. Effect of Modern Developments
The claim that taxing U.S. citizens overseas prevents American
businesses from competing effectively, and thus hurts the United
States, rests on several premises.2 99 As the following discussion
explains, to a large extent these premises are interdependent, so the
weakness of one might significantly undermine the general argument.
Commentators have recently suggested that modern develop-
ments in the global economy, in particular the increased mobility of
capital and labor, create an even stronger imperative than previously
existed for an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion based on
competitiveness concerns. 300 Accordingly, in discussing the premises
underlying competitiveness arguments, the following analysis pays
particular attention to the effects of these modern trends. The anal-
ysis concludes that, rather than strengthening the case for an unlim-
ited foreign earned income exclusion, these recent developments tend
to weaken that case.
a. Direct Effects on Citizens Abroad and U.S. Multinationals
Consider the case of a U.S.-based multinational corporation that
transfers a U.S.-based employee to a foreign country whose effective
tax rate is lower than the U.S. rate.301 In isolation, this transfer will
not result in any increased taxes for the citizen (assuming his base
that citizens in low-tax, high-cost jurisdictions were better off under 1978 legislation,
whereas those in low-tax, low-cost jurisdictions received fewer benefits).
298 See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 35-37 (1981) (describing changes and justifying them on
competitiveness grounds).
299 For example, the argument envisions a simplified view of an "American" company,
where benefits to the company result in benefits to the U.S. population as a whole. It also
rests on the premise that an increase in hiring of U.S. citizens abroad results in increases in
U.S. exports and the spread of goodwill toward the United States. For alternative formula-
tions of the premises underlying competitiveness arguments, see, for example, Gann, supra
note 70, at 62-63, and Sobel, supra note 70, at 113.
300 See, e.g., Gingrich & Kies, supra note 9 (arguing that recent limitations on foreign
earned income exclusion make U.S. companies less competitive in modern global
economy); Mitchell, supra note 9 (arguing that "[g]lobalization is sending tax rates tum-
bling across the world, as jobs and capital migrate across borders ... mak[ing] it all the
more imperative" to eliminate U.S. tax on citizens working abroad); The Tithes That Bind,
supra note 9, at 12-13 (claiming that economic advantages of international experience of
workers will be lost unless Congress eliminates taxes on citizens working abroad).
301 See S. REP. No. 97-144, at 35-36 (discussing alleged competitive disadvantage
resulting from need of U.S.-based multinationals to compensate U.S.-based employees for
higher costs of living abroad).
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salary remains the same) because he will continue to pay U.S. taxes on
his salary just as he did in the United States. However, a citizen
abroad might incur higher expenses for housing, children's education,
and other items when compared to what he would have paid in the
United States.30 2 Under these circumstances, the U.S. corporation
often compensates the citizen for the transfer, increasing his post-
transfer salary by an amount equal to the excess costs. 30 3 Under gen-
eral tax principles, this extra pay is itself subject to taxation, and the
corporation typically compensates the individual for this tax burden as
well. Thus, while advocates of competitiveness arguments often speak
broadly about the extra tax costs passed on to multinationals in the
absence of an earned income exclusion,30 4 in this basic overseas
transfer scenario the only direct additional tax-related cost to the
employer is the gross up with respect to the tax imposed on the reim-
bursement of excess housing, education, and other expenses. Neither
the amount of the extra expenses themselves nor the tax imposed on
the employee's base salary reflects additional taxes attributable to the
overseas transfer.305
At the margin, this might prevent some companies from transfer-
ring a U.S. citizen abroad even though, in the absence of this addi-
tional cost, business considerations might have justified it. However,
this marginal effect is further diminished to the extent the employer
can deduct this additional cost as a compensation expense. 30 6
At the other extreme, if the United States were to enact an
unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, not only would the tax on
excess expense reimbursements be eliminated, but the tax on the. base
salary itself would be eliminated as well. In effect, the exclusion
302 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
303 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN EARNED
INCOME EXCLUSION 9-10 (2005) (listing elements of typical compensation package for
married employees sent overseas).
304 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-144, at 35-36 ("[Because] the policy of these businesses is to
make their employees whole for any extra tax expenses the employees incur because of
overseas transfers[,] .. an extra tax cost to the employees becomes a cost to the business
.... ").
305 As a very simplified example, consider a U.S. employee with a base salary of
$200,000 who is transferred to a foreign country and incurs $30,000 of additional housing
and other expenses. In addition to the $200,000 base salary that the employer was already
paying the employee in the United States, the employer would pay an additional $45,000
(approximately, based on a thirty-three percent marginal rate) to compensate for the addi-
tional expenses plus the tax thereon. Thus, the employer would pay a total of $245,000 to
the employee abroad, but only $15,000 of this amount would be attributable to the United
States' taxation of the citizen abroad.
306 In the prior example, if the U.S. employer deducted the $15,000 additional expense,
its after-tax cost would be only $9750 (assuming a thirty-five percent marginal corporate
rate).
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would act as an indirect subsidy to employers transferring employees
abroad 307 because the corporation could pay the employee a signifi-
cantly lower (untaxed) salary outside the United States instead of a
higher (taxed) salary within the United States.308 As long as the for-
eign location's living expenses are comparable to, or even somewhat
higher than, U.S. expenses, the total compensation expenses of the
corporation will be lower if the employee moves abroad.30 9 Thus, an
unlimited foreign earned income exclusion might create a strong
incentive for U.S. corporations to move existing U.S.-based
employees to foreign locations, particularly those that impose low or
no income taxes. A limited exclusion, such as the one that currently
exists, might have similar effects, although the specific consequences
would depend on both the amount of the exclusion and the excess
foreign living expenses.
310
The foregoing critique of an unlimited foreign earned income
exclusion focuses on an existing employment relationship between a
corporation and a U.S. citizen in which the U.S. employee is trans-
ferred abroad. Given that U.S.-based companies frequently transfer
U.S.-citizen employees abroad under existing tax provisions-
including executives whose compensation significantly exceeds the
current foreign earned income exclusion-these transfers, and the
corresponding windfalls described above, should increase if an unlim-
ited foreign earned income exclusion were enacted.
307 See Peroni, supra note 111, at 1008 (noting that resulting distortion in location of
business operations violates capital export neutrality); see also Hale E. Sheppard, Perpetu-
ation of the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: U.S. International Tax Policy, Political
Reality, and the Necessity of Understanding How the Two Intertwine, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 727, 743-44 (2004) (discussing violations of capital export neutrality in this
context).
308 Alternatively, the corporation could continue to pay the same salary as before, effec-
tively conferring a significant after-tax pay increase on the employee and creating an incen-
tive to move to a foreign location.
309 Returning to the example in note 305, supra, where the employer pays a $200,000
base salary in the United States, the employee's after-tax income is approximately $150,000
(ignoring deductions). If the foreign earned income exclusion were unlimited, the
employer could transfer the employee abroad, pay him $150,000 of (untaxed) salary, plus
$30,000 for excess living expenses, and thereby incur only $180,000 of cost (rather than
$200,000 if the employee worked in the United States). The employer could share a por-
tion of this $20,000 savings with the employee as an inducement to move and would still
have lower costs after the transfer.
310 For example, under the pre-2006 law, with its unlimited housing cost exclusion
(above a relatively low floor) and $80,000 earned income exclusion, the citizen (and hence
the reimbursing corporation) would incur no additional tax-related expenses as long as the
nonhousing excess costs resulting from the transfer were less than $80,000 (regardless of
how high the housing costs were). To the extent the nonhousing excess costs were less than
$80,000, the exclusion would effectively offset a portion of the tax on the individual's base
salary.
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Proponents of competitiveness arguments do not focus only on
the transfer of existing U.S. employees abroad.311 They also posit a
situation in which the U.S.-based multinationa 3 12 is considering
whether to fill a new position in a low- or no-tax 313 foreign country
and whether to fill the position with a U.S. citizen or a noncitizen from
a third country. Because a U.S. citizen will be subject to U.S. income
tax, he will demand a higher salary than the noncitizen and, accord-
ingly, the corporation will hire the noncitizen.
314
Before addressing the alleged adverse consequences to the U.S.
economy that flow from this hypothetical hiring decision, it is impor-
tant to address the implicit assumptions underlying the argument.
315
The argument, by focusing on the U.S. tax regime as the determining
factor in this hiring decision, generally assumes that both individuals
are equally qualified and that both will demand similar after-tax com-
pensation. 316 If, instead, the noncitizen is better qualified and willing
to accept the same net salary as the U.S. citizen, or if he is equally
qualified and willing to accept a lower net salary, the company will
hire him regardless of the U.S. tax system. With the increasing availa-
bility of skilled workers from economically less developed coun-
tries,317 it is reasonable to assume that a significant number of
overseas positions might be filled by noncitizens, regardless of the
U.S. tax regime.
311 See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 307, at 743 (noting incompatibility of foreign earned
income exclusion with capital export neutrality).
312 The analysis does not necessarily require that the employer be a U.S. multinational,
but some aspects of the competitiveness argument discussed infra are stronger if it is a U.S.
company.
313 The competitiveness argument is less relevant when the U.S. citizen is working in a
country with an effective income tax rate in excess of the U.S. rate. In such circumstances,
the foreign tax credit generally will eliminate any residual U.S. tax, and both the U.S.
citizen and the noncitizen will be subject to the same tax in the host country.
314 For example, in the absence of a foreign earned income exclusion, a U.S. citizen
working in Saudi Arabia would be subject to significant U.S. income taxes, while a French
national working (and residing) in Saudi Arabia would not be subject to French income
taxes. Neither individual would be taxed by Saudi Arabia, as that country generally does
not impose income taxes on foreign nationals working there.
315 For example, Newt Gingrich and Ken Kies briefly acknowledge that their competi-
tiveness claims depend on "all things being equal." Gingrich & Kies, supra note 9.
316 Whereas the cost of living in a foreign country is an important factor for the equity
analysis, it is not directly relevant to this aspect of the competitiveness argument because
both the U.S. citizen and the noncitizen presumably will face the same costs in the foreign
country.
317 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY OF THE
HIGHLY SKILLED 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/20/1950028.pdf
(discussing prevalence of migration of highly skilled workers from developing countries to
OECD member states).
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At the other extreme, if the U.S. citizen is significantly better
qualified for the position than is the noncitizen, the company might
hire the citizen regardless of the extra cost of grossing up his U.S.
taxes. Given the significant number of U.S. citizens currently working
abroad for U.S. companies, it seems safe to assume that this situation
is common. It is not possible to know how many overseas hires of
U.S. citizens are economically viable only by reason of the limited for-
eign earned income exclusion, although it is reasonable to assume that
a significant number would continue to be employed in the future
even if the earned income exclusion were completely eliminated.
Accordingly, in many cases the assertion of citizenship-based tax-
ation and the existence of a foreign earned income exclusion are not
the deciding factors when a company considers whether to hire a
noncitizen rather than a U.S. citizen. Under such circumstances, reli-
ance on competitiveness-based arguments in support of an unlimited
foreign earned income exclusion is misplaced.
b. Direct Effects on U.S. Economy
Proponents of the competitiveness argument assert that, to the
extent citizenship-based taxation causes U.S. companies to hire nonci-
tizens instead of U.S. citizens, it will lead to a drop in U.S. exports.
This, in turn, will result in the loss of a significant number of manufac-
turing jobs in the United States. This was the principal argument in
favor of the original foreign earned income exclusion in 1926,318 and it
remains a principal argument today.
319
It is difficult to quantify to what extent, if any, citizenship-based
taxation reduces exports in this manner. Advocates often cite studies
prepared years ago that purport to demonstrate that a tax-induced
reduction in U.S. workers abroad would have a significant negative
impact on exports. 320 These studies, several of which were prepared
on behalf of business groups advocating an unlimited foreign earned
318 See 67 CONG. REc. 3782-83 (1926) (statement of Richard P. Momsen, president of
the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil) (discussing connection between foreign
earned income exclusion, U.S. exports, and domestic manufacturing); 1925 Ways & Means
Hearing, supra note 58, at 180 (statement of O.K. Davis) (same).
319 The argument is based on the assertion that "Americans are best at selling
America." Gingrich & Kies, supra note 9; see also 67 CONG. REC. 3782 (1926) (statement
of Richard P. Momsen) (describing same); 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 58, at
181-82 (statement of O.K. Davis) (same). However, as other commentators have noted,
this assertion is questionable. For example, in some circumstances a national of a foreign
country might be more effective at selling products in that market because he is more
familiar with the local language and customs. Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1122.
320 For example, the Gingrich & Kies op-ed piece cites a 1980 study by the Chase
Econometric Group and a 1995 study by PriceWaterhouse. Gingrich & Kies, supra note 9.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers issued an updated study in 2005, discussed infra note 323.
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income exclusion, have been critiqued elsewhere, with many articles
questioning both their methodology and conclusions.321 These criti-
ques generally conclude that while the elimination of the foreign
earned income exclusion might lead to some reduction in U.S.
exports, the studies fail to establish that any such reduction would be
significant.
322
Recent competitiveness arguments fail to reflect the significant
changes in the global economy that have occurred since most of these
studies were conducted.323 The traditional case for the foreign earned
income exclusion envisions a world of clearly delineated economic
functions and corporate structures, with U.S. companies employing
U.S. workers in the United States to manufacture tangible goods,
which U.S. citizen-salesmen abroad sell in foreign markets. 324 This
model was reflected in the legislative debate leading to the initial
enactment of the foreign earned income exclusion in 1926,325 as well
as in the legislative history of the current regime's enactment in
1981.326 However, as discussed in detail in Part II above, modern
321 See, e.g., Taxation of Foreign Earned Income: Hearing on S. 2283, S. 2321, and S.
2418 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the S. Comm.
on Finance, 96th Cong. 65-67 (1980) [hereinafter Hearing, Foreign Earned Income] (state-
ment of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy) (providing
detailed critique of Chase and other studies); Sobel, supra note 70, at 146-55 (analyzing
thoroughly several studies); Victor Thuronyi, A Critique of the Chase Study of the Tax
Treatment of U.S. Workers Overseas, 10 TAX NoTEs 979, 981 (1980) ("All that the Chase
study does is to run an assumed number through a computer model .... The study does
not, however, evaluate the soundness of the claim that our current tax rules cause a
decrease in exports."). A principal criticism of several studies is that they rely on self-
interested estimates by corporate executives regarding the potential negative impact on
exports.
322 See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 307, at 746 (claiming that although "[mlany studies
regarding the economic effects of the [exclusion] have been conducted by both govern-
mental agencies and the private sector," provision's effectiveness in increasing exports or
otherwise helping economy remains "unproven"); Sobel, supra note 70, at 146 ("[Nlo study
has linked these tax incentives definitively with the overseas presence of those expatriates
who influence and promote exports from the United States.").
323 This failure to account for modern developments is reflected in a recent study pre-
pared by PriceWaterhouseCoopers on behalf of several organizations representing U.S.
business interests overseas. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 303. The study con-
cludes that the repeal of the foreign earned income exclusion would reduce U.S. exports by
1.14%, resulting in the loss of 77,115 U.S. manufacturing jobs. Id. at 24 tbl.III.4. However,
the study's underlying calculations regarding the sensitivity of U.S. exports to changes in
overseas compensation levels are based on export data originally collected more than 30
years ago. See id. at 17, 24 tbl.III.4 n.1. Because of the significant changes in the global
economy in the last quarter century, this old data has limited applicability today. See infra
notes 327-31 and accompanying text.
324 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
326 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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developments in the global economy undermine the usefulness of this
traditional model in analyzing tax policy.
In a world where a U.S.-based multinational corporation's
"[m]anufacturing is performed at multiple [worldwide] locations,
using related or unrelated vendors and employing just-in-time inven-
tory and modern logistics," 32 7 the activities of a U.S. citizen employed
in a foreign country by a U.S. corporation may result in relatively little
direct economic benefit to the United States. For example, a signifi-
cant number of products branded as "American" are being manufac-
tured in foreign countries32 8 due to the availability of lower real labor
costs overseas, lowered trade barriers, "faster and cheaper transporta-
tion of goods, ' 329 and other factors unrelated to citizenship-based tax-
ation.330 Thus, the prototypical U.S. citizen-salesman's activities
abroad might result in the sale of goods manufactured by a foreign
subsidiary of the company (or an unrelated foreign vendor) in a for-
eign country. Indeed, a U.S. citizen-employee acting in an executive
position abroad (and receiving the benefits of the foreign earned
income exclusion) might be supervising a manufacturing operation in
a foreign country. Not only will the overseas sales of that operation
not directly benefit the U.S. economy, but its sales into the U.S.
market might displace competing products actually manufactured in
the United States.
331
Moreover, the fact that overseas employment may result in addi-
tional profits to an "American" company does not necessarily equate
to a direct economic benefit to the U.S. economy. As the ABA Task
Force Report noted in the context of international tax reform gener-
ally, "the fact that a policy may advance ... the interests of U.S. cor-
porations.., should not be determinative unless there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that individual U.S. citizens and residents will realize
327 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 658.
328 For example, Black & Decker, an "American" brand of power tools, has manufac-
turing operations in eleven countries. Black & Decker, Company Overview, http://www.ir
.bdk.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=100780&p=IRol-IRHome (last visited Jan. 2, 2007); see also
Interview by Frontline with Ray Bracy, Vice President for Fed. and Int'l Pub. Affairs, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (Sept. 17, 2004), available at http://pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
walmart/interviewslbracy.html (discussing Black & Decker's manufacture of products in
China for sale at Wal-Mart stores in United States).
329 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 657.
330 The overseas production might, in part, be due to U.S. tax considerations other than
citizenship-based taxation. See, e.g., id. at 705 (citing studies showing that business tax
rules affect production location decision).
331 This concern was raised in the 1981 legislative hearings. See Hearing, Foreign Earned
Income, supra note 321, at 68 (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy); Thuronyi, supra note 321, at 982, reprinted in Hearing, Foreign
Earned Income, supra note 321, at 197.
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a benefit in relation to overall costs. '332 Well-advised multinational
companies with business operations abroad generally conduct those
activities through foreign subsidiaries, thereby deferring U.S. taxation
until a (possibly distant) future time when those earnings are repatri-
ated. 333 A U.S. company's profits derived from a U.S. citizen-
employee abroad may provide little direct benefit to persons in the
United States.
334
Finally, it is important to consider other negative effects that an
unlimited earned income exclusion might have on the U.S. economy.
For example, some consultants and other service providers might have
flexibility with respect to the location where they perform services.
While such people might generally prefer to live in the United States,
an unlimited earned income exclusion might entice them to move
abroad. As a practical matter, by establishing residence outside the
United States, these citizens might receive up to a fifty percent after-
tax increase in income by reason of the exclusion. 335 If significant
numbers of individuals relocated under these circumstances, the loss
of their buying power, and the jobs of those who support them, might
have significant negative implications for the U.S. economy.
This analysis does not claim that the employment of U.S. citizens
abroad has no direct positive impact on the U.S. economy, nor does it
purport to quantify the extent of any such impact. However, it does
assert that the competitiveness argument oversimplifies the case for
such an effect and that recent developments in the global economy
suggest that the argument is even less persuasive than it was when
332 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 660 n.20.
333 See id. at 663 ("[Tlaxpayers that earn low-tax foreign income can benefit from
deferral of the imposition of the higher U.S. rate through use of foreign corporations that
avoid the anti-deferral rules of current law."). This factor significantly undermines a recent
op-ed piece by a leading advocate of an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, which
asserted that with an unlimited exclusion "American companies would create more jobs
and boost their exports-and most likely end up paying more in taxes as a result of their
improved economic performance." Mitchell, supra note 9.
334 Of course, that U.S. citizen-employee, as well as his family, will benefit from his
employment abroad. Eventually, the citizen and his family might repatriate that money to
the United States, spending it to support the U.S. economy. However, this is a very indi-
rect effect on the economy, a far cry from the direct effects promised by advocates of the
exclusion. Moreover, given the possible delay in repatriating the earnings to the United
States while residing and working abroad, the individual's receipt of salary might have a
much more direct impact on the U.S. economy if he were employed in the United States-
even if he held a lower-paying job.
335 For example, a person with $300,000 of income in the United States would pay
(approximately) $90,000 of federal income tax, leaving him with $210,000 of after-tax
income. By moving abroad and utilizing an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion,
that person's after-tax income would increase from $210,000 to $300,000, a forty-three per-
cent increase. This simple example assumes that all other factors, such as level of income
and cost of living, remain the same.
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Congress last relied on it a quarter century ago. To the extent an
unlimited foreign earned income exclusion would help the U.S.
economy through increases in U.S. exports, it is important to balance
any such benefits against the likelihood that it would encourage U.S.
companies to transfer some employees abroad or independent service
providers to move abroad.
c. Secondary Effects on Trade
Proponents of the competitiveness arguments also predict that an
unlimited foreign earned income exclusion would produce a secon-
dary benefit for the U.S. economy.336 U.S. citizens abroad, it is
argued, have a tendency to buy "American" products, both for their
business operations and for their personal use. Thus, U.S. exports will
increase to the extent that an unlimited exclusion encourages multina-
tional corporations to hire U.S. citizens instead of noncitizens to fill an
overseas position. As with the prior argument, this assertion also
dates back to the debate over the 1926 legislation, where a proponent
of an unlimited exclusion noted that U.S. citizens abroad have a "ten-
dency .. to get what supplies they use from the United States. ' 337
Just as recent developments in the global economy weaken the
argument regarding the foreign earned income exclusion's direct
effect on trade, they also undermine this secondary effect. 338 For
example, as discussed above, the purchase of a product branded as
"American" does not necessarily benefit the U.S. economy, particu-
larly if the product is manufactured outside the United States.339
336 See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 151, at 61 ("It has been represented to
us that many overseas Americans occupy positions in which they are well placed to influ-
ence procurement decisions for millions of dollars of goods and services. In these positions
they are said to favor American suppliers ....").
337 1925 Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 58, at 183 (statement of O.K. Davis, NF[C
representative). Davis acknowledged that this was a "very minor" proposition compared
to his principal argument regarding the direct effect on trade. Id. This argument has also
been made in more recent congressional testimony. See Hearing, U.S. Citizens Overseas,
supra note 112, at 83-84 (statement of Peter Alegi, Chair, Federated League of Americans
Around the Globe) (arguing that employees of all nationalities seek first to buy goods
from their home countries).
338 For a skeptical view of this argument at the time of the last major legislative debate
on this issue, see Kingson, supra note 15, at 738. Kingson writes that "as to the expatriates
I know, preference for American goods is rather difficult to infer from their clothes,
watches, and cars."
339 See, e.g., Interview by Frontline with Ray Bracy, supra note 328 (giving Black &
Decker as example of "American" manufacturer that builds its products in China for sale
in United States). This example is particularly apt considering that a commentator criti-
cizing this secondary effect argument in 1981 was, at that time, at least willing to concede
that the argument might be valid with respect to "electric saws." Kingson, supra note 15,
at 738.
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Moreover, U.S. citizens abroad might be less committed to buying
"American" goods for personal use than they were in prior
decades.340 After all, even citizens living within the United States are
exposed to an increasing supply of foreign products.
341
This effect also might have decreased in recent decades with
respect to purchases for business operations.342 The assertion assumes
that the person making the purchasing decision has only limited infor-
mation about, or access to, supplies or inputs manufactured else-
where, or that the U.S. citizen will purchase the American product
notwithstanding a better quality-adjusted price for the non-American
product. However, in an era of improved information and price com-
petition, the strength of this argument has likely diminished.
Finally, this focus on purchases by U.S. citizens overseas ignores
an important offsetting effect. To the extent a foreign earned income
exclusion encourages U.S. companies to transfer existing U.S. citizen-
employees abroad,343 those citizens who previously purchased a signif-
icant amount of U.S.-produced goods while living in the United States
might shift their buying patterns to incorporate at least some addi-
tional foreign-produced goods (with a corresponding reduction in U.S.
products) once they are transferred overseas.
d. Ambassador Role
A final assertion is that citizens living abroad act as goodwill
ambassadors for the United States, spreading American values and
culture, and that an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion will
enable more Americans to play this role. Although this is not neces-
sarily an economic argument,344 it often is included within general
competitiveness arguments in favor of the exclusion. 345
340 Of course, some citizens abroad will continue to prefer to purchase American prod-
ucts, at least on a periodic basis. For example, an online "Foreign Buyers' Club" enables
U.S. citizens living in Japan to purchase "[flood and [fgun from home." Foreign Buyers'
Club, http://www.fbcusa.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
341 For example, it has been estimated that Wal-Mart, the United States' largest retailer,
derives more than fifty percent of its nongrocery sales from imported products. See Inter-
view by Online Visitors with Hedrick Smith, Senior Producer, Frontline, on
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Nov. 17, 2004), http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A45855-2004Nov12.html (estimating that imports have "accelerated dramatically" since
death of founder Sam Walton in 1992).
342 But see Sobel, supra note 70, at 114-15 (citing study indicating that citizens overseas
were more likely to buy "American made equipment for their projects").
343 See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
344 This ambassador role arguably could have indirect economic effects if the positive
image conveyed by these citizens encourages persons abroad to purchase more U.S. goods.
345 See, e.g., AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD INITIATIVE 15 (2005),
available at http://www.aca.ch/levelpl.pdf ("Overseas employees of American business are
seen as representatives of our country. Through their participation and visibility in inter-
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Although this argument might once have had some validity, its
current applicability is much weaker. In the early part of the twen-
tieth century, a U.S. citizen living in a foreign country might have rep-
resented one of the few contacts that nationals of a foreign country
had with the United States. However, in the modern world of satellite
television, the Internet, and widespread dissemination of U.S. movies,
music, fast food chains, and other products, nationals of other coun-
tries have significant exposure to American culture on a scale
unimaginable at the time the foreign earned income exclusion was
first enacted.
Of course, not all of this exposure to American culture produces
a favorable view in foreign countries, and it could be argued that
having U.S. citizens "on the ground" might dispel any negative
impressions. Two considerations weaken this argument. First, not all
citizens abroad will foster a positive image of the United States.
346
Second, U.S. citizens living in some countries tend to live and socialize
primarily among other U.S. persons, rather than the local population,
for safety or other reasons.347 Ironically, these countries are often the
places most in need of cultural ambassadors providing a positive U.S.
image, and some are the jurisdictions in which U.S. citizens most
strongly advocate an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion.
348
Another possible argument is that broader foreign policy goals
support an unlimited exclusion. One commentator has suggested that
"key senators and a high Administration official" wanted to increase
tax benefits for citizens overseas in the late 1970s to encourage
Americans to stay in Iran.349 Similarly, the exposure to foreign cul-
tures and foreign languages might benefit the country once the citizen
national business affairs, they can function as goodwill ambassadors whose work exempli-
fies America's ideals and values."); see also Sobel, supra note 70, at 113 (citing assertion
that "a greater number of Americans abroad generates greater international understanding
and goodwill").
346 See Sheppard, supra note 307, at 748-49 (citing examples of U.S. citizens abroad
creating unfavorable impression of United States); see also Sobel, supra note 70, at 114
("[O]n occasion the American presence overseas has been viewed as neocolonial with the
perception of exploitation of the local population.").
347 See, e.g., Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 131 (strongly urging Americans in
Saudi Arabia to stay in secure housing compounds with "hardened security perimeter");
Karen Lowry Miller, The Gilded Cities Club, NEWSWEEK (Int'l Ed.), July 3, 2006/July 10,
2006, at 68 (stating that in many countries "expats and locals run in circles so different that
the foreigners endure their own pockets of inflation"). Ironically, the need to live in
higher-priced communities tailored to the lifestyle of expatriates, rather than in lower-
priced accommodations among the local population, is one of the factors cited by advo-
cates of an unlimited housing cost exclusion. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
348 See supra note 131.
349 Kingson, supra note 15, at 738.
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returns to the United States.350 To the extent that these assertions are
correct, a broad, across-the-board foreign earned income exclusion,
which provides benefits regardless of the foreign country in which citi-
zens reside, is still a very inexact and inefficient way to achieve the
desired results.
As a final note, to the extent a person's contribution to the com-
munity is relevant, a person who remains in the United States might
make a greater contribution than those living abroad.351 For example,
citizens in the United States might participate in local volunteer orga-
nizations, financially support local charities, or make other efforts to
improve life in the United States. Of course, the magnitude of this
difference is not close to that envisioned by legislators enacting the
Civil War-era income taxes who sought to penalize citizens living
abroad for evading their military and other obligations to the
country.352 Nonetheless, this factor undermines arguments in favor of
an earned income exclusion that are based solely on overseas citizens'
limited role as goodwill ambassadors.
V
LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS
This Part briefly summarizes the legislative proposals that flow
from the foregoing analysis.353 It is important that Congress, in
adopting legislation in this area, avoid making last-minute, retroactive
changes as it did in May 2006. While retroactive tax legislation is
sometimes appropriate, 354 it is difficult to justify the retroactive
removal of an intended tax benefit almost halfway through the tax
year. Accordingly, any change to the foreign earned income exclusion
should be done prospectively only.
A. Elimination of Foreign Earned Income Exclusion
As demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, modern developments
strengthen the case for taxing the income of citizens abroad under
traditional equity concerns, as well as under neutrality and benefits
350 For example, reports suggest that U.S. security agencies are in need of additional
Arabic speakers. See Dan Ephron, Smart, Skilled, Shut Out, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 2006, at
28 (noting dearth of Arabic speakers among Department of Homeland Security recruits).
351 A lack of contribution to the domestic community was cited during the 1894 debates
as a justification for taxing citizens living abroad. See supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
352 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
353 Some of these suggestions were previously mentioned in the context of the analysis
in Parts III and IV, supra.
354 Cf United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32 (1994) (upholding legislation that retro-
actively closed unintended loophole in estate tax).
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principles. Additionally, recent developments in the global economy
significantly weaken the "competitiveness" arguments that have been
used to justify special treatment of foreign earned income for the past
eighty years. Accordingly, the foreign earned income exclusion
should be eliminated because there is no convincing policy reason for
allowing citizens working abroad to exclude all or a portion of their
income merely because it is earned outside the United States. As the
ABA Task Force Report observed, "To justify lower U.S. tax on for-
eign income, an overriding benefit should be expected or a more
important objective specified.
'355
If the foreign earned income exclusion is eliminated, compliance
and enforcement concerns support simplifying the rules for claiming a
foreign tax credit. Currently, taxpayers whose entire foreign income
is sheltered by the foreign earned income exclusion need not rely on
the foreign tax credit. However, in the absence of the exclusion, more
citizens residing abroad will utilize the credit to avoid double taxation.
Under current law, the rules for claiming the credit are complicated
due to limitations aimed at preventing potential abuses. 356 Just as it
enacted simplified rules for claiming the foreign tax credit when an
individual pays only a limited amount of foreign taxes on investment
income, 357 Congress could simplify the rules for a citizen working
abroad whose foreign earned income and foreign investment income
are below a threshold level.
358
B. Equity-Based Relief
While earlier analysis suggested that equity might justify pro-
viding deductions for specific excess costs incurred by citizens (instead
of a broad foreign earned income exclusion), 359 the mere fact that
expenses are higher overseas does not necessarily justify relief. The
concern is most easily illustrated by the case of a U.S. citizen who
accepts long-term work in a high-cost foreign jurisdiction as an
355 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 679.
356 See I.R.C. § 904 (West Supp. 2006) (setting forth limitations on claiming foreign tax
credit). Although these limitations were simplified by the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 402-404, 118 Stat. 1418, 1491-97 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 535, 864, 904 (West 2004)), they still can be complicated.
357 See I.R.C. § 9040) (eliminating foreign tax credit limitation if individual paid less
than $300 of foreign taxes, or $600 in case of joint return, and certain other requirements
are satisfied).
358 See Graetz, supra note 12, at 335 (mentioning briefly that simplified foreign tax
credit might be appropriate for citizens with foreign earned income).
359 See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
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independent consultant.360 In accepting a job in a location where the
living costs will be higher, the citizen presumably expects that any
increase in his living costs will be offset by an increase in his compen-
sation. Under such circumstances, when the additional compensation
more than offsets the additional living expenses, equity does not
require tax relief.
361
To the extent Congress seeks to enact equity-based relief notwith-
standing the preceding arguments, the relief should be narrowly
targeted. The short-lived 1978 legislation adopted an equity-based
approach by allowing deductions in specific areas where citizens
abroad were considered to be disadvantaged. 362 However, as the
above analysis indicates, several deductions permitted by the 1978 Act
were overly broad and are particularly difficult to justify today. For
example, many citizens who are raised in one part of the United States
move to another part of the country for employment reasons, and yet
they are not allowed to deduct the cost of periodic visits "home. '3
63
Similarly, a significant number of citizens in the United States pay pri-
vate school tuition for the elementary and secondary education of
their children, 364 and yet they generally are not allowed to deduct the
cost of that tuition. It is difficult to justify deductions for home travel
or private school tuition incurred by citizens living abroad when a sig-
nificant number of citizens in the United States do not get deductions
for similar expenses.
Some commentators have suggested that these deductions might
be targeted to allow deductions only for an "excess" above a U.S.
baseline. 365 For example, home travel expenses might be deductible
only to the extent they exceed the cost of the longest flight possible in
360 Similar principles apply when a corporation employs a U.S. citizen abroad and pays
him additional amounts to compensate for the higher costs.
361 Conceptually, an argument can be made that his extra living costs should be consid-
ered a business expense. However, such an argument goes against the general approach of
the Code, which treats housing and living expenses as nondeductible personal expenses.
Cf. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000) (allowing deduction for travel away from home for temporary
periods).
362 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
363 It might be argued that the home travel expenses are higher for citizens living
abroad. While this may be true in many circumstances, it will not be true in others. For
example, it often is less expensive to fly between a major foreign city and a major U.S. city
than it is to fly between two smaller market cities in the United States. See Postlewaite &
Stern, supra note 79, at 1118 (noting in this context that "[r]ound trip air fare in the United
States from coast to coast ... is greater than that from Washington to London").
364 See supra note 187. While many private schools in the United States are less expen-
sive than private "American" schools abroad, some domestic private schools, particularly
in large cities, might be more expensive.
365 See, e.g., Postlewaite & Stern, supra note 79, at 1118 (suggesting deduction only for
"the excess of the actual travel costs over a 'base' United States air fare").
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the United States. 366 Such an approach, however, might be extremely
difficult to apply in practice, particularly with the ever-changing price
structure of modern air travel. 367 Moreover, for the reasons discussed
above, the mere fact that citizens abroad incur expenses in excess of
those incurred in the United States does not necessarily justify a tax
benefit.368 Accordingly, such a deduction is difficult to justify today.
Although horizontal equity does not support a deduction for for-
eign private school tuition, it does suggest that citizens living abroad
should be entitled to similar education-related benefits as citizens
living in the United States. The most relevant benefit might be
Coverdell Education Savings Accounts, 369 often a key concern of citi-
zens abroad. Although the IRS has not issued explicit guidance, the
language of the statute suggests that excludable distributions can be
made only for primary and secondary schools within the United
States.370 To the extent it would be consistent with administration and
enforcement concerns, this provision should be extended (either
administratively or through legislation) to citizens abroad who send
their children to foreign primary and secondary schools.
Excess housing and other cost-of-living expenses might provide
another case for relief. The 1978 legislation treated these two items
separately, providing separate deductions for each. However, this
separate treatment of housing and other costs can itself lead to inequi-
table windfalls. Consider, for example, a citizen living in a foreign
location with relatively low general costs but high housing costs.
366 Postlewaite and Stern provide the example of a flight from Honolulu to New York.
Id. at 1118 n.122. Similarly, they suggest a citizen abroad might be allowed a deduction for
private school tuition to the extent it exceeds a baseline amount of U.S. property taxes
because citizens in the United States pay for public school education through property
taxes. Id. at 1117-18. However, citizens in the United States who send their children to
private schools in the United States are not allowed to reduce their nondeductible private
school tuition by the amount of state property taxes. Accordingly, horizontal equity does
not support the deduction for citizens abroad, even if it were reduced by a baseline prop-
erty tax amount.
367 Postlewaite and Stern made their proposal in 1979, before the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.), was fully implemented. Today, particularly with the increased use of the
Internet, airline ticket prices fluctuate frequently and significantly, and do not necessarily
correspond to the distance of the flight.
368 See supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
369 See I.R.C. § 530 (West Supp. 2006) (allowing savings to accumulate and be distrib-
uted tax-free for primary and secondary school education).
370 In particular, for purposes of primary and secondary education, the term "school" is
defined by reference to "State law." § 530(b)(3)(B). The statute uses different language to
define eligible higher education institutions, which the IRS has acknowledged can apply to
certain foreign colleges and universities that participate in the Federal Student Aid pro-
gram. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL'N No. 970, TAX
BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION 40 (2005).
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When the two items are separated, the citizen would not be eligible to
claim a deduction for the general cost of living, but he might qualify
for the excess housing cost deduction, even though the overall costs
are not significantly different from the comparable overall costs in the
United States. Accordingly, any potential equity-based relief for high
living expenses should treat housing as an integrated component of
overall costs.
As discussed earlier, 371 horizontal equity supports a deduction 372
only to the extent the costs of living overseas exceed the costs in the
most expensive city in the United States. Even within this framework,
equity considerations might require additional refinements. Different
citizens moving to a foreign location might have widely different
expenses. For example, a high-income person might rent a large,
expensive house, while a lower-income person might rent a small
apartment. In some circumstances the lower-income person might
incur a larger actual increase in housing costs by moving abroad than
does the higher-income person. 373 Thus, a wide range of approaches
could be adopted to calculate the amount of a deduction for excess
costs. For example, the deduction might equal the excess of actual
costs in the foreign location over the average costs in the highest-cost
U.S. city. Alternatively, in the case of a highly compensated execu-
tive, it might equal the excess of actual costs in the foreign location
over the average cost in a more upscale neighborhood in the highest-
cost U.S. city. As these examples demonstrate, efforts to refine the
definition of "excess" costs for equity purposes might add significant
complexity to the provision.
Ultimately, both equity and administration concerns favor a cal-
culation where both the floor and the ceiling for cost-of-living deduc-
371 See supra note 283-284 and accompanying text. While concerns about deducting
foreign housing costs often arise in the context of a citizen performing personal services
abroad, because this proposal is grounded in equity (rather than competitiveness) con-
cerns, it might apply equally to a citizen residing abroad but not receiving earned income
from work. However, as a practical matter this would be relevant primarily in a low-tax,
high-cost location, and, for political reasons, Congress might be reluctant to provide any
tax benefit for a person who could afford to live in such a location without working. More-
over, a person's move abroad for work purposes might be viewed as having at least some
element of involuntariness, particularly when an employee already working for a company
in the United States is transferred abroad (although, ultimately, an employee who does not
want the foreign transfer retains the right to decline the transfer and look for another job
in the United States).
372 This benefit could be structured as either a deduction or, if attributable to amounts
from an employer, as an exclusion.
373 For example, in some places the choice of available American-style housing might be
limited, in which case the high- and low-income employee might live in similar housing. To
the extent this housing is relatively expensive, the lower-income person will have a larger
increase in housing costs.
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tions are based on indices. 374 For example, a citizen satisfying a
foreign residence test could deduct the excess, if any, of the average
(or, if lower, the actual) cost of living in the foreign location 375 over
the average cost of living in the highest-cost U.S. city.376 The averages
in the foreign city could be based on the average cost of living for an
"American" lifestyle, 377 rather than a local lifestyle. If the average
cost in the foreign city were lower than that in the highest-cost U.S.
city, no deduction would be allowed.
Under such an approach, a person living in higher-than-average
housing in the foreign jurisdiction might not be able to deduct a signif-
icant portion of his expenses. However, this result does not necessa-
rily violate the equity concerns underlying the deduction. After all,
the choice to rent a more expensive house is, to a large extent, a per-
sonal decision, and the Code generally does not allow deductions for
personal expenditures. This approach accounts for a basic cost-of-
living increase attributable to an average "American" lifestyle in the
foreign location, but it does not provide for a benefit beyond that.
Moreover, by capping the deduction, this approach prevents
374 The 2006 amendments to the section 911 housing cost amount exclusion also rely on
indices. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. There are, however, several differ-
ences between the 2006 amendments and the proposal described above. Unlike the 2006
amendments, the proposal would incorporate both housing costs and other costs of living,
and the particular indices used in the proposed approach might differ from those used in
the 2006 amendments. As a general note, the amendments are more favorable than the
proposed approach because they take into consideration the actual housing costs up to
$24,720 (30% X $82,400) before subtracting the floor amount--even if the average costs in
the foreign jurisdiction are less than $24,720. See supra note 89. Moreover, the amend-
ments, in adjusting for foreign costs, refer generally to "costs in the United States," see
I.R.C. § 911(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2006), whereas the proposal focuses on the highest-cost
U.S. city.
375 Such an average could be based on the cost of living for an "American" lifestyle,
rather than a local lifestyle.
376 This need not necessarily be the average cost for the entire U.S. city. Rather, it could
be the average cost in the city for a typical professional who is likely to be transferred
abroad. The housing cost exclusion floor under pre-2006 law (which was based on sixteen
percent of a GS-14 government employee's salary) might serve as a model for the housing
component of the cost-of-living calculation. See I.R.C. § 911(c)(1)(B). Because this floor
is intended to achieve only rough equity, it is important that any such calculation (or tables
published by the IRS) be relatively easy to utilize. Although it would add complexity, the
calculations could take family size into account.
377 Admittedly, this is an inexact standard. The housing cost component might, for
example, be based on the living cost and quarters allowances for a particular level of State
Department employee. See U.S. Dep't of State, Quarterly Report Indexes, http://www
.state.gov/m/a/als/qtrpt/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2006) (explaining quarterly allowance calcula-
tions); see also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing recent IRS guidance
on foreign housing cost expenses that relies on this State Department data).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 82:443
TAXING CITIZENS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
employers and employees from shifting a disproportionate amount of
the overall compensation package into high-end housing.
378
A final equity concern involves the calculation of tax on the
income that is subject to tax. As discussed above,379 an "exemption
with progression" approach is difficult to justify to the extent income
is excluded or deducted on equity grounds. For example, to the extent
a citizen abroad is allowed to deduct excess costs of living under the
equity-based proposal discussed above, that deducted amount should
not be added back in order to push the taxpayer into a higher mar-
ginal tax bracket for the remaining income. After all, the purpose of
such a cost-of-living deduction would be to place the taxpayer in
approximately the same tax position as a comparably situated citizen
in the United States. For similar reasons, any amount that is deducted
or excluded based on equity concerns should not be added back into
income for purposes of determining whether the taxpayer qualifies for
other tax code benefits that are subject to income-based phaseouts.380
CONCLUSION
The tax treatment of overseas citizens in the past century and a
half reflects changing perceptions of citizens abroad and their rela-
tionship with the United States, as well as the changing role of the
United States in world economic affairs. During the Civil War, when
citizens abroad were viewed as skulkers evading their civic duties,
Congress adopted a punitive approach. In contrast, for the past eighty
years Congress has viewed citizens abroad as vital economic emissa-
ries of the United States and has excluded significant amounts of their
foreign earned income from taxation. Recently, representatives of
overseas citizens groups and business interests have called for the
elimination of all citizenship-based taxation, 381 claiming that the
modern global economy necessitates its abandonment.
378 While the "lavish or extravagant" standard in the current version of section 911(c)(3)
might prevent egregious abuses, it is much more difficult to enforce than a dollar cap.
379 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
380 For example, contributions to Coverdell Education Savings Accounts are deductible
only to the extent a taxpayer's "modified adjusted gross income" does not exceed certain
levels. I.R.C. § 530(c)(1) (West Supp. 2006). Under current law, the "modified adjusted
gross income" includes any amount excluded under the foreign earned income exclusion
provisions. I.R.C. § 530(c)(2). Because the current foreign earned income exclusion is not
necessarily based on equity principles, the current add-back is not objectionable. For a list
of current-law tax benefits whose phaseout provisions require an add-back of the foreign
earned income exclusion, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 303, at 4.
381 While some advocate a complete elimination of citizenship-based taxation, others
only recommend the elimination of tax on foreign earned income. See supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text.
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This Article refutes this most recent argument, concluding that
changes in business practices and technology strengthen, rather than
weaken, the case for taxing citizens abroad. It also demonstrates that
these modern developments significantly undermine the eighty-year-
old competitiveness arguments advanced for the broad exclusion of
foreign earned income. The Article does not advocate, however, a
return to the punitive approach of the Civil War era. Instead, it sug-
gests a more measured middle ground, where citizens abroad are
treated in a similar manner to those living in the United States. In a
few limited situations, this equity focus might justify narrowly targeted
benefits for overseas citizens.
More generally, this Article demonstrates that Congress, in eval-
uating a tax provision, must consider the changing environment in
which the statute applies. As Professor Seligman observed more than
a century ago, "A system of taxation ... which may have been per-
fectly just under.., older and simpler conditions, may now be entirely
inadequate because of the failure of government to take account
of... new complications .... "382 Given that the competitiveness
arguments advanced by proponents of the foreign earned income
exclusion were not necessarily convincing before the modern develop-
ments of the past few decades, perhaps this Article demonstrates a
corollary to Professor Seligman's observation: A system of
(non)taxation that was not necessarily just under older conditions may
now be entirely inadequate because of the failure of government to
take account of new developments.
382 SELIGMAN, supra note 43, at 99.
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